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Abstract
Effective and efficient strategic decision making is the backbone for the success of
a business organisation among its competitors in a particular industry. The results
of these decision making processes determine whether the business will continue to
survive or not. In this thesis, fuzzy logic (FL) concepts and game theory are being used
to model strategic decision making processes in business organisations. We generally
modelled competition by business organisations in industries as games where each
business organization is a player. A player formulates his own decisions by making
strategic moves based on uncertain information he has gained about the opponents.
This information relates to prevailing market demand, cost of production, marketing,
consolidation efforts and other business variables. This uncertain information is being
modelled using the concept of fuzzy logic.
In this thesis, simulation experiments were run and results obtained in six different
settings. The first experiment addresses the payoff of the fuzzy player in a typical
duopoly system. The second analyses payoff in an n-player game which was used
to model a perfect market competition with many players. It is an extension of the
two-player game of a duopoly market which we considered in the first experiment.
The third experiment used and analysed real data of companies in a case study. Here,
we chose the competition between Coca-cola and PepsiCo companies who are major
players in the beverage industry. Data were extracted from their published finan-
cial statements to validate our experiment. In the fourth experiment, we modelled
competition in business networks with uncertain information and varying level of
connectivity. We varied the level of interconnections (connectivity) among business
units in the business networks and investigated how missing links affect the payoffs
of players on the networks.
We used the fifth experiment to model business competition as games on boards with
possible constraints or restrictions and varying level of connectivity on the boards.
We also investigated this for games with uncertain information. We varied the level of
interconnections (connectivity) among the nodes on the boards and investigated how
these affect the payoffs of players that played on the boards. We principally used these
experiments to investigate how the level of availability of vital infrastructures (such
as road networks) in a particular location or region affects profitability of businesses
in that particular region.
The sixth experiment contains simulations in which we introduced the fuzzy game ap-
proach to wage negotiation in managing employers and employees (unions) relation-
ships. The scheme proposes how employers and employees (unions) can successfully
manage the deadlocks that usually accompany wage negotiations.
In all cases, fuzzy rules are constructed that symbolise various rules and strategic
variables that firms take into consideration before taken decisions. The models also
include learning procedures that enable the agents to optimize these fuzzy rules and
their decision processes. This is the main contribution of the thesis: a set of fuzzy
models that include learning, and can be used to improve decision making in business.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Decision making processes are generally an integral part of our everyday lives. In
every situation, we make one or more decisions regarding what to do, how to do
it, what not to do. In order to make a decision, we choose from among available
options to take actions. However, how to select a proper action when facing other
agents is quite unclear [2].
A lot of researchers have used game theory to model various decision processes in
firms [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], in military [13, 14].
Many authors have used fuzzy logic concepts to analyze various decision mak-
ing processes [13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. For
instance, Ngai and Wat in [29] described a fuzzy decision support system in e-
commerce (EC) development for the purpose of assessment of risk. In the paper,
they designed and developed a model which is web based and that can assist an
e-commerce project planner to identify some of the risk factors as well as project
risks in their corresponding e-commerce projects.
In [27] Ding and Liang extended the concepts of fuzzy logic applications by propos-
ing a model that involves the utilization of fuzzy set theory fundamental principles
to analyse and consider a multiplicity of complex criteria and then make decisions
on the most suitable partner in strategic shipping alliances in shipping industry.
The project developed a practical model for business purposes that used the mem-
bership functions features in fuzzy set theory [30, 31] that suitably set the defini-
tion, conversion and treatment of vague and multi-level criteria in liner shipping.
They argued that using the model would help a shipping business decision-maker
1
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in identifying and recognising effective partner selection criteria prior to forming
a joint service pact in liner shipping industry.
Jose Naranjo et al in [32] illustrated a model that implements fuzzy inference sys-
tems in designing a system that mimics human decisions while driving on roads
and the model automatically controls vehicles. The prototype was able to auto-
matically adjust speeds, select routes and is able to make decisions in performing
some other more sophisticated tasks such as maneuvering and overtaking.
Philippe De Wilde in his work in [33] extended the applications of fuzzy logic in
making micro-economic decisions by studying the rationality of fuzzy choice and
introduced fuzzy constraints. This framework for fuzzy-decision making was differ-
ent from previous attempts in that he showed how this could be easily combined
together with maximizing a fuzzy utility. He then implemented fuzzy Cournot
adjustment, defined equilibria and also studied their stabilities.
Also, some authors have applied these fuzzy logic concepts on different types of
games [13, 15, 24, 25, 34, 35, 36]. For example, Borges et al, in [15] extended
the two moves that are conventionally possible in traditional iterated prisoner’s
dilemma[37, 38] with the aid of fuzzy sets.
However, for the first time, we are combining the concepts of game theory [39, 40]
and fuzzy logic theory to address the uncertainties of anticipated or prevailing
market demand information [41] and production cost with respect to competition
through commodity price. We are finding how a firm should appropriately respond
to them so as to maximize its profit and position itself in a competitive advantage
over its competitors. In other words, we are using the theories of games and fuzzy
logic to model decision making processes of firms in industries.
Moreover, the famous laws of demand and supply, which can be found in many
works such as [42, 43, 44], have explained the behaviours of consumers and firms
with response to market prices of commodities. However, these laws treat market
demands in the form of information that is readily available with sharp distinction
and certainty. In the real world, the situation and conditions of the markets are
not always known with certainty as according to [43], “the assumption of perfect
knowledge is an unsatisfactory one in economics and to assume full knowledge of
future profit streams seems particularly unsatisfactory”. Therefore, a firm needs
to base its strategic decisions on this uncertain (fuzzy) information available at
its disposal. The law provides answers to what happens in the market when a
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commodity demand takes on the two crisp variables higher than a or lower than
a for a constant a. It does not tell us what would happen if the demand takes on
uncertain or fuzzy variables, such as very low, low, medium, high, very high, and
how a firm should strategically respond to them.
Taking decisions that solve the problems in this kind of situation is the essence
of our research. We are designing an algorithm (simulation) which combines the
concepts of game theory and fuzzy decision making systems [22, 45] to model the
scenario described above, in which a firm makes strategic moves in marketing [46]
based on uncertain market information [41] available to the firm and on strategy
moves of those of its competitors.
Also, the laws of demand and supply explain how firms take decisions based on
the market information only but in the real world, a firm rarely bases its decisions
on market demand information only. Rather, it takes into consideration some
factors internal to itself [47] such as cost of production which may include cost of
raw materials, logistics, research and development. Therefore, our research also
attempts to address this issue. That is, our algorithm analyses how a firm can
successfully fix the price of a commodity by taking into consideration the uncertain
market information as well as some factors that are internal to the firm such as
cost of production. This is with the aim of making strategic moves that will enable
the firm to maximize its payoffs through maximization of its market share as well
as profits. These can be seen as an attempt to redefine the law of demand and
supply in a more practical way as applicable to firms’ competition in industries.
This research aims at developing an efficient decision support scheme simulated in
the form of a non-cooperative zero-sum game with imperfect information, using
fuzzy logic concepts that can assist a business organization in making an effective
decision in a competitive market environment. We used a general illustration to
describe the model and we verified the validity of our results with a case study
using Coca-Cola and PepsiCo companies who are major players in the beverage
industry. The thesis extends knowledge in the area of decision support functionali-
ties through extension of methods for modeling underlying functionalities of fuzzy
logic and game theory concepts. It also supports decision making processes in
economics, measures impacts on individual users, multiparticipant users, organi-
sations and in evaluating the fuzzy decision support system. In accordance with
the aim of classical economists, our interests are concerned with answering ques-
tions of how agents in a market could interact so as to gather maximum monetary
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wealth (profits) for themselves. This will mainly be based on a decision making
scheme developed in [13]. The payoff of the game relies on the concept of theory
of fuzzy moves (TFM) in which, according to Kandel and Zhang in [24], a player
not only strives to take a strategy that is advantageous to himself but that is also
at the same time, disadvantageous to his opponents.
1.1 Objectives
Our main objectives are:
• To advise the management of a business organization on certain marketing
strategic decision policies that will keep the business in a strategic advantage
over its competitors in the market.
• To investigate how a firm can successfully compete with its peers in the mar-
ket by determining how much of its resources or efforts should be dissipated
on our three adopted strategies of marketing: consolidation efforts (C), re-
served resources/wealth/capital (W ) and marketing aggressiveness (M) in
such a way that its profit (accumulated wealth Aw) will be maximized.
• Given the uncertain (fuzzy) and prevailing market demand (D) information,
the cost of producing a commodity (CP ), and considering the traditional
laws of demand and supply, to find out what strategy [C,W,M ] a firm should
adopt to maximize its payoffs and minimize those of its competitors.
• To provide trained and optimized fuzzy rules that establish the relation-
ship between demand (D), production cost (CP ) as well as those marketing
strategies above (i.e. [C,W,M ]) that an entrepreneur can follow in forecast-
ing the selling price of a commodity and thereby, the profit or wealth to be
generated or accumulated (Aw).
• To investigate the validity of the research via a case study using real data of
known companies.
• To analyse interaction and competition among networked business organisa-
tions.
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• To examine various network characteristics [48] such as level of interaction
or connectivity, number of nodes (players), location of a player with respect
to those of his opponents, strength of individual player’s strategy and those
of his immediate opponents. We will investigate how these characteristics
affect the payoff of players in a business network.
The board game results are further used to investigate the following:
• How the level of availability of vital infrastructure such as transportation in
a geographical location can affect the profitability of business enterprises.
• To investigate situations where there are constraints imposed by regulatory
authorities such as when two or more players are forbidden (possibly by law)
from interacting to prevent collusion. This leads to constrained optimisation.
Constraints can be between variables, or can be constraints imposed on
communication between players.
• Why industries tend to concentrate more in highly developed locations than
in less developed ones.
• Why developing nations are less attractive to industrialists [49] when com-
pared to developed ones.
• How fuzzy reasoning or fuzzy inference systems (FIS) can help to improve the
performance of businesses in an environment that is clouded with uncertainty
and adverse conditions such as low level of infrastructural development.
• How performance of these business enterprises can be improved or enhanced
through adaptation or learning of the fuzzy rules.
The fuzzy game approach to wage negotiation simulations are used to investigate
the following:
• How deadlocks that usually associate with wage negotiation and employment
contracts can be resolved by using the concepts of fuzzy logic and game
theory.
• How to facilitate smooth relationships between employers and employees
with respect to wage negotiation.
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1.2 List of Contributions
• For the first time, we are employing the concepts of fuzzy logic and game the-
ory to model decision processes of firms in industries with respect to strategic
competition. We are providing a model that can serve as an effective tool in
the hands of a business executive that will enable him to effectively utilize
the uncertain (fuzzy) and anticipated market demand (D) information, cost
of producing a commodity (CP ) and other fuzzy information at his disposal
to maximize his market share as well as profit in the industry.
• For the first time, competition and uncertainties in business networks and on
boards are being modelled through the combination of fuzzy logic concepts
and game theory.
• We have investigated situations where there are constraints imposed by reg-
ulatory authorities such as when two or more players are forbidden (possibly
by law) from interacting to prevent collusion.
• For the first time, we have employed concepts of fuzzy logic and game theory
to investigate and explain why industries tend to concentrate more in highly
developed locations than in less developed ones.
• Why developing nations are less attractive to industrialists when compared
to developed ones.
• How fuzzy reasoning could help entrepreneurs, who are operating in locations
with low level of infrastructures, make effective and competitive business
decisions.
• We are giving a new perspective on the common laws of demand and sup-
ply with a more practical approach which takes cognisance of the uncertain
(fuzzy) nature of most information at the disposal of business decision mak-
ers.
• We are introducing the fuzzy logic concepts and game theory in managing
employers and employees relationships with respect to employment contract
and wage negotiation.
• We illustrating how effective learning of the fuzzy membership functions can
be achieved to enable the fuzzy player achieve the set goal.
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1.3 Assumptions
1.3.1 Gender and Economic terms
Throughout this thesis, we shall be using he/his or him as appropriate to represent
agents of any gender. Also, since this work represents a model of a real system,
some of the economic terms and formulas used in this research such as demand
(D), cost of production ratios, strategy variables [C W M ], modelling equations,
other variables as well as the fuzzy rule base may be modified by anybody adopting
the model to suitably represent the situation in question. What we are trying to
show is that the uncertainty in business environments can be suitably modelled or
represented using fuzzy logic and game theory concepts.
We have further explained these strategic variables and what they represent in
Section 4.1 on page 63. The models can work for systems that have more strategic
variables than those that we have used in the models.
In Section 7.4.1 (page 110), we have demonstrated that the variables in our models
can be tailored to the business situations in the real world and therefore are not
limited to those variables that we have used in designing the systems.
These models can be used as effective and efficient decision tools by business organ-
isations that are operating in different scenarios similar to those we have described
in this thesis. However, in using the models as decision tools, the entrepreneur
will need to adapt, adjust and modify the variables and the decision rules to suit
the situations in question as well as his business environments.
For example, rather than competing with capital resources (say £5M), the organ-
isation’s competing resources may be in terms of roles assigned to personnels in
the organisation. For instance, due to persistent reduction in sales over the last
few weeks, an organisation may decide to assign more personnels to the marketing
department (M ) and less to the operation department (C ) of the organisation.
The organisation will then change these roles until desirable results are attained
in the business.
Therefore, the models could be used as decision tools but the variables may need
to be modified to adequately represent the situations in question as we have done
in chapter 5 of Cola War simulations between Coca-Cola and PepsiCo companies.
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1.3.2 Sources of Fuzzy Rules
As in many applications of fuzzy rule-based systems, the fuzzy if-then rules used in
our models have been solicited from human experts [50, 51]. We sought knowledge
from human experts in the fields that are related to each scenario described in this
thesis. For example, in wage negotiation games in chapter 9, we sought knowledge
from both the employers’ sides and also from those of the unions.
In all the simulations, the accuracy of these solicited rules are judged and amended
by searching related data from published economic and fuzzy inference literatures
such as [42, 43, 52, 53, 54].
However, various other methods have been proposed in different publications for
automatically generating fuzzy if-then rules from numerical data. According to
Nozaki et al in [50], most of these methods have involved iterative learning proce-
dures or complicated rule generation mechanisms such as gradient descent learning
methods, genetic-algorithm-based methods and least-squares methods.
Therefore in this thesis, the fuzzy rule base we have adopted in formulating the
fuzzy if-then rules used in our models have been solicited from human experts
[50, 51] in the related fields.
1.4 Layout or Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 1 explains the research background, chapter 2 contains the summary of the
literature review and chapter 3 contains the fuzzy set theory and the optimization
technique used in the research. Chapter 4 gives the research general methodology
with general illustrations. Chapter 5 verifies the validity of our model that we
explained in chapter 4 by using companies’ real data and we used a case study of
competition between Coca-Cola and PepsiCo companies who are major players in
the beverage industry.
Chapter 6 examines the payoff of the fuzzy player in n-player game which was used
to model a perfect market competition with many players and as an extension of
the two-player game of a duopoly market which we considered in chapter 4. It
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investigates how the payoff of fuzzy player is affected with increasing number of
competitors.
Chapter 7 explains how we modelled competitions on business networks with un-
certain information and varying levels of connectivity. There, the level of intercon-
nections (connectivity) among business units in the business networks were varied
and how their payoffs are affected were investigated.
Chapter 8, models business competitions as games on boards and we investigated
how various constraints on the boards affected players’ payoffs.
Chapter 9 contains work on wage negotiation which proposes how fuzzy logic
and game theory concepts could help to successfully reduce problems that usually
accompany wage negotiation in employers and employees relationships.
Chapter 10 highlights summaries, conclusions and the future work will intend to
do at later time after this PhD programme.
1.5 Other activities during PhD Programme
The bulk of the work done during the PhD Programme is as summarised in Sec-
tion 1.4.
However, during this research, a lot of time was spent on reading literature related
to the work from journals, papers and text books and also, enormous time were
spent on running simulations in the laboratory using both Java programming
language and Matlab. Some of the literature that I read have been summarised in
chapter 2 of this thesis under literature review and a comprehensive list of them
are as contained in the bibliography section of the thesis as well. I also took
some time to study LATEX. I attended several research seminars, workshops and
conferences organised by Educational Development Unit (EDU) of the university
including: how to be an effective researcher. Also, I attended all the three stages
of learning enhancement and development skills (LEADS 1, 2 and 3) which trained
participants to become an approved tutor of the university, research development
programs (RDP) and so on.
Outside Heriot-Watt University, I also attended some seminars, workshops and
conferences at the University of Edinburgh and University of St Andrews, Fife
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including SICSA PhD Conference 2009 which was organised for PhD students in
Informatics and Computer Science in Scotland and held at St Andrews University
on 3rd June 2009.
A full length paper was published from my work by a journal; International Journal
of Production Economics. In this paper [52], we summarised all the topics and
simulations covered from chapters 1 to 6 and it was titled Dynamics of Business
Games with Management of Fuzzy Rules for Decision Making.
Also, I equally presented conference papers on my research and these are high-
lighted in publications’ section at the beginning of this thesis. Another full length
paper has been submitted to the journal of Expert Systems with Applications.
I also served, very often, as reviewer of academic papers for Journals such as IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics–Part B: Cybernetics.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Decision Making Processes
A decision is a goal-directed behaviour made by the individual, in response to a
certain need, with the intention of satisfying the motive that the need occasions
[55]. The decision process begins with identification of a problem and ends with a
choice. The problem arises when a sought-after goal can be obtained via alternative
and sometimes competing avenues. In every behaviour or step we take, we are
involved in at least simple decisions. For example, about four years ago, I was
involved in a personal decision process on whether to go for a PhD degree or to
continue with my work and enjoy my salary. Then, after I had made a decision to
go for PhD, I was involved in another stage of decision processes which was based
on which country (Nigeria, United States, United Kingdom and others) to do the
PhD. This decision stage favoured United Kingdom. After I had overcome that
decision stage, then another came in, on whether to go to University of Glasgow
or Heriot-Watt University both in United Kingdom and Heriot-Watt University
finally became the product or choice of my three-stage decision process.
The decision maker is an individual at the simplest level and a decision process
must have a purpose in so far as it only exists to further a particular objective
or goal of the decision maker. When faced with certain problems, an individual
rational decision maker will make attempts to order or rank his goals or objectives
in some certain relative order. The decision maker will then be in a position to
examine various alternative means in order to achieve the desired goals. He will
11
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then choose the best strategy which either minimizes the costs of any possible
failure or maximizes the set objectives to achieve the desired goals[55].
There are many theories that provide advice to an economic man and among these
are economic theory and decision theory. According to Martin Shubik in [10], mi-
croeconomic theory involves the study of the optimization process for a “rational”
individual decision-maker an economic man-usually modeled as though he were
confronted with a completely known set of certain or probabilistic outcomes. He
asserted that the individual rational decision-maker of economic theory has been,
on the one hand, a singularly simple individual and, on the other, an extremely
complex one. His pristine simplicity comes about in his good fortune in know-
ing what he wants. For an entrepreneur-owner of a firm, his principal economic
decision role is to maximize profits.
Decision processes in firms have been modelled in different research papers such
as in [10, 33, 56, 57, 58]. Shubik in [59], summarizes the basis of the concepts of
an economic man and his near relatives in decision making processes as follows:
1. A decision is a (conscious) choice of a move (or action) from among a well-
defined set of alternatives.
2. The individual decision maker can attach a value to the outcomes arising
from any set of moves.
3. The individual decision maker is motivated to act in such a manner that the
expected value to him of the outcome is as high as possible.
2.1.1 View of a Rational Decision Maker
The rational man school of thought asserts that decisions are made by an individ-
ual and rational decision maker that is usually consistent and having considered
economic factors, is cognizant of relevant of related cost and benefit ratios. It is in
the assumption of this school of thought that a decision-maker has all the infor-
mation and tools required for implementing and making a decision. This school
also depends on assumption of an ideal situation that is not always available in
the dynamic and business world. Hossein Bidgoli in [60] highlighted the progres-
sive steps that the rational actor school follows in making its classic approach to
decision making processes and these steps are listed as follows:
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• Definition of the problem
• Generation of the alternatives
• Evaluation of the alternatives
• Implementation of the best out of the alternatives
• Evaluation of the solution to investigate how it is working by performing a
systematic follow up.
However, a decision maker is frequently confronted with fuzzy constraints, fuzzy
utility maximization, and fuzziness about the state of competitors[33]. There
are many decision situations when we cannot process the information contained
precisely in a quantitative form but which may need to be rather accessed or
processed in qualitative form and therefore, the need for us to adopt a linguistic
approach [61] . Decision-makers in a conflict must often make often make their
decisions under risk and under unclear or fuzzy information[25]. In this thesis,
Section 3.5.2 on page 41 has been dedicated to decision making under uncertainty
or fuzziness.
2.2 Game Theory
2.2.1 Game Theory Framework
Game theory is a method for the study of decision-making in situations of con-
flict and it deals with problems in which the individual decision-maker is not in
complete control of the factors influencing the outcome [9].It was developed to
quantify, model and explain human behavior under conflicts between individuals
and public interests[62]. A decision-maker in a game faces a cross-purposes max-
imization problem. He must plan for an optimal return, taking into account the
possible actions of his opponents. A game is a model of a situation where two or
more groups are in dispute over some issues or resources[25]. A player in a game
is an autonomous decision-making unit. Tapan Biswas in [63] also stated that a
large part of the decision making processes under uncertainties can be covered by
game theory.
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Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among rational
players produce outcomes with respect to the preference (or utilities) of those
players, none of which might have been intended by any of them [64]. It is part of
a large body of theories concerning decision making [11]. It deals with decision-
making processes involving two or more parties, also known as players with partly
or completely conflicting interest [9, 25] and it is one of the methodologies designed
for application to the social sciences [10]. All situations in which at least one agent
can only act to maximize his utility through anticipating (either consciously, or
just implicitly in his behaviour) the responses to his actions by one or more other
agents are called games and agents involved in games are referred to as players
[44, 64] and could represent people, military, firms, countries or other organisations
[13, 14, 25].
A game can be described in terms of the game’s rules, individual decision-makers
or the players, outcomes of the game or the payoffs, values of the players’ payoffs,
players’ strategies, the type and the condition of information that is available
during the game. All these components can be found in all situations of conflict
and are therefore the major constituents of game theory. They are all elements
and building blocks of game theory.
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 invented the mathematical
theory of games [64] and despite the fact that game theory has been rendered
mathematically and logically systematic only since 1944, the game-approach to
solving various problems can be found among commentators from the ancient
times. The participants in a game are called the players. In a non-cooperative
game, the possible courses of action available to the players are referred to as
options. Any set of options that can be taken by a particular player is called a
strategy. When each player has selected a strategy, the result is referred to as an
outcome. What is essential in a game is that two or more players are involved
with partly or completely conflicting interests [25].
Participants (players) in games are assumed to be rational. Classical decision
theory assumes that a man that is rational would choose the optimum out of the
alternatives available to him from the universe of choices.
Each player in a game is concerned with maximizing his payoff and the players
therefore need to also consider the possible reactions of the opponents to his every
move in order to achieve his own optimal move [63]. Since the players do not
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know the moves of the opponents with certainty, they therefore need to take deci-
sions about their moves with some levels of rational justification. The essence of
decision-making under uncertainty is indeed, the search for this rational decision
[63].
Games are extensively used in modelling and understanding complex behaviours in
a wide range of fields including theoretical biology, social interactions, economics,
politics, defense and security. In spite of their simple structures, games are suc-
cessful in capturing real life complex dynamics and have proved to be a powerful
tool for analysing interesting phenomena [65, 66]. Classical game theory uses the
extensive form and the strategic (or normal) form to describe a game [25, 64]. Each
player in a game faces a choice among two or more strategies and a strategy is a
predetermined programme of play that tells him what actions to take in response
to every possible strategy other players might use [8, 24, 44, 64]. According to
Fisher in [5], bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game
theoretic terms, including problems that are easier to deal with in other forms and
every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist
who thinks in game theoretic terms. As a result, business strategy is not left out
in this context as it is mostly dominated by the game theoretic approach.
Concepts of game theory investigate individuals that have different objectives or
goals which are somehow interlocked. It must be noted that not all decision-
making scenarios are games in nature. For example, an accountant who has been
given certain sum of money to carry out a project or an engineer who has been
mandated by his supervisor to reduce an industrial design complexity in order to
minimize cost. These two scenarios do not portray game situations. Both the
accountant and the engineer are faced with the problems of minimization and
maximization which is a field in operation research. Both the accountant and the
engineer can control fully, the relevant variables that are involved in these two
situations and therefore do not have any human opponents to contend with that
may want to oppose, jeopardize or act in contrary of their set objectives or goals.
2.2.2 Terms in Game Theory
For any game, there are three very important requirements and these are listed as
follows [63]:
Chapter 2. Literature Review 16
1. Players
2. Strategies which are permitted with respect to the rules of the game and
3. Payoffs (that is, utilities or outcomes)
A crucial aspect of the specification of a game involves the information that players
have when they choose strategies. The simplest games (from the perspective of
logical structure) are those in which agents have perfect information [67], meaning
that at every point where each agent’s strategy tells him to take an action, he
knows everything that has happened in the game up to that point. A board
game of moves in which both players watch all the actions (and know the rules in
common), such as chess, is an instance of such game [8, 64]. In contrast, games
in which players do not know everything that has happened in their games up to
that point when they take actions, are referred to as with imperfect information.
A games may also be distinguished based on the order of play that is, based on
when or the order with which players choose their strategies with respect to those
of the opponents. With respect to this, games are classified into sequential-move
games and simultaneous-move games. We explained this as follows: consider two
firms that are planning marketing campaigns, one of the firms might have allocated
to its strategy some months or weeks earlier and if neither knows when the other
(competitor or opponent) has allocated to its strategy or will allocate to its strategy
(that is, when the campaign decision will be made), then such game is referred
to as simultaneous-move games. In a sequential game however, such as in a chess
game, players see what their opponents have done before taking their actions and
these types of games are therefore referred to as sequential-move games [64].
With the two concepts described above, one may be thinking that the distinctions
between games of imperfect information with that of perfect information and the
games of sequential-move games with that of simultaneous-move games are the
same. However, it is true that all games of simultaneous-move are also games
of imperfect information. In some cases however, some games may be observed
to contain mixed traits of sequential-move games and that of simultaneous-move
games. For examples, if two competing firms allocates to their marketing campaign
strategies without the knowledge of each other, then after that initial allocation, if
they then engage in price competition in full view of each other, then we will need
to analyze these two stages as a single game that has a stage of simultaneous-
move followed by a stage of sequential-move. Therefore, if a game comprises
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combined stages of this kind, then such game is referred to as a game of imperfect
information.
On the other hand, for a game to be classified as that of perfect information, there
must be no stages of simultaneous-move. That is, all players know and remember
what have happened before and at each stage of the game.
Games of perfect information are simple to analyse by both the players and the
analysts. This is because since they are finite and stop (terminate) after a certain
and known number of steps, the games can be represented by using a straightfor-
ward procedure for predicting the outcomes by both the players and the analysts.
A player in such game, before choosing an action, would have considered series of
counter actions or reactions from his opponent, that may result from each action
open to him. The player will then consider and choose, out the available action
open to him, that action that is likely to earn him highest payoff.
The rules of the game specify the complete structure of the game. They indicate
the span of the alternatives faced by a player at any point during the play, his
information state and the payoffs resulting from any play [8]. A play of a game is
a path followed down the game tree. The payoff is the resultant allocation from
the play of a game. In chess, this is the value attached to a win, loss or draw
and in poker, it is money. A strategy is a complete plan of actions for a player
[24, 44, 64]. A move is the selection of one among a set of alternatives at a choice
point in a game. In a game in which each player has a single move and these are
made simultaneously, a strategy and a move are equivalent. The players have no
contingencies to plan for [8].
2.2.3 Game Representation
Neumann and Morgenstern employed two major ways of representing game and
these are known as the normalized form and the extensive form[68]. The nor-
malized form can be displayed by means of a payoff matrix while the extensive
form can be displayed by means of a game tree. Examples are used as follows to
illustrate the two forms of game representation.
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2.2.3.1 Payoff Matrix
To illustrate the normalized form of game representation, let us consider a simple
game which consists of two players in which each player has only one move. The
moves must be made simultaneously and a player must not have knowledge of
actions of each other. Each of the players must choose and select a green or
yellow card. If the two players select cards of the same colour, the first player
wins £1. If however, cards with different colours are selected then, the second
player will win £1. In any case, any player that loses will have to pay £1 to the
opponent. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the payoff matrix for player 1 and player
2 respectively in their conventional forms. 
 
                   Yellow          Green                           
Yellow     £1                - £1 
 
 
  - £1                 £1 
 
 
Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Yellow          Green                           
Yellow       -£1                £1 
 
 
     £1                  - £1 
 
 
Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Yellow                                                Green                           
Yellow     £1                - £1                             - £1,               £1 
 
 
  - £1                 £1                              £1                 - £1 
 
 
Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Payoff of player 1.
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Figure 2.2: Payoff of player 2.
We can also equivalently combine the two matrices in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 into one
matrix as shown in Figure 2.3. In each cell, the first figure represents the payoff of
the first player while the second figure represents the payoff of the second player.
2.2.3.2 Game Tree
The extensive form of game representation with the use of game trees can take
two forms. In the strict sense of game theory, these two forms are equivalent but
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Figure 2.3: Matrix showing payoffs of players 1 and 2.
may be viewed psychologically as being different. The two forms are as portrayed
in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. As shown in the figures, the points during which players
can make their choices are represented by the vertices on the game trees. Next to
each vertex are shown the numbers that indicates which of the players must make
the choice. The difference between Figures 2.4 and 2.5 is that in Figures 2.4, the
first player has the topmost vertex as his choice point while the second player has
the other two vertices to make his choice. The situation is opposite in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Game tree with first player at topmost vertex.
2.2.4 Branches and Methodologies of Game Theory
In order to understand fully, the many ways of applications of game theory in the
field of microeconomics, it will be useful to highlight the major five out of many
branches of game theory. According to [8, 10] these are identified as follows:
1. Theories of solution for two-person constant-sum games,
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Figure 2.5: Game tree with second player at topmost vertex.
2. Description of the extensive form of a game,
3. Theories of solution for n-person games (where n ≥ 2 for non-constant-sum
games; n ≥ 3 for constant-sum games),
4. Theories of solution for games against nature (games in which the rules are
not completely specified),
5. Theories of solution for dynamic games.
Since there are very numerous publications on the above listed branches of game
theory, we will not offer much explanation on them but we will however explain
briefly on the first item on the list and highlight some of its aspects or divisions.
More information on the other items on the list can be found in [8, 10].
2.2.4.1 Two-Person Constant-Sum and Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
With constant-sum games, the aggregate of players’ payoff is the same with every
combination of the players’ strategies. In constant-sum, the payoffs of all players
add up to a fixed constant for all possible outcomes [44]. The zero-sum game is
therefore a peculiar case of constant-sum games. In two-person zero-sum game,
the amount that one player wins is exactly the amount that the other player loses.
Two-person zero-sum game are essentially betting games where the loss of one is
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the gain of the other[63] .Examples of this include the matching pennies and two-
person poker. Most of the other two-person games also belong to this category
[9]. Competition between two firms may be modelled using this concepts and the
payoffs of players can be represented by a payoff matrix described in Figures 2.1,
2.2 and 2.3 on page 18.
Games that have duel characteristics can be classified as typical direct applications
of two-person zero-sum games. In a duel, one of the properties is that the goals
of the players are diametrically opposed. In businesses or in any market where
the size of the marked demand is somehow fixed by regulation agents such as
the governments or fixed by habits, any additional customers that are gained by a
particular firm will result in another firm losing an equivalent number of customers
in that market.
2.2.4.2 Non-Zero-Sum Games
It must be noted that not all games are zero-sum in nature and in fact, many of the
competitions that are more interesting in the market, business and economics are
not zero-sum [63]. A very large market that contains many players (competitors)
may not be zero-sum because instead of players fighting or opposing each other,
there may be room for all. Example of these markets can be found in banking
industries where there are so many players and the gain of one player may not
necessarily affect another.
2.2.4.3 Goals of Gaming
There are different goals of gaming and in [65] few of them are identified and these
are listed as follows:
• Training
• Experimentation
• Entertainment
• Therapy and Diagnosis
• Operations
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• Training
Further and extensive readings on these goals of gaming can be found in [65]
2.2.4.4 Example of Popular Strategic Games
Scientists have used wide range of strategic games to analyze different phenomena
or situations and common examples of these popular games are:
• Prisoner dilemma game
• Snowdrift game
• Game of chicken
• Battle of the Sexes game
• The stag-hunt game
• Free-rider game
Also, since there are many publications that have extensively discussed items on
this list and other strategic games, no further explanation of them shall be offered
in this thesis. Further readings can be found in different publications such as
[15, 25, 26, 63, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73]
2.2.4.5 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium [74] is one of the most important concepts of solution in classical
game theory. It denotes an outcome at which none of the players would likely want
to unilaterally depart because doing so may result in worst outcomes, or at least
would not result in better outcomes that what has been earlier achieved. This
may be viewed as the stable state of the game since none of the players would
have any reason to defect to a different strategy if the opponent player does not
defect. However, it has been argued that the rationality of moving or departing
from outcomes-at least beyond an immediate departure- is not considered in this
concept[25, 72].
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Nash equilibrium (‘NE’) applies (or fails to apply, as the case may be) to whole
sets of strategies, one for each player in a game. A set of strategies is a Nash
equilibrium just in case no player could improve his payoff, given the strategies of
all other players in the game, by changing his strategy [63, 64, 75].
2.3 Board Games
Since our experiments in Chapter 8 is based on board games in which we used
various characteristics and constraints on boards to investigate how restrictions
affect businesses, we shall give a brief introduction on board games in this chapter.
The definition of a particular game is generally considered or otherwise transparent
by listing the rules of the game. Board games are games with a fixed set of rules
that limit the number of pieces on a board, the number of positions for these
pieces and the number of possible moves [76]. The limitations set by these rules
contrast with games of skill where the number of positions may be endless. Also,
in a board game, there must be indeed a board with pieces on it and moves or
placement of pieces may influence the situation on a board and the pieces relate to
one another on that board. This is however in contrast with most lottery games,
such as roulette, where each bet or contract is commonly independent from the
other contracts that have been made on the table, and by definition, are not
moving around the board. A die in a board game such a ludo, shown in Figure 2.6
from [77], limits the movement of pieces on the board.
Board games have intrigued researchers in a number of sciences either as object
of study or as models for developing analogies [76]. This is because unlike other
games, board games present more opportunities for thinking, memory, and study-
ing perceptions. Like other games, all board games require players who are mostly
two. This characteristic sets board games apart from puzzles which usually involve
one player.
2.3.1 Classification of Board Games
Board games have been classified by many authors based on the purpose of the
game. For instance, war games require captures while players in race games race
each other to reach the end of the board.
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There are many variants of board games and these are not all as intellectually as
demanding as chess or Go. Many board games involve two players, and are deter-
ministic (no random element such as dice), and they also provide full information
about the game’s state to each player. Most board games do not also have hidden
elements such as cards in the opponent’s hand as we have in card games [78].
Research on board games can be found in numerous sources ranges from journals
on psychology, cognition to historical works on board games.
An overview of board games as it is used and understood in a particular disci-
pline exists for the field of artificial intelligence and computer science and such
an overview was long ago provided for historical research [76]. The research on
chess players has so far been generalised to several other domains of expertise
and the domain of board games has received attention in its own right from other
disciplines. There are board games such as Go, gomoku, bao and awele that have
enabled comparative studies that put theories of cognition in different cultural
contexts. Meanwhile, these areas of studies might not have been possible with-
out the increasing interest in board games as another area of study [76]. Board
games, most especially, Go, checker and chess have often been used to investigate
and illustrate emergent theory which studies how complex behaviour emerges from
simple components.
2.3.1.1 Description of the Chess Game
We shall give a brief description of the chess game as a sample of board games
while full description on it and other games can be found in [76, 78, 79].
The conventional chess is made of 8X8 board and the objective of the game is
to checkmate or capture the opponent player’s king. At the beginning of the
game, the arrangements of the white pieces follow the following order on the
first row: Rook, Knight, Bishop, Queen, King, Bishop, Knight, and Rook. On the
second row, the eight white Pawns are then arranged. For the player black (second
player), the arrangement of his pieces follow the same pattern on rows eight and
seven respectively.
On the players’ movements, the Bishops move in diagonal while the Rooks move
horizontally and vertically in straight lines. The Queen combines the movements of
both the Bishop and the Rook while the King can move one square in a direction.
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Knight will first move horizontally by one square and vertically and it will then
move one square ahead diagonally. Knight happens to be the only piece that can
jump over pieces on the board. For all pieces, a piece is captured when a move
ends on a square that is occupied by an opponent’s piece. Pawns move one square
forward but can also move two square forward from their starting point and can
capture one square diagonally. There are special rules such as castling in which
both the King and the Rook can move, taken enpassant (this happens when Pawn
can be taken as if it had moved only one square when it has actually moved two
squares from its starting location), and stalemate which is a game draw condition
in which one side cannot move but is not however in a check.
Figure 2.7 on page 32 illustrates the picture of a conventional chess board while
Figure 2.8 on page 32 illustrates fuzzy chess board as designed by Professor De
Wilde. For instructions on how to play the fuzzy chess game, reader should please
go to Professor Philippe De Wilde channel on Youtube and to play the game,
please go to the following link on his home page:
(http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/ pdw/fuzzychess/fuzzychess.html).
Another popular example of board games is Ayo-Olopon also know as Oware,
Awele, Mancala, Adji-Boto and many more names. A typical Ayo-Olopon game is
as shown in Figure 2.9 on page 33. Figure 8.1 on page 125 show the author of this
thesis playing the board game with his wife Adesola in the computer laboratory
to investigate his research results. Other popular board games are Ludo games
shown in Figure 2.6 on page 32 and Nine Men’s Morris shown in Figure 2.10 on
page 33.
2.4 Business Games
2.4.1 Why Business Games?
Business gaming and case studies are commonly used in training and education
in both business schools and companies. In a business school, the objective is
to let the students know practical knowledge. On the other hand, the purpose
of corporate training is to improve the behaviors and attitudes of employees in a
company [80]. It is one of the educational techniques to train skills for managerial
decisions within a limited time under the virtual business environment.
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In business games, the firm identifies the moves that the rival could make in re-
sponse to each of its strategies. The firm can then plan counter-strategies [42]. As
Doug Ivester, Coca-Cola’s president put it [43] “I look at the business like a chess-
board. You always need to be seeing three, four, five moves ahead; otherwise, your
first move can prove fatal”. Game theory helps explore the impact of calculations
about future market advantages on a firm’s current market strategies.
In business games, the conflicting interest of a firm may be to minimize the cost
function, maximize the market share, or maximize the profit [25]. In this game,
profit maximization of the fuzzy player is to be achieved through learning by the
fuzzy agent, and minimization of the payoffs of the opponents.
Game theory has had a deep impact on the theory of industrial organization. The
reason it has been embraced by a majority of researchers in the field is that it im-
poses some discipline on theoretical thinking. It forces economists to clearly specify
the strategic variables, their timing, and the information structure faced by firms.
As is often the case in economics, the researcher learns as much from constructing
the model (the “extensive form”) as from solving it because in constructing the
model one is led to examine its realism. Is the timing of entry plausible? Which
variables are costly to change in the short run? Can firms observe their rivals’
prices, capacities, or technologies in the industry under consideration? and so on
[5].
Many authors have attempted to describe business games in different contexts. In
[81], the author discussed the use of business game simulations as tools for teach-
ing Information Systems. He argued that even though, the traditional teaching
method may be useful for the foundational knowledge dissemination, but they do
not provide the students, the platform that is optimal for implementing the IS
concepts. The author acknowledged the effectiveness of business games simula-
tions in designing Decision Support Systems (DSS) [82] and highlights his works
which consists of a game he designed to engage students in decision-making sys-
tems that involve entrepreneurial decisions. However, this paper did not capture
the uncertainties that surround the business environment and it mainly focused on
teaching students rather than focusing on the business decision makers [83] which
our work has thus addressed.
Martin Shubik in his paper [84] stated that the most common types of teaching
games in existence are business games. Several definitions of business games were
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offered in the paper [84] and few of them are as highlighted below:
• A business game is a contrived situation which imbeds players in a simulated
business environment, where they must make management-type decisions
from time to time, and their choices at one time generally affect the envi-
ronmental conditions under which the subsequent decisions must be made.
Further, the interactions between decision and environment are determined
by a refereeing process which is not open to argument from the players.
The statement concerning the refereeing process presents a factor which
differentiates teaching from operational gaming.
• A business simulation or game may be defined as a sequential decision-
making exercise structured around a model of a business operation in which
participants assume the role of managing the simulated operation.
The relevant features of an organisation and its environment can be simulated
using business games. In playing the game, the manager, the businessman, en-
trepreneur or others involved in the decision-maker making process may be re-
quired to make decisions in a very short period of time. The business gaming
model will then portray the following characteristics:
1. A description of the internal features of the organisation or firm to be con-
sidered.
2. The firm’s environment. This may comprise the customers, state of the
economy, the market structure, and other business environmental variables
[85].
3. Organisation’s decision set. This may comprise marketing decision variables
such as advertising, production policy, pricing, employment procedures and
contracts and other variables on which the decision-makers could have some
direct control over.
4. Set of possible outcomes. This will be determined by the choice of strategy
selected by the decision-maker together with some other environmental fac-
tors. These sets of outcomes of a business game may include metrics such as
level of market or industry shares, volume of sales, profits, and other metrics
which are referred to in game theory as payoffs of the game.
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2.4.2 Decision Making Processes in a Firm
Decision makers in an organisation are expected to be aware of and to be able
to assess the information they generate and the potential use (or otherwise) of
that information [86]. Nowadays, decision making [87] processes are becoming
increasingly very complex for managers [86]. Therefore, the information needs of
a manager are becoming more complex and demanding also as a result of this
increasingly complexity of the business environment in which organisations have
to function. Figure 2.11 on page 34 highlights some of the major pressures that
are responsible for making decision making processes increasingly problematic in
business environments [86].
For decisions to be adequately made in a firm [88], decision makers of the firm are
assumed to have access to three different types of information; product-demand in-
formation, factor-supply information and production-technology information [44].
Under the assumptions of neoclassical marginal analysis, product-demand infor-
mation usually takes one of two possible forms. Either the firm knows the prices of
each of its products (and these prices are assumed to be constant) or it knows its
total revenue function. According to [44], figure 2.12 below represents the common
flow pattern of decision making process of a firm. In this research however, we
are analysing product-demand information while we also combining production-
technology information and factor supply information together as production func-
tion or cost.
2.4.3 Economic Theories of Market Structures, Demand
and Supply
Demand and supply information are two of the most important market information
to any firm and perhaps, the most fundamental concepts in Economics. The
relationship between the two determines how resources are allocated. Demand
refers to the number (quantity) of good or service is desired by buyers. Quantity
demanded is the amount of a good or service that consumers are willing to buy
at a certain price in a particular period of time. Supply of a commodity refers
to the quantity that the market can offer. Quantity supplied denotes the amount
of the good or service the manufacturers are willing to supply at a certain price.
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From these, it can be inferred therefore, that price is a determinant of demand
and supply [42, 44, 89, 90].
2.4.3.1 Law of Demand
The law of demand states that given that all factors remain constant, the higher
the price, the lower the quantity demanded [42, 55]. This means that the con-
sumer will demand less of a commodity at high price because as the price of the
commodity goes up so does its opportunity cost. Therefore there exists at every
time a particular relationship between the price of a good in the market and the
quantity demanded of that good. The relationship between the quantity of a good
bought and the price is what the economists refer to as demand curve, or demand
schedule. For normal commodities, the demand curve will always have a negative
slope. Figure 2.13 illustrates this relationship between demand and price of a
commodity.
2.4.3.2 Law of Supply
The law of supply illustrates the quantities of a commodity that will be sold at
a given price. However, unlike demand that slopes downwards, the slope for the
law of supply goes positively upward. That is, the higher the price, the higher the
quantity supplied [42, 44]. This means, the supplier will be willing to supply more
at higher price so as to accumulate higher revenue and directly, a better profit.
Figure 2.14 shows the relationship between price and the supply of a commodity.
2.4.3.3 Oligopoly
This is a market in which the number of firms is small enough for the behaviour
of one firm to affect the behaviour of other firms in the market [44]. It is a
market structure in which a few firms dominate the industry. Crucially, these
firms recognise their rivalry and interdependence, fully aware that any action on
their part is likely to induce counter-actions by their rivals [42]. This leads us into
a consideration of strategies and counter-strategies between market participants,
some of which can be modelled in terms of ‘game playing’ situations.
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Oligopoly is a market structure that forms an intermediate between the two ex-
tremes of pure monopoly [42] and perfect market competition 2.4.3.5 [91]. There
are key characteristics of oligopoly market that differentiates it from other market
structure and these are listed as follows:
• Few sellers in the market with difficult entry for new entry.
• In oligopoly, products may be either homogeneous or non-homogeneous
(product differentiation).
• Interdependence among firms is recognized in oligopoly competition.
• In oligopoly, prices tend to be sticky or rigid.
2.4.3.4 Duopoly
This is an extreme form of oligopoly with just two firms in the market. This is
the type of market structure that the first game in this thesis (2-player game) il-
lustrates and this leads us into a consideration of strategies and counter-strategies
between market participants which are modelled in terms of ‘game playing’ situ-
ations.
2.4.3.5 Perfect Market
This is a market in which there are many sellers and buyers with homogeneous
products and complete information about prices. In this thesis, this is illustrated in
Chapter 6 as a game of multiple players (i.e. n-player game). Perfect competition
is defined by the economist as a technical term and this only exist in a market
where no businessman, farmer or labourer is big enough to have any personal
influence on market price.
According to Griffiths and Wall in [42], there are key assumptions of a perfect
market competition and these are listed as follows:
• Large number of buyers (purchasers): None of these purchasers must be
significant enough to the extent of being able to influence the market price
of the commodity by an individual purchasing decision.
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• Large number of small firms: None of the firms must be significant enough
by itself to influence the supply of the commodity in the market. Also, all
the firms must produce identical (homogeneous) products.
• Each firm is a price taker on the demand curve for its product as being
perfectly elastic at the going market price.
• Availability of perfect information: The price of the identical (homogeneous)
product must effectively convey all the necessary information required by the
buyers and the consumers.
• There must be freedom of entry into (as well as exit from) the market or
industry
However, since there are many well known works on microeconomics that address
those economic terms briefly explained above, no further discussion will be given
of them in this thesis.
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Figure 2.6: Ludo board game with pieces and one of the dice on the board.
Figure 2.7: Chess board game with pieces shown on the board.
Figure 2.8: Fuzzy chess game developed by Prof. Philippe De Wilde. This
uses the fuzzy inference system in making the moves on the board.
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Figure 2.9: Ayo-Olopon or Oware game showing initial arrangement of seeds.
Figure 2.10: A board game of Nine Men’s Morris .
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Chapter 3
Fuzzy Logic Concepts
3.1 Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Sets
As the complexity of a system increases, the utility of fuzzy logic as a modeling
tool increases. For very complex systems, few numerical data may exist and only
ambiguous and imprecise information and knowledge is available. Fuzzy logic
allows approximate interpolation between input and output situations [92]
Fuzzy logic is a problem solving technique that was introduced by Lotfi Zadeh in
[93] to deal with vague or imprecise problems [17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 29, 36, 94, 95, 96].
It provides a framework that attempts to define a natural way of dealing with
problems in which the source of imprecision is the absence of sharply defined
criteria of class membership rather than the presence of random variables [93]. It
is used to model human reasoning and knowledge that do not have well defined
boundary. Although fuzzy logic covers a wide range of theories and techniques, it
is mainly based on four concepts: fuzzy sets, linguistic variables [97], possibility
distributions (membership functions), and fuzzy if-then-rules [22]. The values of
a linguistic variable are both quantitatively described by a fuzzy set. Possibility
distributions or membership functions are constraints on the value of a linguistic
variable imposed by assigning it a fuzzy set. Fuzzy if then rules are a knowledge
representation scheme for describing a functional mapping between antecedents
and consequents. A fuzzy inference system employs fuzzy if-then rules and can
model the qualitative aspects of human knowledge and reasoning processes without
employing precise quantitative analysis. Fuzzy inference systems are generally
36
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understandable because the knowledge in these systems is contained in the form
of fuzzy if-then rules containing membership functions [98].
The classical theory of crisp sets can describe only the membership or non-membership
of an item to a set[99]. While, fuzzy logic is based on the theory of fuzzy sets which
relates to classes of objects with unsharp boundaries in which membership is a mat-
ter of degree. In this approach, the classical notion of binary membership in a set
has been modified to include partial membership ranging between 0 and 1. The
membership function is described by an arbitrary curve suitable from the point of
view of simplicity, convenience, speed, and efficiency. A sharp set is a sub set of a
fuzzy set where the membership function can take only the values 0 and 1. The full
range of the model input values, which are judged necessary for the description of
the situation, can be used in fuzzy sets. The process of formulating the mapping
from a given input to an output using fuzzy logic is called the fuzzy inference. The
basic structure of any fuzzy inference system is a model that maps characteristics
of input data to input membership functions, input membership function to rules,
rules to a set of output characteristics, output characteristics to output member-
ship functions, and the output membership function to a single-valued output or
a decision associated with the output. In rule based fuzzy systems, the relation-
ships between variables are represented by means of fuzzy if-then rules such as
“IF antecedent proposition THEN consequent proposition” [100].
3.2 Fuzzy Thinking
Fuzzy logic is not logic that is fuzzy, but logic that is used to describe fuzziness [54].
Fuzzy logic theory is the theory of fuzzy sets, sets that calibrate vagueness. Fuzzy
logic is based on the idea that all things admit of degrees. Temperature, height,
speed, distance, beauty- all come on a sliding scale. For example, description such
as the music is very loud, the car is speeding very fast, Adesola is very beautiful,
Joshua is really tall, Modakeke is quite a long distance from Kaduna, Abuja is a
very large and beautiful city, the weather is really very cold. All these examples fall
on sliding scales which often makes them impossible to distinguish members of class
from non-members. Take for another instance, how do we answer a question: when
does weather becomes too cold? At what speed can a driver be accused of speeding
too fast? When does water becomes too hot? All these forms of vagueness or
uncertainty in a situation are very essential decisions that engineers should ponder
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before determining appropriate procedure or method to express the vagueness.
Boolean or conventional logic uses sharp distinctions, governed by a logic that
uses one of two values: true or false; it forces us to a line between members of
a class and non-members [54] whereas fuzzy logic provides a mathematical way
to represent vagueness and fuzziness in humanistic systems [53]. As a specific
example, in Boolean logic, we can easily determine when somebody is tall or short
based on the calibration of our measuring device. If we draw a line of 1.70m, then
in Boolean or binary logic sense, anybody below 1.70m is short and his membership
of the class of tall men in that regard is zero “0” and his membership of the class
of short men is one “1”. This will be the case for somebody such as Seyi, who
is 1.69m tall or Funmilayo who is 0.8m tall. They both belong to same class.
Similarly, Adesola and Peter who are 1.71m and 3.20m tall respectively would be
classified, in binary or crisp sense, as each having a membership value of one “1”
in the class of tall men and a membership value of zero “0” in the class of short
men. Fuzzy logic however, attempts to take human reasoning beyond a crisp value
of black and white or zero and one by introducing the degrees of membership. In
the notion of fuzzy logic, those four people mentioned above would be recognised
as being members of both short and tall men classes but to a certain degree or
membership values denoted as µ in the interval between 0 and 1 (i.e. [0, 1]).
3.3 Fuzzy Sets
A fuzzy set is a set containing elements that have varying degree of memberships in
the set [16, 22]. It can simply be defined as a set with fuzzy boundary [54]. Fuzzy
set theory has been applied to many disciplines such as control theory, manage-
ment sciences, mathematical modelling, operations research and many industrial
applications [101]. A key difference between crisp and fuzzy sets is their mem-
bership function; a crisp set has unique memberships, whereas a fuzzy set may
have an infinite number of memberships to represent it [53]. For fuzzy sets, the
uniqueness is sacrificed, but flexibility is gained because the membership function
can be adjusted to maximize the utility for a particular application. Elements of
a fuzzy set are mapped to a universe of membership values using function theo-
retic form. Fuzzy sets are denoted by different symbols in different publications,
however, in this thesis; a fuzzy set will be represented by a letter with a tilde on
top of it. That is, fuzzy set A will be represented by A˜ and membership of a set
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will be represented by µ. Therefore the functional mapping given by:
µA˜(x) ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the degree of membership of element x in fuzzy set A˜. Therefore, µA˜(x) is
a value on the unit interval that measures the degree to which element x belongs
to fuzzy set A˜.
A fuzzy set is defined by a membership function, it consists of some elements x
of a universe of discourse X together with their membership values (or degrees)
µa(x) [102] .
3.4 Membership Functions
In order to represent a fuzzy set in a computer, the membership function must
be determined first. The membership function embodies the mathematical repre-
sentation of membership of elements in a set [53]. All information contained in
a fuzzy set is described by its membership function and it is useful to develop a
lexicon of terms to analyse various special features of this function. There are a
number of methods that can be used here such as seeking the knowledge of a single
or multiple experts in the field. The use of artificial neural networks can also be
implemented. This learns available system operation data and then derives the
fuzzy sets automatically [54]. Membership functions can be represented graphi-
cally by different shapes such as triangle, trapezium and so on. In this research,
we shall restrict ourselves to the use of triangular and trapezoidal membership
functions [103] as shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2.
We choose triangular membership functions because they can be specified by just
three parameters, and this speeds up the learning procedure when the membership
function shapes are adapted. Triangular membership functions are very general,
and their versatility has been studied in [103, 104]. The range of our fuzzy variables
is arbitrary; in a practical application such as in Section 5, the actual range of
demand, production cost and so on would be re-scaled. What is important is
that on the range, we define four or five membership functions. The number of
membership functions is our choice of granularity in the examples.
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The universe of discourse is a set X, discrete ({x1, . . . , xn}), or continuous (union
of intervals on the real line). Therefore, a membership function is a function
µA : X → [0, 1] [102].
       Membership functions of x 
         1 
 
 
0                    xi    
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Membership functions of set x. 
      Membership functions of y 
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Figure 3.2: Membership functions of set y.
3.5 Linguistic Variables and Hedges
Linguistic variables are fuzzy variables while hedges are concentrations which tend
to concentrate the elements of a fuzzy sets by reducing the degree of all elements
that are only ‘partly’ in the set. The less an element is in a set (i.e. the lower
its original membership value), the more it is reduced in membership through
concentration [53]. For example, in a statement such as ‘Adesola is very beautiful’
means that the linguistic variable Adesola takes beautiful as its linguistic value
and has very as its hedge. Other examples of edges are slightly, very very, plus,
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minus, moderately. They are generally useful operators which can also be used to
break down continuums into fuzzy intervals.
3.5.1 Operations on Fuzzy Sets
Most of all the properties and operations on crisp sets are applicable to fuzzy sets.
Examples of these operations are: intersection, union, complementary, contain-
ment, commutativity, associativity, indempotency, identity, transitivity, involution
and De Morgan’s laws.
3.5.1.1 Basic Logic Operations on Fuzzy Logic
The following are some of the basic operations on fuzzy logic [105]:
• AND Operation: µA∩B(x) = min(µA(x), µB(x)), ∀x ∈ X.
• OR Operation: µA∪B(x) = max(µA(x), µB(x)), ∀x ∈ X.
• NOT Operation: µ¬A(x) = 1− µA(x), ∀x ∈ X.
• Extension Principle: A function transforming a set into another set will
transform a membership function into another membership function, using
the extension principle [102].
• If f : X → Y is a function transforming universe of discourse X into Y , then
fuzzy set µA(x) is transformed into µB(y):
µB(y) =
{
maxy=f(x) µa(x) if f
−1(y) 6= ∅,
0 otherwise.
3.5.2 Decision Making under Uncertainty or Fuzziness
According to Lofti Zadeh in [106], much of the decision-making in the real world
takes place in an environment in which the goals, the constraints and the conse-
quences of possible actions are not known precisely. Before fuzzy set theory was
introduced, to deal quantitatively with imprecision, we usually employ the con-
cepts and techniques of probability theory [107] and, more particularly, the tools
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provided by decision theory, control theory and information theory. In so do-
ing, we are tacitly accepting the premise that imprecision-whatever its nature-can
be equated with randomness [106]. Although, probability theory is appropriate
for measuring randomness of information, it is inappropriate for measuring the
meaning of information[108].
Linguistic decision analysis is based on the use of the linguistic approach and it
is applied for solving decision making problems under linguistic information by
employing the theory of fuzzy sets. Its application in the development of the
theory and methods in decision analysis is very beneficial because it introduces a
more flexible framework which allows us to represent the information in a more
direct and adequate way when we are unable to express it precisely. In this way,
the burden of quantifying a qualitative concept is eliminated [61].
Let X be a set of options. A fuzzy goal is a fuzzy set µG(x), x ∈ X. A fuzzy
constraint is a fuzzy set µC(x), x ∈ X.
A fuzzy decision is a fuzzy set µD(x), x ∈ X, with
µD(x) = min(µG(x), µC(x)).
A crisp decision x∗ can be derived from a fuzzy decision by defuzzification:
x∗ = arg max
x∈X
µD(x).
There are several ways to defuzzify of fuzzy set, for example the centre of gravity
of the area under the curve can be taken to get the defuzzified results. An example
of a decision making graph according to Philippe De Wilde in [102] is as shown in
Figure 3.3
3.5.2.1 Uncertainty of a Functional Dependency
• Uncertainty can be represented by additive noise, e.g.
y = x2 + ξ,
with ξ a random variable.
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x∗ is the decision, subject to constraints C and goal G.
Philippe De Wilde 2. Introduction to fuzzy logic
Figure 3.3: x∗ is the decision, subject to constraints C and goal G.
• The noise can also be on the parameters of the functional relationship, e.g.
y = x(2+ξ),
or
y = ξx2.
• Zadeh proposed a radically different way of looking at this, where the curve of
a function becomes a union of squares, and each point in the union belongs to
the function to a certain degree. This is the fuzzy graph shown in Figure 3.4
[1, 102].
3.5.2.2 Union of Cartesian Products
The fuzzy graph is a union: (A1 ×B1) ∪ (A2 ×B2) ∪ . . . (An ×Bn).
Also the fuzzy graph could also be expressed as a union:
(A1 ×B1) ∪ (A2 ×B2) ∪ . . . (An ×Bm).
For example, if y-axis has four numbers and x-axis has five numbers, then the
fuzzy graph could be expressed as:
(A1 ×B1) ∪ (A2 ×B2) ∪ (A3 ×B3) ∪ (A4 ×B4) ∪ (A5 ×B4).
If X and Y are universes of discourse, f ∗ : X → Y is a fuzzy graph if:
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Figure 3.4: Fuzzy graph [1].
• f ∗ = ⋃ i=1,n
j=1,m
Ai ×Bj,
• µf∗(u, v) = maxi min(µAi(u), µBj(v)), u ∈ X, v ∈ Y.
3.5.3 Fuzzy Associative Memory
To further illustrate the functions of fuzzy associative memory (FAM) [109], con-
sider sampled fuzzy rules below which illustrate the application of fuzzy logic in
the automobile:
3.5.3.1 Fuzzy Control: Rules for Stopping a Car
• 1 input, 1 rule, 1 output
If you go too fast, brake hard.
• 1 input, 2 rules, 1 output
If you go too fast, brake hard, or, if you go fast, brake.
• 2 inputs, 4 rules, 1 output
If you go too fast and the wall is very close, brake hard, or
If you go fast and the wall is very close, brake, or
If you go too fast and the wall is close, brake, or
If you go fast and the wall is close, slow down.
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too fast fast
very close brake hard brake
close brake slow down
Table 3.1: Fuzzy associative memory (FAM) table for a two-input one-output
rule system.
µ21 µ
2
2 µ
2
3 . . .
µ11 µ11 µ12 µ13 . . .
µ12 µ21 µ22 µ23 . . .
µ13 µ31 µ32 µ33 . . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
Table 3.2: Fuzzy associative memory (FAM) table for n-inputs and n-outputs
rule system.
Based on the rules above, the fuzzy associative memory (FAM) table can be formed
as shown in Table 3.1 for two inputs fuzzy inference system while Table 3.2 shows
the FAM table for many inputs, many outputs fuzzy inference systems. The tables
illustrate how an expert makes use of fuzzy rules in making decisions.
3.5.3.2 Two Inputs Fire Rules
From Tables 3.1 and 3.2 the two inputs firing rules of the fuzzy inference system
can be illustrated as follows:
• 2 inputs x1 and x2
• x1 belongs to the input membership functions:
µ11, µ
1
2, µ
1
3, . . . to degrees µ
1
1(x
1), µ12(x
1), µ13(x
1), . . ..
• x2 belongs to the input membership functions:
µ21, µ
2
2, µ
2
3, . . . to degrees µ
2
1(x
2), µ22(x
2), µ23(x
2), . . ..
• output membership function µij fires at degree
min[µ1i (x
1), µ2j(x
2)], using min because of the ‘and’ in the rules.
• output membership function µij is truncated at min[µ1i (x1), µ2j(x2)].
The steps involved in truncation of the membership functions which is illustrated
in Figure 3.5 are as itemized below:
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z
µij(z) 
truncation
= min
{
µij(z),min[µ1i (x
1), µ2j (x
2)]
}
= min
[
µij(z), µ1i (x
1), µ2j (x
2)
]
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Figure 3.5: Truncated output membership function.
• = min{µij(z),min[µ1i (x1), µ2j(x2)]}
• = min [µij(z), µ1i (x1), µ2j(x2)]
3.5.3.3 Combination of all Output Membership Functions
All output membership functions are then combined as shown in Figure 3.6 and
the processes involved are as summarized below:
• Max, because a collection of rules is combined with ‘or’.
• maxi,j min
[
µij(z), µ
1
i (x
1), µ2j(x
2)
]
• Sum can be used instead of max.
3.5.3.4 Defuzzification Using Centre of Gravity
The final stage of the fuzzy inference system is the defuzzification stage and the
details involved are as summerized below:
• f(z) = maxi,j min
[
µij(z), µ
1
i (x
1), µ2j(x
2)
]
• Centre of gravity y =
∫∞
−∞ zf(z)dz∫∞
−∞ f(z)dz
• y is the defuzzified output, the control
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maxi,j min
[
µij(z), µ1i (x
1), µ2j (x
2)
]
Sum can be used instead of max.
 
z
Philippe De Wilde 2. Introduction to fuzzy logicFigure 3.6: Combination of all Output Membership Functions.
3.5.4 Fuzzy Rules
Generally, fuzzy rules are conditional statements in the form of IF-THEN state-
ments [110]. The simplest fuzzy rules are of the form If X is A˜i THEN Y is E˜j
where A˜i and E˜j are fuzzy sets for the domains of X and Y [13]. More complex
rules which will be used in this research will consist of several input and output
variables. For example; If X is A˜i and Y is E˜j THEN Z1 is C˜1k and Z2 is C˜2k.
The statements before THEN is referred to as the antecedent while that after is
referred to as consequent part. X, Y and Z are linguistic variables while A˜i, E˜j,
C˜1k and C˜2k are linguistic values.
3.6 Fuzzy Decision Making System
In general, a fuzzy decision making system (FDMS) uses a collection of fuzzy
membership functions (Figure 3.1 on page 40) and decision rules [111] that are
solicited from experts in the field to reason about data [22]. Typical components
of a fuzzy decision making system are as shown in Figure 4.1(a) on page 76. The
components of an FDMS, as shown in the figure are; a fuzzification section, a fuzzy
rule base, fuzzy decision logic and defuzzification section [19].
1. Fuzzification section: This is the section where the process of making a crisp
quantity fuzzy [53] is carried out. This is done by simply recognising that
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InputB/Input A A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
B1 X1 X4 X1 X3
B2 X4 X5 X1 X2
B3 X4 X4 X3 X2 X2
B4 X1 X1 X4 X4 X1
Table 3.3: Fuzzy associative memory (FAM) table for a two-input one-output
rule system.
many of the quantities that we considered to be crisp and deterministic are
actually not deterministic at all. They carry considerable uncertainty. If the
form of uncertainty happens to arise because of imprecision, ambiguity, or
vagueness, then the variable is probably fuzzy and can be represented by a
membership function.
2. Fuzzy rule base: These rules are expressed in conventional antecedent-consequent
form. The collection of such rules constitutes the fuzzy logic knowledge base
that is used for inference of the decision agent. In a fuzzy system, if the
antecedent is true to some degree, then the consequent is also true to that
same degree. For a small number of inputs, there exists a compact form of
representing a fuzzy rule-based system which consists of a tabular format
with different partitions representing different inputs. This compact graph-
ical form is called fuzzy associative memory table, or FAM table as shown
in Table 3.3. Further explanations on FAM are offered in Section 3.5.3 on
page 44 of this thesis.
In FAM, the linguistic values of one input variable form the horizontal axis
and the linguistic values of the other input form the vertical axis. At the
intersection of a row and a column lies the linguistic value of the output
variable. A rule is said to ‘fire’, if the degree of truth of the premise part of
the rule is not zero [22]. The implication is implemented for each rule and
in Matlab [112], many built-in methods are supported such as the functions
that are used by the AND method: min(minimum), which truncates the
output fuzzy set, prod (product), which scales the output fuzzy set. Here, the
AND method was used and the centroid was computed using the Mamdani-
type inference system which requires the output membership functions to
be fuzzy sets after the aggregation process. It (Mamdani FIS) integrates,
using Equation 3.1 on page 50, across a two-dimensional function to find the
centroid [113].
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3. The decision making logic (DML): The decision making logic is analogous to
classical logic for reasoning [53] and it is similar to simulating human decision
making in inferring fuzzy control actions based on the rules of inference in
fuzzy logic [22].
4. Defuzzification process : This is the procedure that converts the fuzzy results
into a crisp output. It converts a fuzzy control action (a fuzzy output)
into a non-fuzzy control action (a crisp output) [22, 114]. Defuzzification
has the result of reducing a fuzzy set to a crisp single-valued output, or
to a crisp set; of converting a fuzzy matrix to a crisp matrix; or making a
fuzzy number a crisp number. Fuzziness helps to evaluate the rules, but the
final output of a fuzzy system has to be a crisp number and the input for
the defuzzification process is the aggregate output fuzzy set and the output
is a single number [54]. Mathematically, the defuzzification of a fuzzy set
is the process of ‘rounding off’ from its location in the unit hypercube to
the nearest (in a geometric sense) vertex. If one thinks of a fuzzy set as a
collection of membership values, or a vector of values on the unit interval,
defuzzification reduces this vector to a single scalar quantity - presumably to
the most typical (prototype) or representative value [53]. The fuzzy output
is obtained from aggregating the outputs from the firing of the rules [92].
Subsequent defuzzification methods on the fuzzy output produce a crisp
value.
Several defuzzification methods have been discussed in the literature such as
[22, 53, 54]. Among these methods are the following:
• Max membership principle.
• Centroid method.
• Weighted average method.
• Mean max membership.
• Center of sums.
• Center of largest area.
• First (or last) of maxima
For extensive explanation on each of the above methods, please see[22, 53,
54]. In this research, we used the centroid method and we shall give a brief
explanation of it.
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In fuzzy logic control systems, the defuzzification step involves the selection
of one value as the output of the controller. More specifically, starting with
a fuzzy subset (possibility distribution) F over the output space X of the
controller, the defuzzification step uses this fuzzy subset to select a represen-
tative element x∗. The two most often used methods of defuzzification found
in the literature are the center of area (COA) and mean of maxima (MOM)
methods. The MOM method takes as its defuzzified value, the mean of the
elements that attain the maximum membership grade in F [115]
Centroid defuzzification method : This method is also referred to as centre of
area (COA) or centre of gravity (COG). It is the most commonly used [22],
most popular [54], most physically intuitive [53] defuzzification technique and
it finds the point where a vertical line would slice the aggregate set into two
equal masses. In theory, the centroid method of defuzzification is calculated
over a continuum of points in the aggregate output membership function but
in practice, a reasonable estimate can be obtained by calculating it over a
sample of points. Mathematically, the centroid method can be expressed as:
COG =
∫
µA˜(x)x dx∫
µA˜(x) dx
. (3.1)
COG =
∑
µA˜(x)x∑
µA˜(x)
(3.2)
Fuzzy inference techniques : In general, fuzzy decision making system can be
implemented using any of the three common methods of deductive inference
for fuzzy systems based on linguistic rules [53] and these methods are listed
as follows:
• Mamdani system
• Sugeno systems
• Tsukamoto models
3.6.1 Fuzzy Inference Techniques
In fuzzy inference experiments there are two main types of Inference techniques
(FIS) and these are: the Mamdani-type [113] and the Takagi-Sugeno (T-S)-type
[116]. These are later referred to as Type I and Type III inference techniques
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respectively . The differences between these two FISs lie in the consequents of
their fuzzy rules, and thus their aggregation and defuzzification procedures differ
accordingly [117].
3.6.1.1 Comparison of Mamdani and Takagi-Sugeno Model
In terms of use, the Mamdani FIS is more widely used, mostly because it provides
reasonable results with a relatively simple structure, and also due to the intuitive
and interpretable nature of the rule base. Since the consequents of the rules in a T-
S FIS are not fuzzy this interpretability is lost; however, since the T-S FIS’s rules’
consequents can have as many parameters per rule as input values, this translates
into more degrees of freedom in the design than a Mamdani FIS thus providing
the system’s designer with more flexibility in the design of the system. However,
it should be noted that the Mamdani FIS can be used directly for either MISO
systems (multiple input single output) as well as for MIMO systems (multiple
input multiple output), while the T-S FIS can only be used in MISO systems
[118].
In currently available adaptive fuzzy inference systems the fuzzy rules follow the
Takagi, Sugeno, and Kang (T-S) style, sometimes called Type III. T-S rules have
been shown to be more robust than Mamdani style rules, sometimes called Type
I. However, Type I rules are easier to understand and can sometimes generalize
better than Type III rules. A Type I rule is more intuitive than a Type III rule;
the consequence is a fuzzy variable. The consequences of Type III rules are a
linear combination of the antecedent labels therefore these rules may not be any
easier to understand [98]. T-S adopts a linear equation in consequent part, which
can not exhibit human’s judgment reasonably.
Ebrahim Mamdani in 1975 [113] proposed the scheme which was the very first
attempt to control a steam engine and boiler combination by synthesizing a set
of linguistic control rules obtained from experienced human operators [117] and
Takagi-Sugeno (T-S) FIS was proposed to develop a systematic approach to gen-
erate fuzzy rules from a given input-output data [116]. The T-S fuzzy inference
system works well with linear techniques and guarantees continuity of the output
surface. But the T-S fuzzy inference system has difficulties in dealing with the
multi-parameter synthetic evaluation; it has difficulties in assigning weight to each
input and fuzzy rules.
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In the T-S fuzzy model, the rule consequents are usually taken to be either crisp
numbers or linear functions [100]. In general, T-S fuzzy modeling involves struc-
ture identification and parameter identification. The structure identification con-
sists of initial rule generation after elimination of insignificant variables, in the
form of IF-THEN rules and their fuzzy sets. Parameter identification includes
consequent parameter identification based on certain objective criteria. In many
situations, such rules are difficult to identify by manual inspection and therefore
are usually derived from observed data using techniques known collectively as
fuzzy clustering [100].
The Takagi-Sugeno scheme is a data driven approach where membership functions
and rules are developed using a training data set. The parameters for the mem-
bership functions and rules are subsequently optimized to reduce training error.
The relationship in each rule is represented by a localized linear function. The
final output is a weighted average of a set of crisp values.
In this research, we used the Mamdani inference system. We adopted the Mamdani
method which according to Chai et al in [119] has advantages in consequent part.
According to [119], other advantages of the Mamdani fuzzy inference system are:
• It is intuitive.
• It has widespread acceptance.
• It’s well suited to human cognition
3.6.1.2 Mamdani Fuzzy Inference Technique
The Mamdani scheme is a type of fuzzy relational model where each rule is rep-
resented by an IF-THEN relationship. It is also called a linguistic model because
both the antecedent and the consequent are fuzzy propositions. The model struc-
ture is manually developed and the final model is neither trained nor optimized.
The output from a Mamdani model is a fuzzy membership function based on the
rules created. Since this approach is not exclusively reliant on a data set, with
sufficient expertise on the system involved, a generalized model for effective future
predictions can be obtained [92].
Since Mamdani fuzzy inference system shows its advantage in the output expres-
sion, we therefore used Mandani inference system (FIS) in this thesis. The process
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truncates the output membership functions at their maximum value [53]. The
model has the ability of learning because of differentiability during computation
and has greater superiority in expression of consequent part and intuitive of fuzzy
reasoning.
Moreover, the Mamdani model is a universal approximator because of its infinite
approximating capability by training. All parameters in Mamdani FIS are non-
linear parameters which can be adjusted by learning rules discussed above. The
experimental results show that this model is superior to others in amount of ad-
justed parameters, scale of training data, consume time and testing error. It does
well in non-linear modeling and forecasting [119].
3.7 Optimization of Fuzzy Membership Functions
Optimization deals with the ideas of tracking optimum operating conditions of
systems [120]. The subject of function minimization is both important and ubiq-
uitous in the physical sciences. This is easily demonstrated by noting that it is
involved in a very wide variety of areas ranging from finding roots of polynomi-
als and solving simultaneous equations to estimating the parameters of non-linear
functions [121, 122]. In a fuzzy logic system, the membership functions can be pa-
rameterized by a few variables and the membership optimization problem can be
reduced to a parameter optimization [123] problem if we constrain the membership
functions to a specific shape such as triangles and trapezoids [124].
Fuzzy parameters refer to the parameters that define the membership functions of
a fuzzy logic system. For instance, if we are using triangular membership functions,
then the fuzzy parameters would be the centers and half-widths of the triangles
[124].
Researchers have used many different methods over the past decade to optimize
fuzzy membership functions. According to Dan Simon in [124], the methods can
be broadly divided into two types: those that explicitly use the derivatives of the
fuzzy system’s performance with respect to the fuzzy parameters, and those that
do not use these derivatives. Derivative-free methods include genetic algorithms
[125, 126], neural networks, evolutionary programming, geometric methods, fuzzy
equivalence relations, and heuristic methods. Derivative-based methods include
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gradient descent [127], Kalman filtering [128], least squares, back propagation, and
other numerical techniques [124].
Derivative-based methods are limited by dependency on analytical derivatives.
They are also limited to specific objective functions, specific types of inference,
and specific types of membership functions [124].
In this research, we have used the Nelder-Mead simplex method to optimize the
fuzzy logic membership functions. The algorithm is as explained in the sections
that follow.
3.7.1 Nelder-Mead Method of Optimization
Nelder-Mead algorithm [120] is a simplex method for finding a local minimum of
a function of several variables [129]. The method [120] describes the minimization
of a function of n variables, which depends on the comparison of function values
at the (n + 1) vertices of a general simplex, followed by the replacement of the
vertex with the highest value by another point. The simplex adapts itself to the
local landscape, and contracts on to the final minimum. The method is shown to
be effective and computationally compact. A procedure is given for the estimation
of the Hessian matrix in the neighbourhood of the minimum, needed in statistical
estimation problems.
The Nelder-Mead simplex method also refer to as “amoeba algorithm” in [130] is a
“direct” method requiring no derivatives [121]. The objective function is evaluated
at the vertices of a simplex, and movement is away from the poorest value. The
process is adaptive, causing the simplexes to be continually revised to best conform
to the nature of the response surface.
It is an enormously popular direct search method for multidimensional uncon-
strained minimization [131]. In the method, the simplex adapts itself to the local
landscape, elongating down long inclined planes, changing direction on encoun-
tering a valley at an angle, and contracting in the neighbourhood of a minimum.
The criterion for stopping the process has been chosen with an eye to its use for
statistical problems involving the maximization of a likelihood function, in which
the unknown parameters enter non-linearly [120].
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The Nelder-Mead method attempts to minimize a scalar-valued nonlinear function
[132] of n real variables using only function values, without any derivative informa-
tion (explicit or implicit). The Nelder-Mead method thus falls in the general class
of direct search methods. A large subclass of direct search methods, including the
Nelder-Mead method, maintain at each step a nondegenerate simplex, a geometric
figure in n dimensions of nonzero volume that is the convex hull of n+ 1 vertices
[131].
Each iteration of a simplex-based direct search method begins with a simplex,
specified by its n+1 vertices and the associated function values. One or more test
points are computed, along with their function values, and the iteration terminates
with a new (different) simplex such that the function values at its vertices satisfy
some form of descent condition compared to the previous simplex. Among such
algorithms, the Nelder-Mead algorithm is particularly parsimonious in function
evaluations per iteration, since in practice, it typically requires only one or two
function evaluations to construct a new simplex [131].
3.7.2 Why Nelder-Mead Algorithm?
Since Nelder Mead algorithm uses simplex methods and our fuzzy membership
functions are of simplex shapes (triangles and trapeziums), therefore the algorithm
proves more effective and is computationally more efficient than other optimization
methods for our model. The method is selected because it is simple, can be
programmed on a computer fairly easily and it is derivative-free [133]. Derivative-
free method is desired since they do not use numerical or analytical gradients and
can be applied to a wide range of objective functions and membership function
forms.
Other main points of using the Nelder-Mead algorithm are the generality of the
method, its accuracy, and the simplicity of the information required for the com-
puter input statements. It can handle a wide variety of optimization problems,
without requiring any modifications tailored to the problem at hand [121]. It can
accommodate angle and angle rate as input variables [134].
Since its publication in 1965, the Nelder-Mead “simplex” algorithm has become
one of the most widely used methods for nonlinear unconstrained optimization
[131].
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Further applications of this method which show other types of problems it can
solve in comparison with alternative algorithms can be found in different papers
such as [120], [131] and [121].
Lagarian et al in [131], offered three other reasons the Nelder-Mead Algorithm is
widely acceptable and so extraordinarily popular and these are: First, in many
applications, for example in industrial process control, one simply wants to find
parameter values that improve some performance measures; the Nelder-Mead al-
gorithm typically produces significant improvement for the first few iterations.
Second, there are important applications where a function evaluation is enor-
mously expensive or time-consuming, but derivatives cannot be calculated. In
such problems, a method that requires at least n function evaluations at every it-
eration (which would be the case if using finite difference gradient approximations
or one of the more popular pattern search methods) is too expensive or too slow.
When it succeeds, the Nelder-Mead method tends to require substantially fewer
function evaluations than these alternatives, and its relative “best-case efficiency”
often outweighs the lack of convergence theory. Third, the Nelder-Mead method
is appealing because its steps are easy to explain and simple to program.
3.7.3 Nelder-Mead Concepts
If we have two variables, then a simplex is a triangle, and the method represents a
pattern search that compares the values of the function at the three vertices of the
triangle. The model will reject the vertex, where value of the function f(a, b) is
highest and it will then replace this vertex with a new vertex. This translates into a
new triangle and the search will continue from there. This algorithm will generate
many triangles and these triangles may be of different shapes. In each subsequent
triangle, the function values at the vertices become gradually smaller from each
iteration. The triangles’ sizes are reduced and we then find the coordinates of the
minimum point. The algorithm is stated using the term simplex (a generalized
triangle in N dimensions) and will find the minimum of a function of N variables.
It is effective and computationally compact [129].
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3.7.3.1 Formulating the Initial Triangle with Vertices P,T and Q
Consider f(a, b) as a function that needs to be minimized. Let us start with a
triangle with three vertices: Mr = (ar, br), r = 1, 2, 3. At each of the three points:
er = f(ar, br) for r = 1, 2, 3., we will then evaluate f(a, b). Then we will reorder
the subscripts such that e1 ≤ e2 ≤ e3. The following notations are used:
P = (a1, b1), T = (a2, b2) and Q = (a3, b3) (3.3)
In equation 3.3, P is considered to be the best vertex, this follows by T as the as
good vertex (meaning that vertex T is next to the best) and finally, the vertex Q
is considered to be the worst of the three vertices.
3.7.3.2 Calculating the center of the good side
Considering the initial triangle shown in Figure 3.7 on page 57, in using Nelder-
Mead algorithm, the iteration processes begin by calculating the midpoint of the
segment line that joins points P and T of the triangle PTQ. We will get this by
finding the average of the two points.
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Figure 3.7: Initial triangle PTQ of Nelder-Mead algorithm.
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N =
P + T
2
=
(
a1 + a2
2
,
b1 + b2
2
)
(3.4)
3.7.3.3 Reflect to Point Z through PT
The value of the function f(a, b) reduces as it proceeds on the side of the triangle
along the line segment QP starting from point Q to point P. The function also
reduces when proceeding from point Q to T. It can then be thought that f(a, b)
values may be smaller at a point that lies on the opposite side of line PT and
away from point Q. This is as illustrated in Figure 3.8. By reflecting the triangle
through the side of the line segment PT, we can choose a point Z as a test point.
In order to calculate the point Z, we need to first determine the center of the line
segment PT. We will denote this center point of PT as N. We can then draw a
line segment of length u from point Q to point N. In order to locate our earlier
chosen point Z, we need to extend the last segment QN by a distance u further,
through N. These are as shown in Figure 3.8. We can then obtain the formula for
the vector Z as follows:
Z = N + (N −Q) = 2N −Q. (3.5)
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Figure 3.8: Modified triangle PTQ, the center point N and reflected point
Z.
3.7.3.4 Expanding the line QZ to H
To find out if we have moved in the right direction of finding the minimum, we will
need to compare the values of the function f(a, b) at point Z to its value at point
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Q. If it is smaller at point Z than at point Q, then we have moved in the right way.
We will then need to expand the triangle PTZ to form another triangle PTH by
extending the line joining point N and Z to another point H. The length of the
newly formed line segment ZH is of distance u as shown in Figure 3.9. We then
need to compare the values of the function f(a, b) at the newly formed point H
to that of the former point Z. We will know that we have found a better vertex at
point H if the function value is smaller there than its value at point Z. We can
then obtain the formula for the vector H as follows:
H = Z + (Z −N) = 2Z −N. (3.6)
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Figure 3.9: New triangle PTQ, points Z, and H.
3.7.3.5 Shrinking toward Point C
If however the function value at point Z is not smaller than its value at point Q
but both rather have the same values, then we need to test another point. It may
be that the function value is smaller at point N and since we must have a triangle,
therefore, we cannot replace point Q with point N. We will need to consider two
center points K1 and K2 for the line segments QN and NZ, respectively. These
are as shown in Figure 3.10. We will consider the function f(a, b) values at these
two new points and we will refer to the point with smaller function value as point
K. A new triangle PTK is then formed.
3.7.3.6 Contraction toward Point P
We will again check the function value at the new point K and should the value at
K found to be not less than the function value at Q, we will then need to shrink
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Figure 3.10: The triangle PTQ, showing the shrunk points K1, and K2.
the points T and Q toward P as shown in Figure 3.11. Then we replace point T
with N and Q with F. This new point F is the center of the line segment that
joins P with Q.
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Figure 3.11: The triangle PTQ, showing line QT shrunk toward point P.
3.7.3.7 Computation and Decision at each Vertex
In this PhD research, we used computer programs in Matlab [135] to perform these
computations and at each step, new vertices are produced, the program checks the
function value at each new vertex and compares it to the previous vertex. These
processes continue until a desirable solution has been achieved.
A simple flow chart that illustrates the steps involved in Nelder-Mead simplex
algorithm which we used for our fuzzy logic membership functions optimization is
as shown in Figure 3.12 on page 61.
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Figure 3.12: Summary of steps involved in Nelder-Mead simplex search
method.
In this research, the design and implementation of this fuzzy decision making
system was achieved with the aid of Matlab software. Matlab is a menu driven
software [135] that allows the implementation of fuzzy constructs like membership
functions and a database of decision rules [22].
Chapter 3. Fuzzy Logic Concepts 62
3.8 Research Background
The background work for this research was based on extensive search of numerous
publications as listed in the reference section of this thesis. These include those on
game theory, fuzzy logic concepts, microeconomic theories, membership functions
optimization techniques, decision making processes in different situations such as
in firms, military, and other related situations.
However, specific attention was paid to the research that was carried out by Braa-
then and Sendstad in [13]. In that research, they used fuzzy logic theory and
a constraint satisfaction problem approach to model automatic decision making
processes in a military context. The decision agent was applied in two different
types of simulation games to prove the general applicability of the design. The
first game discussed a two sided zero sum application sequential resource allocation
game with imperfect information which was interpreted as an air campaign game
while the second was a network flow stochastic board game designed to capture
important aspects of land maneuver operations. The fuzzy logic/constraint satis-
faction problem (FL/CSP) decision agent was trained to optimize its performance
against some measures.
In [13], two players; blue and red played against each other in which each player
chose to allocate its resources on three roles: defense, profit and attack. The
game comprised a two stage fuzzy inference system (FIS). The design of the au-
tomatic decision making in the simulation game considered both the generation
of the set of moves and the evaluation of strategies based upon a ranking mea-
sure. It was labelled a modular mixed approach because the agent decomposed
the implementation into several modules and rendered possible the combination
of a constructive (human) and an evaluation (machine) type move generation ap-
proach. The training of the decision agent was done as an optimization of the FL
parameters by playing a series of training games with performance measure based
on game payoffs. The procedure that was adopted optimized the fuzzy logic (FL)
parameters by minimizing the difference between the agent’s performance measure
value and game theoretic payoff value (or its estimates). It was concluded that
the design could be generally useful for designing automatic decision agents in
simulation game models.
Chapter 4
Research Methodology and
General Illustration
In the first year of the PhD, we designed a model which was termed as fuzzy
decision making system for business games (FDMSB) [52], and this is what we
have summarised in this chapter.
4.1 Players’ Strategies
A strategy is a decision rule that specifies how the player will act in every possible
circumstance [136]. It is a specific course of action taken by the firm. This will
involve the firm allocating values to its policy variables. These policy variables
are generally those aspects of its activities that the firm can directly affect and
may include price, spending on promotion, marketing, research and development
and so on. For each strategy of this firm, its rival (or rivals) may adopt counter-
strategies [42].
The outcome of a game will depend upon the strategies employed by every player.
In games, any pure strategy, which can be rejected by comparing it with the other
pure strategies and finding that there are others which are always better under
every circumstance, is a dominated strategy and will not enter into a solution [9]
In our experiment, each player is given five units of initial resources which may
represent capital, time, personnel or other business resources. In this case study, we
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assume capital (say £5M). In each round, the players may choose to allocate their
resources to one of three roles: consolidation efforts (C), reserved or generated
wealth (W ) and aggressive marketing efforts (M). These resource allocations will
be done simultaneously by both players. Only the opponent’s move history will be
known, but without knowledge of the opponent’s current choice of strategy. The
allocations are denoted as a vector [C,W,M ] for each player and constitute the
strategy of that player.
Consolidation efforts C refer to the proportion of resources that are spent to
retain existing customers (if any) such as various customer service improvements,
customer care, satisfaction, delight and customer retention initiatives. Marketing
aggressiveness M denotes the part of these resources that are allocated to various
advertising, marketing and promotional campaigns. These are principally targeted
towards getting new customers. Reserved wealth W refers to part of the resources
that are kept unused in the firm’s coffer.
As examples of players’ strategies, consider a firm Y that is a new entrant into
a market. Y does not have existing customers to consolidate at the start of the
game and therefore has C = 0. It may then decide to allocate all or most of
its resources on advertising (marketing) campaigns M . If it chooses to allocate
all to marketing M = 5, then its strategy [Cy,Wy,My] becomes [0, 0, 5]. This is
considered to be the strongest strategy. We refer to it in Section 4.2 Step 11, as
globally optimizing player (Geq).
Assume Y enters the market with a much reduced price Esp (probably as a result
of new technology which leads to reduced production cost Cp). If it is economically
impossible for the incumbent (existing) firm G to cut its price to the same level due
to its high production cost Cp, G may decide to devote most of its resources (say
£4M) to consolidate its existing customers in order to retain its market share. It
may then decide to allocate the remaining resources Mg to market new customers.
Therefore, G’s strategy [Cg,Wg,Mg] becomes [0, 4, 1].
The difference between strategies of different players is the proportion, number
or amount that each player decides to allocate to each component of his own
strategy [C,W,M ] out of his available total resources (say £5M). This is how firms
allocate resources to their core strategies for competition (such as advertisement)
and how these allocations could affect their payoffs in an uncertain or fuzzy market
environment.
Chapter 4. Research Methodology and General Illustration 65
The variables in our models can be tailored to the business situations in the real
world and therefore are not limited to those variables that we have used in de-
signing the system as we further explained in Section 1.3.1 on page 7. Therefore,
this model can be applied to any real business situation and the variables can be
adapted to suit the situation in question.
The model can also work for systems that have more strategic variables than those
that we have used in this model.
4.2 Fuzzy Decision Making System for Business
Games (FDMSB)
The model for our proposed fuzzy decision making system for business games
(FDMSB) is as shown in Figure 4.1(b) on page 76.
Our FDMSB involves two players (firms) in a typical duopoly market which we
shall represent as green (g) and yellow (y) which represents the fuzzy agent. Each
player is given five units of initial resources which may represent capital, time,
personnel or other business resources. In our case we assume capital (say £5M).
The number of rounds the game must be played is five which denotes a sequence
of five possible moves for each player. In each round, the players may choose
to allocate their units between three roles (strategies): consolidation efforts (C),
reserved or generated wealth (W ) and aggressive marketing efforts (M). These
resources allocation will be done simultaneously with only the opponent move
history that will be known but without knowledge of the opponent’s current choice
of strategy and are denoted as vector [C,W,M ] for each player.
The general procedures necessary for designing the proposed decision support sys-
tem (FDMSB) are as listed in the steps below:
1. List all uncertain (fuzzy) factors that will be considered in taking the business
decision: the uncertain or fuzzy information (factors) we are taking into
consideration in this illustration are anticipated market demand information
(D) and the production costs(CP ).
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D/CP Low Medium High
Very Low very low very low very low
low low low low
Medium medium medium low
High medium high medium
Table 4.1: FAM table for expected market consolidation(Ec) efforts as output.
2. Determine the strategies of the players: Here, we are adopting three strate-
gies for each player and these strategies are consolidation effort, wealth cre-
ated or reserved and aggressive marketing efforts denoted as a vector with
three elements [C,W,M ]. As an illustration of a duopoly system, we have
two players (firms) represented as green (g) with strategy represented as
[Cg,Wg,Mg] and yellow (y) with strategy represented as [Cy,Wy,My].
3. Determine the input and output variables of FDMSB FIS: The inputs are
market demand information (D) and production costs (CP ) and the outputs
are expected consolidation efforts (Ec), expected wealth (Ew) and expected
aggressive marketing efforts (Em) where: Em = 5− (Ew +Ec) (Because the
total (expected) resources of each player at any point is five). Figure 4.2 on
page 77 shows the Mamdani FIS interface of the simulation.
4. Develop fuzzy sets, subsets and membership functions for all the input and
output variables: This can be accomplished by soliciting knowledge from
the experts or searching through literature data. Our adopted fuzzy sets,
subsets and membership functions are as shown in Figure 4.3 on page 78.
5. Formulate decision rules for the rule base: These also, ought to be solicited
from experts [18, 94]. In this case study however, our adopted decision rules
are as stated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 while Figure 4.4 on page 79 shows the
rules as coded using Mamdani fuzzy inference system.
6. Establish relationships between input values and their fuzzy sets and apply-
ing the decision rules: Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the FAM tables for the rule
base and the fuzzy rule base can be coded into fuzzy inference system (FIS)
using Matlab toolbox.
7. Play the game: The procedure for playing the game is as follows: The game
state is represented as vector [g, y, Aw, r]. g represents green player’s amount
of resources, y represents yellow player’s amount of resources, Aw represents
green’s accumulated wealth (profit) and r is the number of rounds the game
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D/CP Low Medium High
Very Low medium very large very large
Low medium large large
Medium small medium large
High small medium medium
Table 4.2: FAM table for expected wealth created(Ew) as output.
is played. Green player strategy is denoted as [Cg,Wg,Mg] and yellow player
strategy is denoted as [Cy,Wy,My] where:
C +W +M = 5. (4.1)
Because the total resources of each player at any point is five. As explained in
Section 1.3.1 on page 7 and Section 4.1 (page 63), our choices of the number
five in Equation 4.1 and for variable r are arbitrary. In a real system, any
number that suitably represents the process can be chosen.
General rules of the game are as follows:
• Initial stage of the game is [5, 5, 0, 5] (i.e according to vector [g, y, Aw, r])
• At every state [g, y, Aw, r], green chooses his moves by allocating to his
strategy [Cg,Wg,Mg] where Cg + Wg + Mg = g = 5 and yellow who is
the fuzzy agent chooses his strategy [Cy,Wy,My] where Cy+Wy+My =
y = 5.
• The game changes states as follows:
r = r − 1, (4.2)
Aw = Aw +Wg −Wy, (4.3)
g = g + Cg +Mgr − (y + Cy +Myr), (4.4)
y = y + Cy +Myr − (g + Cg +Mgr), (4.5)
temp = Aw + g − y; (4.6)
Where temp represents game payoff. Then,
Em = 5− (Ew + Ec) (4.7)
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Because the total resources or expected resources of each player at any
point is five. Now,
D = My/Mg, (4.8)
CP = (My + Cy + k)/(Mg + Cg + k), (4.9)
Where k represents other costs which are taken to be zero to avoid need-
less complication (i.e k = 0). We define Ew (expected profit/Wealth)=
Esp − CP , where
Esp = Ew + CP (4.10)
and Esp represents the expected selling price of the product.
• The game ends when r = 0 and if temp is greater than zero (temp > 0),
the green player wins, if less than zero (temp < 0), then the fuzzy agent
player (yellow) wins else, the game is draw (i.e. if temp = 0).
• This 2-player game is a zero sum game and therefore, yellow loses when-
ever green wins and vice versa and since our aim is to develop an agent
that would win as much as possible, maximize his payoff and minimize
that of the opponents, Nash equilibrium [137, 138] is not considered in
this context.
8. Evaluate the fuzzy inference system (FIS): Using Matlab fuzzy toolbox, all
the fuzzy inputs are passed into the Mamdani type FIS.
9. Get the defuzzified output from the FIS: The crisp output for the FDMSB is
computed using centre of gravity method (COG) and sampled results are as
shown in Figure 4.5 using rule view from Matlab FIS editor and the surface
view is as shown in Figure 4.6 on page 80.
10. Determine whether the conditions for the end of the game have been met:
In this case study, the condition for the end of the game is when the number
of rounds r reaches 1 counting down from 5 (i.e. when r = 1). This is the
first loop in the FDMSB game as shown in Figure 4.7 on page 81.
11. Training and performance evaluation: As explained in Section 3.7 on page 53,
training and learning [139] of the FDMSB decision agent was accomplished
through the optimization of the fuzzy logic parameters while using the game
payoff as the basis for the performance measure after playing a series of the
game as in [13]. This training or learning of the fuzzy agent to optimize
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its performance was achieved through the use of the fminsearch function
in Matlab having considered other optimization algorithms such as gradient
descent and genetic algorithm.
Learning or training of the fuzzy player forms the second loop in the game.
The flowchart in Figure 4.7 on page 81 shows the two loops of the FDMSB
game. The first loop stops when r = 1 (this means the fifth round of the
game) and the second loop represents learning of the fuzzy player and it
stops when the set performance criteria have been met.
Fminsearch uses the Nelder-Mead Simplex Search Method for finding the
local minimum x of an unconstrained multivariable function f(x) using a
derivative-free method and starting at an initial estimate. This is generally
referred to as unconstrained non-linear optimization. If n is the length of x,
a simplex in n-dimensional space is characterized by the n+1 distinct vectors
that are its vertices. In two-space, a simplex is a triangle; in three-space, it
is a pyramid. At each step of the search, a new point in or near the current
simplex is generated. The function value at the new point is compared
with the function’s values at the vertices of the simplex and, usually, one of
the vertices is replaced by the new point, giving a new simplex. This step is
repeated until the diameter of the simplex is less than the specified tolerance
[131]. We maximized the fuzzy agent’s payoff based on the fuzzy membership
functions (MFs) and therefore, algorithm stops when opponent’s wealth is
minimized. However, during the algorithm, the membership functions need
to retain a valid shape as shown in Figure 4.8 on page 82 in comparison with
those in Figure 4.5 on page 79.
Meanwhile, a better optimization result may be achieved through simulated
annealing [140, 141, 142, 143] but this is outside the focus of this research
and may be considered as an avenue for further research.
Furthermore, in this FDMSB game, we do not employ a maxmin strategy
but rather, we attempted to maximize the number of times that the fuzzy
agent wins, and his payoff, while at the same time minimize those of the
opponents.
Consider two players G and Y playing the game, the expected outcome or
payoff of a game can be denoted as Ex(G, Y ), using the notation of [13]. As
a training performance measure, the minimum expected payoff of an entire
game taken over the class of all opponents S was used as in [13]. If the fuzzy
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agent encounters the strongest opponent choice of strategy (say an opponent
with strategy [0 0 5] as in iteration 12 in Table 4.3 (page 75)), the outcome
of this play will result in a minimum payoff and the opponent may win the
game. In [13], this very strict global performance measure was regarded as
equity against globally optimizing opponent (Geq).
Geq(G) = inf
X∈S
{Ex(G,X)} (4.11)
Another extreme opponent which may be regarded as weakest opponent will
be that which reserves all his resources i.e. an opponent with strategy [0 5
0] (as in iteration 13 in Table 4.3 (page 75)) with respect to the strategic
vector [C W M ], this results in FDMSB fuzzy agent winning the game
with highest payoff and we regard this as equity against a locally optimizing
opponent (Leq).
Leq(G) = sup
X∈S
Ex(G,X) (4.12)
These combined global and local performance measures are the basis for the
rating of our FDMSB decision agent.
The results of training are shown in Figure 4.8 on page 82. When compared
to the output triangles of Figure 4.5 on page 79, it can be observed that after
training, the membership functions (triangles) of the fuzzy sets have shifted
considerably towards left to minimize the opponent’s payoff and thereby
maximize the fuzzy agent’s payoff. Also, the surface view of the trained
system is as shown in Figure 4.9 on page 82.
4.3 Results Discussion for 2-Player Games
Sampled results of a typical FDMSB experiment in accordance with the proce-
dure highlighted above are as shown in Table 4.3 on page 75 . The pie chart in
Figure 4.10 (page 83) and data on Table 4.3 (page 75) show that the fuzzy player
(Yellow) was able to win more than the competitor (Green) because he made
use of the fuzzy inference system in making his business decisions.
From equations 4.4 and 4.5 on page 67 and from the results in Table 4.3, it will
be seen that for any of the players to win the game, he must allocate a substantial
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part of his resources to aggressive marketing and this allocation must outweigh
that of the opponent’s allocation.
According to this model and with respect to the two equations, since the number
of rounds r decreases as the game is played, this reduces the strength of marketing
aggressiveness. An entrepreneur who is a new entrant into an industry, is best
advised to try as much as possible to devote much of his resources on aggressive
marketing campaigns (M) than other strategies (i.e. efforts on consolidation (C)
and reserved wealth (W )). This will enable him to have a strong footing in the
industry and to be able to have a large market share as early as possible as the
game is played and thus, will result in winning the game.
However, because the fuzzy player is able to capture the uncertainty in the business
environment more effectively and efficiently as a result of the fuzzy rules in the
fuzzy inference system, he is able to override the system and wins more often than
the opponent. From the results in column four and five of Table 4.3, out of thirteen
iterations shown on the table, the fuzzy player (yellow) wins in eight iterations
(iterations 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 13) while the opponent (green) wins in only
five iterations which are iterations 4, 5, 7, 8 and 12.
As shown in columns six and seven of Table 4.3, we verified these results by
designing control experiments (simulations) in which the fuzzy player does not
change his moves in accordance with the fuzzy rule base. The results obtained
from the control experiments show that the game follows conventional trends,
that is, the fuzzy player wins only where he allocates more units of resources to
his marketing strategy at the start of the game than those of his competitors and
his payoff also depends on this. The payoff of the fuzzy player in the control
experiments (where he did not use fuzzy rule base) are far less than what he got
when he used fuzzy rule base to make his business decisions.
Moreover, after learning, as stated in Section 7.4.1 step 11 and as shown in Ta-
ble 4.3 and pictured in Figure 4.11 on page 83, the fuzzy agent performs much
better as the agent was able to win more than he won before training.
Results in columns eight and nine show the the performance of the players after
learning (training). The columns show that after learning, out of the same thirteen
iterations that were used before learning, the fuzzy player wins a total of ten
iterations (additional wins of two iterations and these therefore means losses to the
opponent) while the opponent wins only three iterations. After learning, the two
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additional iterations won by the fuzzy player, as shown in the table, are iterations 4
and 8. Therefore, these means that the opponent has lose two additional iterations
as a result of zero sum concept.
A typical example is when the two players chose [4, 0, 1] and when they both chose
[3, 1, 1]. In both cases and some other cases, before training, it was green that won
the game while after training, it was the fuzzy agent (yellow) that won. Moreover,
in all cases, even when green wins, his payoff (temp) is always smaller (minimized)
after learning of the fuzzy agent than what it was before learning.
For examples, in iterations 5, 7 and 12 (the only three iterations where green player
wins after learning), before leaning of the fuzzy player, green’s payoffs were 351.6,
136.8 and 1054.5 for those three iterations respectively. However, after learning,
these were reduced (minimized) by the learned fuzzy player and therefore,
green’s payoffs for those iteration become 302.2, 94.9, and 1012.0 respectively.
From the results explained above, it can be observed that training (learning) of
the fuzzy agent was really important and the training algorithm was very effective
because it enables the agent to learn and reach the performance criteria.
At the end of the game, the estimated price for the commodity can be forecast
with Equation 4.10: (Esp = Ew + CP ).
4.4 Conclusion
We have modelled decision making processes under uncertainty in business games,
using fuzzy logic concepts and game theory. Our model was termed fuzzy decision
making system for business games (FDMSB). We illustrated this for 2-player games
that represent duopoly market structure. A fuzzy decision making system for
business games was designed and implemented using Matlab software. Fuzzy
rules were constructed in developing the FDMSB model using the Matlab toolbox
and the implementation of this model heavily depends on expert knowledge and
experience to facilitate the development of a reasonable fuzzy rule base for the
determination of the if-then rules that denote the relationship between inputs and
the output variables.
Furthermore, we have applied a learning algorithm to the decision processes which
enables the decision agent to optimize his performance in the decision processes
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as the games were played so as to meet the set criteria. To do the learning,
the Nelder-Mead simplex method for finding the minimum of an unconstrained
multivariable function was used.
Results of the learning showed that the learning algorithm works very effectively
and efficiently as the fuzzy player (yellow) was able to perform much better after
learning with higher payoffs and this enables him to reach the set criteria
We verified these results by designing a control experiment (simulation) in which
the fuzzy player does not change his moves in accordance with the fuzzy rule base.
The results obtained from the control experiments show that the game follows
conventional trends, that is, the fuzzy player wins only where he allocates more
units of resources to his marketing strategy at the start of the game than those of
his competitors and his payoff also depends on this. The payoff of the fuzzy player
in the control experiment (where he did not use fuzzy rule base) are far less than
what he got when he used fuzzy rule base to make his business decisions.
Our FDMSB procedure has practical uses in business contexts as it can serve as
very useful tools in the hands of an entrepreneur to:
• Advise him on certain marketing strategic decision policies that can keep his
business in strategic advantage over his competitors in the market.
• Give him insight on how his firm can successfully compete with its peers
in the market by determining how much of its available resources or efforts
could be dissipated on our three adopted strategies of marketing in such a
way that his profit (accumulated wealth) will be maximized.
• Effectively utilize the uncertain (fuzzy) and prevailing or anticipated market
demand (D) information, cost of producing a commodity (CP ) and other
fuzzy information at his disposal to achieve the set goal of his business.
Also, we have been able to supplement the laws of demand and supply with a more
practical approach which takes into consideration the uncertain (fuzzy) nature of
most information available to business decision makers. While the traditional laws
of demand and supply address the nature of decision processes by consumers and
suppliers respectively, our own approach extends them further. This is to address
the nature of decision processes by an intending entrepreneur or manufacturer
to forecast the prospect of the proposed business through profit prediction from
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estimated selling price given the fuzzy market or industry information available to
him. This allows him to determine price and marketing strategies in function of a
very low, medium, high, very high, etc. demand.
In arriving at our results, the simulations are based on assumptions and condi-
tions that the players involved in the decision processes are rational players (Sec-
tion 2.1.1 on page 12) and that only the fuzzy player (yellow), at the moment, uses
fuzzy moves [144]. This is in accordance with our overall aim of designing models
that illustrate how an entrepreneur could make effective and efficient business de-
cisions by using fuzzy inference systems (FIS) in capturing uncertainties that may
surround his business environments. This will therefore help the entrepreneur to
have competitive advantages over his competitors who are unaware of the useful-
ness of these tools and therefore are not making use of the fuzzy inference models
in their decision making processes.
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Agent Moves Untrained Control Expt Trained
S/N Green Yellow Winner Payoff Winner Payoff Winner Payoff
1 1, 1, 3 1, 0, 4 Yellow -22.0 Yellow -14.7 Yellow -63.9
2 2, 1, 2 1, 1, 3 Yellow -52.7 Yellow -35.2 Yellow -94.8
3 3, 0, 2 2, 0, 3 Yellow -26.7 Yellow -17.9 Yellow -68.8
4 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 Green 40.8 Green 61.3 Yellow -8.2
5 1, 0, 4 2, 0, 3 Green 351.6 Green 527.5 Green 302.2
6 3, 1, 1 4, 0, 1 Yellow -16.1 Yellow -10.7 Yellow -65.2
7 3, 0, 2 2, 1, 2 Green 136.8 Green 205.2 Green 94.9
8 3, 1, 1 3, 1, 1 Green 14.8 Green 22.34 Yellow -34.2
9 3, 1, 1 2, 0, 3 Yellow -289.3 Yellow -192.9 Yellow -305.0
10 0, 5, 0 1, 4, 0 Yellow -99.8 Yellow -66.6 Yellow -142.2
11 0, 5, 0 0, 1, 4 Yellow -704.8 Yellow -469.9 Yellow -747.2
12 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 Green 1054.5 Green 1581.8 Green 1012.0
13 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow -863.8 Yellow -575.9 Yellow -906.2
Table 4.3: Results of simulations of the untrained and trained agent
in 2-player game: From the table, the first column shows the serial numbers
of the iterations, the second column contains player green’s strategies while
the third column contains that of yellow. For example, in the first iteration,
green’s strategy shows [1, 1, 3], this indicates how resources are allocated to
strategy [C,W,M ]: C = 1, W = 1 and M = 3. The forth column gives the
winners for the untrained simulations while the fifth column gives the payoffs
of those simulations. Column six shows the winners for the control experiment
simulations while the payoffs of players for those simulations are displayed in
column seven. The control experiments show the results where both players
did not use fuzzy inference systems in playing the games. Column eight shows
the winners for the trained simulations while the payoffs of players for those
simulations are displayed in column nine. These results show that that the fuzzy
player (Yellow) was able to win more than the competitor (Green) because
he made use of the fuzzy inference system in making his business decisions.
Also, it can be observed that the trained agent is able to perform better after
training as he wins more often than when he was not trained and where he does
not win, opponent’s payoff is minimized considerably and thereby maximized
his own. The strongest opponent (Geq) and weakest opponent (Leq) are shown
in iterations 12 and 13 respectively. The minus sign on yellow payoffs merely
shows zero-sum. These results are as summarized in the pie charts of Figure 4.10
(page 83) and Figure 4.11 (page 83).
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interval that measures the degree to which element
x belongs to fuzzy set A˜.
2.4. Fuzzy Decision Making System
In general, a fuzzy decision making system
(FDMS) uses a collection of fuzzy membership
functions (Figure 2) and decision rules that are so-
licited from experts in the field to reason about data
(Dweiri and Kablan, 2006). Typical components of
a fuzzy decision making system are as shown in Fig-
ure 1(a). The components of an FDMS, as shown
in the figure are; a fuzzification section, a fuzzy rule
base, fuzzy decision logic and defuzzification section
(Famuyiwa et al., 2008).
(i) Fuzzification section: This is the section where
the process of making a crisp quantity fuzzy
(Ross, 2005) is carried out. This is done by
simply recognising that many of the quantities
that we considered to be crisp and determinis-
tic are actually not deterministic at all. They
carry considerable uncertainty. If the form of
uncertainty happens to arise because of impre-
cision, ambiguity, or vagueness, then the vari-
able is probably fuzzy and can be represented
by a membership function.
(ii) Fuzzy rule base: These rules are expressed
in conventional antecedent-consequent form.
The collection of such rules constitutes the
fuzzy logic knowledge base that is used for
inference of the decision agent. In a fuzzy sys-
tem, if the antecedent is true to some degree,
then the consequent is also true to that same
degree. For a small number of inputs, there
exists a compact form of representing a fuzzy
rule-based system which consists of a tabular
format with different partitions representing
different inputs. This compact graphical form
is called fuzzy associative memory table, or
FAM table as shown in Table 1 and 2. In FAM,
the linguistic values of one input variable form
the horizontal axis and the linguistic values
of the other input form the vertical axis. At
the intersection of a row and a column lies the
linguistic value of the output variable. A rule
is said to ‘fire’, if the degree of truth of the
premise part of the rule is not zero (Dweiri
and Kablan, 2006). The implication is imple-
mented for each rule and in Matlab, many
built-in methods are supported such as the
functions that are used by the AND method:
min(minimum), which truncates the output
fuzzy set, prod (product), which scales the
output fuzzy set. Here, the AND method was
used and the centroid was computed using
the Mamdani-type inference system which
requires the output membership functions
to be fuzzy sets after the aggregation pro-
cess. It (Mamdani FIS) integrates, according
to Equation (1), across a two-dimensional
function to find the centroid (Mamdani and
Assilian, 1975).
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Fig. 1. (a)Fuzzy decision making system (FDMS), (b)Fuzzy
decision making system for business games (FDMSB) model.
5
Figure 4.1: (a)Fuzzy decision making system (FDMS), (b)Fuzzy decision mak-
ing system for business games (FDMSB) model.
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Figure 4.2: Mamdani fuzzy inference system (FIS) of the results of the simu-
lation.
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Figure 4.3: Membership functions for fuzzy variables of FDMSB rule base-
inputs: Demand(D) and Production cost(CP ) and outputs:Expected consolida-
tion efforts(Ec) and Expected wealth(Ew).
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Figure 4.4: Rule base with Matlab rule editor for expected consolidation ef-
forts(Ec) as output.
                      
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Defuzzified (crisp) values for expected wealth generated Ew at
inputs D = CP = 2.5.
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Figure 4.6: Surface views of expected wealth generated Ew.
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Figure 4.7: Chart showing the two loops of the FDMSB game. The first loop
stops when r = 1 (this means the fifth round of the game) and the second loop
represents learning of the fuzzy player and it stops when the set performance
criteria have been met as explained in step 11 on page 68.
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Figure 4.8: Output of the trained FDMSB fuzzy agent: It can be seen that the
triangles of the membership functions have changed considerably and thereby
minimized opponent’s wealth accordingly.
Figure 4.9: Surface view of expected wealth generated Ew after training.
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Yellow no of wins 8
Green no of wins 5
Yellow (Fuzzy Player) Vs Green Wins
Yellow no of 
wins
62%
Green no of 
wins
38%
Yellow no of wins
Green no of wins
Figure 4.10: Results show that the fuzzy player (yellow) wins more often than
the competitor (Green) because he made use of the fuzzy inference system (FIS)
in making his business decisions from the results in Table 4.3.
Untrained Player Wins 8
Trained Player Wins 10
Wins of Untrained and Trained Fuzzy Players
Untrained Player 
Wins
44%Trained Player 
Wins
56%
Untrained Player Wins
Trained Player Wins
Figure 4.11: This chart shows how the performance of the fuzzy player in-
creased after training as it won more often than it won before training from the
results in Table 4.3 of page 75.
Chapter 5
FDMSB Case Study
5.1 PepsiCo Vs Coca-Cola Company
In this chapter, we illustrated the FDMSB model by taking competition in the
beverage industry as a case study and this will be between Coca-Cola and Pep-
siCo who are the major players in the industry. Since these two companies are well
known, we shall give no further introduction on them. We chose the two compa-
nies after we have considered companies in other industries but most of them do
not have uniform means of reporting their financial data which made their data
comparison very difficult
In running the FDMSB simulations, we used the companies’ data available in their
annual financial statements for the year 2003 as our initial values and input for
the first round (year 2004). We then ran the FDMSB simulation for five rounds
(representing five years) according to the procedures highlighted in Section 4.2
(page 65) and we compared the results obtained in the simulations to the two
companies’ data published for the year 2008. According to the published annual
financial statements, PepsiCo had lower profits (payoffs) in both years. The chart
in Figure 5.1 compares their profits for that year. Therefore, we took PepsiCo
as our fuzzy player. After five rounds, we compared the results obtained to those
which were published in the 2008 financial year and we discovered that had PepsiCo
implemented our FDMSB approach, it would have outperformed its rival (Coca-
Cola) with higher profit (payoff) in the year 2008 and eventually would have won
the cola war.
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As we explained in Section 1.3.1 (page 7) and Section 4.1 (page 63), the variables
used in Section 4.2 (page 65) are modified to suit the situation in question and for
this purpose, the following variables were used in the simulations: working capital
(W ), equity turnover or working capital turnover (Wt), current assets (ca), current
liabilities (cl), market capitalization (mc), profit margin (Pm), profit or net income
(Aw), sales or revenue (L), cost or expenditure (C). The number of rounds (r = 5)
the game is played represents years 2004 to 2008.
Also, we made use of the following standard accounting ratios and formulas for
the variables:
Working Capital (W ) equals Current Assets (ca) minus Current liabilities (cl),
W = ca − cl
Cost or expenditure (C) equals cost of sales Cos plus Selling, general and admin-
istrative expenses Sga.
C = Cos + Sga
Profit Margin (Pm) equals Net Income(profit Aw) divided by Sales or Revenue (L)
Pm = Aw/L. (5.1)
Working Capital Turnover (Wt) equals Sales(L) divided by Working Capital (W )
Wt = L/W. (5.2)
Our inputs, in this case study, for the fuzzy inference system (FIS) in the FDMSB
model in Figure 4.1(b) (page 76) are profit margin (Pm) and working capital
turnover (Wt). Input strategies for the two companies are cost (C), working capital
(W ), and sales (L) represented by vector [C W L] for each player. Values for these
variables are extracted from the two companies’ financial statement for the year
2003 which were used as input data for the year 2004 (which represents the first
round of the game) and are as shown in Table 5.1. Output strategies of the
inference system of the FDMSB are expected cost (Ec), expected working capital
(Ew) and expected sales (EL) represented as vector [EcEwEL]. Coca-Cola company
is represented as the green player (g) with strategies [CgWgLg] while PepsiCo is
represented as yellow player (y) with strategies [CyWyLy]. After each round of
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S/N Variables Coca-Cola PepsiCo
1 Cost or expen-
diture (C)
15,250 21,839
2 Working capi-
tal (W )
24,825 23,625
3 Sales(L) 21,044 26,971
4 Working cap-
ital turnover
(Wt)
0.8476 1.1416
5 Net income or
profit (Aw)
4,347 3,568
6 Profit margin
(Pm)
0.2065 0.1323
Table 5.1: Data and variables used in the simulation were obtained from year
2003 financial statement of PepsiCo and Coca-Cola companies. A pie chart that
shows the difference in their profits is as shown in Figure 5.1.
the game, PepsiCo, who is the fuzzy agent, changes his strategies to the output
of the FIS [EcEwEL] and this is used for the next round of the game. A simple
model that shows the relationship between the input and the output variables of
the FDMSB is as shown in Figure 5.2 on page 87.
Coca-cola 4347
PepsiCo 3568
Profits of Coca-cola and PepsiCo in 2003
Coca-cola
55%
PepsiCo
45%
Coca-cola
PepsiCo
Figure 5.1: This chart compares Coca-Cola and PepsiCo profits published for
the year 2003.
The procedures for the simulations follow those highlighted in Section 4.2 on
page 65. Following these procedures, steps 4, 5 and 6 are now illustrated in the
membership functions shown in Figure 5.3 (page 88). The decision rules for the
rule base, as stated before, would normally be solicited from experts. In this case
study however, our decision rules are as stated below:
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Figure 5.2: A basic model of the FDMSB engine showing the two inputs
Pm,Wt and the three outputs Ec, Ew and EL.
Rule Base 1:
1. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Cost or expenditure is Slightly Low)
2. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Low)
3. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Slightly Low)
4. If (Profit Margin is Medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Slightly Low)
5. If (Profit Margin is Medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium)
then (Expected Cost or Expenditure is Slightly Low)
6. If (Profit Margin is Medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Very Low)
7. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then (Ex-
pected Cost or Expenditure is Very Low)
8. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Very Low)
9. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Very Low)
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Fig. 6. Membership functions for fuzzy variables of
FDMSB rule base- inputs: Profit margin(Pm) and Work-
ing capital turnover (Wt) and outputs:Expected Cost or
Expenditure(Ec), Expected working capital Ew and Ex-
pected sales(EL)
(i) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Cost or
expenditure is Slightly Low)
(ii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Medium) then (Expected Cost
or Expenditure is Low)
(iii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is High) then (Expected Cost or
Expenditure is Slightly Low)
(iv) If (Profit Margin is Medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Cost
or Expenditure is Slightly Low)
(v) If (Profit Margin is Medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Cost or Expenditure is Slightly Low)
(vi) If (Profit Margin is Medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Cost or Expenditure is Very Low)
(vii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Cost or
Expenditure is Very Low)
(viii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Medium) then (Expected Cost
or Expenditure is Very Low)
(ix) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (Expected Cost or
Expenditure is Very Low)
(x) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Cost
or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
(xi) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
(xii) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
Rule Base 2
(i) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Low) then (Expected Working
Capital is Small)
(ii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Medium)
(iii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (ExpectedWorking
Capital is Medium)
(iv) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected
Working Capital is Small)
(v) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Medium)
(vi) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Working Capital is Large)
(vii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Low) then (Expected Working
Capital is Medium)
(viii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Large)
(ix) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (ExpectedWorking
Capital is Large)
(x) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
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Fig. 6. Membership functions for fuzzy variables of
FDMSB rule base- inputs: Profit margin(Pm) and Work-
ing capital turnover (Wt) and outputs:Expected Cost or
Expenditure(Ec), Expected working capital Ew and Ex-
pected sales(EL)
Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
(xii) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
Rule Base 2
(i) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Low) then (Expected Working
Capital is Small)
(ii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working ap-
ital Turnove is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital Medium)
(iii) If (Profit Margin is Hig ) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (ExpectedWorking
apital is M dium)
iv If i i m i i
apital urnover is Low) then ( xpected
Working Capital is Small)
(v) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Medium)
(vi) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Working Capital is Large)
(vii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Low) then (Expected Working
Capital is Medium)
(viii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Large)
(ix) If (Profit Margin is Lo ) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (ExpectedWorking
Capital is L e)
(x) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Turnov r is Low) then (Expected
Working Capital is Medium)
(xi) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Very Large)
(xii) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Working Capital is Very Large)
Rule Base 3
(
i l Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales is
Small)
(ii) If (Profit argin is High) and ( orking Capi-
tal Turnover is Medium) then (Expected Sales
is Medium)
(iii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is High) then (Expected Sales is
Medium)
(iv) If (Profit Margin is edium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales
is Sm ll)
(v) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Sales is Medium)
(vi) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Sales is Large)
(vii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Cap-
it l Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales is
Medium)
(viii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Medium) then (Expected Sales
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Fig. 6. Membership functions for fuzzy variables of
FDMSB rule base- inputs: Profit margin(Pm) and Work-
ing capital turnover (Wt) and outputs:Expected Cost or
Expenditure(Ec), Expected working capital Ew and Ex-
pected sales(EL)
i i
(xii) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Tur over is High) then (Expected
Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
Rule Base 2
(i) If (Profit argin is High) and ( orking Capi-
tal Turnover is Low) then (Expected Working
Capital is Small)
(ii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Medium)
(iii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (ExpectedWorking
Capital is Medium)
(iv) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected
Working Capital is Small)
(v) If (Profit Margin is edium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is ediu )
(vi) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Working Capital is Large)
(vii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and ( orking Capi-
tal Turnover is Low) then (Expected orking
it l is e i )
(i ) If ( r t r i is w) ( r i i-
tal urnover is igh) then (Expected orking
Capital is Large)
(x) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected
Working Capital is M dium)
(xi) If (Profit Margin Very Low) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Very Large)
(xii) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Working Capital is Very Large)
Rule Base 3
(i) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Low) t en (Expected Sales is
Small)
(ii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Medium) then (Expected Sales
is Medium)
(iii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is High) then (Expected Sales is
Medium)
(iv) If ( ro t argi is e i ) a ( orki g
i l is Low) then (Expected Sales
is Small)
(v
it l Turnover is Medium) then ( t
Sales is Medium)
(vi) If (Profit argin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Sales is Large)
(vii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales is
Medium)
(viii) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Medium) then (Expected Sales
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Fig. 6. Membership functions for fuzzy variables of
DMSB rule ase- inputs: Pr fit margin(Pm) and Work-
ing capital turnover (Wt) and outputs:Expected Cost or
Expend ure(Ec), Expec ed working capital Ew and Ex-
pect d sales( L
Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
(xii) If (Profit Marg n is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capi al Turnover is High) then (Expected
Cost r Expenditure s Very Very Low)
Rule Base 2
(i) If ( r t r i is i ) ( r i i-
l i Low) then (Expected Working
C pital is Small)
(
Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Working Capital is Medium
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(vii) If (Profit argin is Lo ) and ( orking api-
tal Turnover is Low) then (Expected orking
Capital is edium)
(viii) If (Profi Margin is Low) and ( orking Cap-
ital Turnove is Medium) the (Expected
Working Capital arge)
(ix) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (Expected r i
apital is arge)
( ) If ( r t r i is r ) ( r -
i i l i
( ii) If ( r r i is r ) ( r -
i g a ital r over is ig ) t e ( x ecte
orking apital is ery Large)
Rule Base 3
(i) If (Profit Ma gin is Hig ) and ( orking Cap-
ital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales is
Small)
(ii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is Medium) then (Expected Sales
is Medium)
(iii) If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Cap-
ital Turnover is High) t en (Expected Sales is
Medi m)
(iv) If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales
is Sm l)
(v) If (Profit argin is medium) and ( orking
apital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Sales is Medium)
(vi) If ( ro t Margin is medium) and (Working
Capital Tu nover is High) then (Expected
Sales is Larg )
(v
Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales is
Medi m)
(viii) If ( r t r i is ) ( r i i-
tal urnover is Medium) then (Expected Sales
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Figure 5.3: Membership functions for fuzzy variables of FDMSB rule base-
inputs: Profit ma gin(Pm) and Working capital turnover (Wt) and out-
puts:Expect d Cost or Expenditure(Ec), Expected working capital Ew and Ex-
pected sales(EL).
10. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
11. If (Profit Ma gin is Ve y Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium)
then (Expected Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
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12. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Cost or Expenditure is Very Very Low)
Rule Base 2
1. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Working Capital is Small)
2. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium) then
(Expected Working Capital is Medium)
3. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Working Capital is Medium)
4. If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Working Capital is Small)
5. If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium)
then (Expected Working Capital is Medium)
6. If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Working Capital is Large)
7. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then (Ex-
pected Working Capital is Medium)
8. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium) then
(Expected Working Capital is Large)
9. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Working Capital is Large)
10. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Working Capital is Medium)
11. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium)
then (Expected Working Capital is Very Large)
12. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Working Capital is Very Large)
Rule Base 3
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1. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Sales is Small)
2. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium) then
(Expected Sales is Medium)
3. If (Profit Margin is High) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Sales is Medium)
4. If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Sales is Small)
5. If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium)
then (Expected Sales is Medium)
6. If (Profit Margin is medium) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Sales is Large)
7. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then (Ex-
pected Sales is Medium)
8. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium) then
(Expected Sales is Large)
9. If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Sales is Large)
10. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Low) then
(Expected Sales is Medium)
11. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is Medium)
then (Expected Sales is Very Large)
12. If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working Capital Turnover is High) then
(Expected Sales is Very Large)
The fuzzy rules are coded using Matlab software as shown in Figure 5.4 (page 91).
The Mamdani type fuzzy inference system (FIS) shown in Figure 5.5 (page 91)
shows the basic input/output system of the FDMSB model for the rule base 3
while samples of the defuzzified outputs are as shown in Figure 5.6 (page 93) with
surface view in Figure 5.7 (page 93).
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Figure 5.4: The rule base 3 coded using Matlab software.
is Large)
(ix) If (Profit Margin is Low) and (Working Capi-
tal Turnover is High) then (Expected Sales is
Large)
(x) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Low) then (Expected Sales
is Medium)
(xi) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Working
Capital Turnover is Medium) then (Expected
Sales is Very Large)
(xii) If (Profit Margin is Very Low) and (Work-
ing Capital Turnover is High) then (Expected
Sales is Very Large)
The fuzzy rules are coded using Matlab software
as shown in Figure 7. TheMamdani type fuzzy infer-
ence system (FIS) shown in Figure 8 shows the basic
input/output system of the FDMSB model for the
rule base 3 while a sample of defuzzified outputs are
as shown in Figure 9 with surface view in Figure 10
Fig. 7. The rule base 3 coded using Matlab software
Step vii, which explains how players change strat-
egy, goes as follows:
The game state (S) is represented as vector
S = [g, y, Awg0, Awy0, r],
where g and y represent initial resources of green and
yellow respectively, Awg0 is the green (Coca-cola)
initial (2003) net income or profit, Awy0 represents
yellow (PepsiCo) initial (2003) net income or profit.
Then
g = Wg + Lg − Cg, (16)
y = Wy + Ly − Cy . (17)
Fig. 8. The fuzzy inference system for rule base 3 of FDMSB
case study
These resources change in each round of the game
as follows:
g = Wg/Wy + Lgr/Ly − Cg/Cy, (18)
y = Wy/Wg + Lyr/Lg − Cy/Cg. (19)
At the end of each round, the new state (S) of the
game becomes:
S = [g, y, Awg, Awy, r]
. New profit (payoff or Net income) of yellow (Awy)
equals expected sales (EL) minus expected cost Ec
(outputs of FIS):
Awy = EL − Ec
and that of green implies: Net profit (Awg) equals
Sales of green (Lg) minus Cost of green (Cg):
Awg = Lg − Cg
After each round, strategies of the fuzzy player
change from [CyWyLy] to output of FIS: [EcEwEL].
The game ends when r = 0 and if pay-
off/profit/net income of y (Awy) is greater than
that of g (Awg), then PepsiCo (yellow) who is the
fuzzy player wins. If Awy is less than Awg, then
PepsiCo lost and if Awg is equal to Awy then the
game is a draw.
After this modified Stepvii, the rest of the game
follows the rest of the procedural steps in Section 3.2.
Sampled defuzzified outputs are as shown in Figure 9
and the surface view in Figure 10.
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Figure 5.5: The fuzzy inference system for rule base 3 of FDMSB case study.
• Step 7, which explains how players change strategies, goes as follows:
The game state (S) is represented as vector
S = [g, y, Awg0, Awy0, r],
where g and y represent initial resources of green and yellow respectively,
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Awg0 is the green (Coca-Cola) initial (2003) net income or profit, Awy0 rep-
resents yellow (PepsiCo) initial (2003) net income or profit. Then
g = Wg + Lg − Cg, (5.3)
y = Wy + Ly − Cy. (5.4)
These resources change in each round of the games as follows:
g = Wg/Wy + Lgr/Ly − Cg/Cy, (5.5)
y = Wy/Wg + Lyr/Lg − Cy/Cg. (5.6)
At the end of each round, the new state (S) of the game becomes:
S = [g, y, Awg, Awy, r]
New profit (payoff or Net income) of yellow (Awy) equals expected sales (EL)
minus expected cost Ec (outputs of FIS):
Awy = EL − Ec
and that of green implies: Net profit (Awg) equals Sales of green (Lg) minus
Cost of green (Cg):
Awg = Lg − Cg
After each round, strategies of the fuzzy player change from [CyWyLy] to
output of FIS: [EcEwEL].
The game ends when r = 0 and if payoff (profit or net income) of y (Awy) is
greater than that of g (Awg), then PepsiCo (yellow) who is the fuzzy player
wins. If Awy is less than Awg, then PepsiCo lost and if Awg is equal to Awy
then the game is a draw.
• After this modified step 7, the rest of the game follows the rest of the pro-
cedural steps in Section 4.2 on page 65. Sampled defuzzified outputs are as
shown in Figure 5.6 (page 93) and the surface view in Figure 5.7 (page 93).
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Fig. 9. Defuzzified (crisp) output of the FDMSB
Fig. 10. Surface view of the FDMSB case study
4.2. Results of FDMSB case study of the cola war
Recorded (published) data of the two companies
in year 2008 (that is, after five years) are as shown
on Table 5.
Results of FDMSB simulation after five rounds
which represents five years (year 2008) are as shown
on Table 6.
It was observed that both players performed bet-
ter in the game while the fuzzy player who made use
of the fuzzy reasoning performed much better de-
spite his weaker initial 2003 financial data that were
S/NVariables Coca-cola PepsiCo
1 Cost or expenditure
(C)
23,148 36,252
2 Working capital
(W )
37,738 28,136
3 Sales(L) 31,944 43,251
4 Working capital
turnover (Wt)
0.8465 1.5372
5 Net income/profit
(Aw)
5,807 5,142
6 Profit margin (Pm) 0.1818 0.1189
Table 5
This table shows the data published by the two companies in
their year 2008 financial statement and when it is compared
to the results of FDMSB simulation shown in Table 6, it
would be observed that even though, both players performed
better in the game, however, the fuzzy player PepsiCo won
the game.
S/N Variables PepsiCo
1 Cost or expenditure (C) 23,999
2 Working capital (W ) 29,000
3 Sales(L) 42,001
4 Working capital turnover (Wt) 1.4483
5 Net income/profit (Aw) 18,002
6 Profit margin (Pm) 0.4286
Table 6
This table shows the results of FDMSB simulation after five
rounds and when compare the results to the data published
by PePsiCo at the end of year 2008 (shown on Table 5), it
will be observed that the fuzzy player (PepsiCo) performed
better in terms of the profit gained (game payoffs), and
eventually won the cola war due to his ability to grasp the
uncertainties in the market through the implementation of
the fuzzy rules and reasoning aided by FDMSB framework.
used as input and starting strategies for the first
(2004) round of the game. Therefore, we concluded
that if PepsiCo or any company could make use of
our model, they will be able to perform much better
while competing with their peers in the market and
possibly win the market.
5. N-Player Game
5.1. Procedures for N -Player Game
In our n-player game which represents a perfect
market competition with many players (please see
page 4), our fuzzy player is still represented as yel-
low, the n-th player, who faces n− 1 opponent play-
15
Figure 5.6: Defuzzified (crisp) output of the FDMSB.
Fig. 9. Defuzzified (crisp) output of the FDMSB
Fig. 10. Surface view of the FDMSB case study
4.2. Results of FDMSB case study of the cola war
Recorded (published) data of the two companies
in year 2008 (that is, after five years) are as shown
on Table 5.
Results of FDMSB simulation after five rounds
which represents five years (year 2008) are as shown
on Table 6.
It was observed that both players performed bet-
ter in the game while the fuzzy player who made use
of the fuzzy reasoning performed much better de-
spite his weaker initial 2003 financial data that were
S/NVariables Coca-cola PepsiCo
1 Cost or expenditure
(C)
23,148 36,252
2 Working capital
(W )
37,738 28,136
3 Sales(L) 31,944 43,251
4 Working capital
turnover (Wt)
0.8465 1.5372
5 Net income/profit
(Aw)
5,807 5,142
6 Profit margin (Pm) 0.1818 0.1189
Table 5
This table shows the data published by the two companies in
their year 2008 financial statement and when it is compared
to the results of FDMSB simulation shown in Table 6, it
would be observed that even though, bot players performed
better in the game, however, the fuzzy player PepsiCo won
the game.
S/N Variables PepsiCo
1 Cost or expenditure (C) 23,999
2 Working capital (W ) 29,000
3 Sales(L) 42,001
4 Working capital turnover (Wt) 1.4483
5 Net income/profit (Aw) 18,002
6 Profit margin (Pm) 0.4286
Table 6
This table shows the results of FDMSB simulation after five
rounds and when compare the results to the data published
by PePsiCo at the end of year 2008 (shown on Table 5), it
will be observed t at the fuzzy player (PepsiCo) performed
better in terms of the profit gained (game payoffs), an
eventually won the cola war due to his ability to grasp the
uncertainties in the market through the implementation of
the fuzzy rules and reasoning aided by FDMSB framework.
used as input and starting strategies for the first
(2004) round of the game. Therefore, we concluded
that if PepsiCo or any company could make use of
our model, they will be able to perform much better
while competing with their peers in the market and
possibly win the market.
5. N-Player Game
5.1. Procedures for N -Player Game
In our n-player game which represents a perfect
market competition with many players (please see
page 4), our fuzzy player is still represented as yel-
low, the n-th player, who faces n− 1 opponent play-
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Figure 5.7: Surface view of the FDMSB case study.
5.2 Results of FDMSB Case Study of the Col
War
Recorded (published) data of the two companies in year 2008 (that is, after five
years) are as shown in Table 5.2 on page 94.
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S/N Variables Coca-Cola PepsiCo
1 Cost or expen-
diture (C)
23,148 36,252
2 Working capi-
tal (W )
37,738 28,136
3 Sales(L) 31,944 43,251
4 Working cap-
ital turnover
(Wt)
0.8465 1.5372
5 Net income or
profit (Aw)
5,807 5,142
6 Profit margin
(Pm)
0.1818 0.1189
Table 5.2: This table shows the data published by the two companies in their
year 2008 financial statements. Pie chart in Figure 5.8 (page 94) also compares
their published profits. When these are compared to the results of FDMSB
simulations shown in Table 5.3 (page 95) as summarised in Table 5.4 (page 95),
it would be observed that even though, both players performed better in the
game, however, the fuzzy player PepsiCo won the game with much higher profits.
Coca-cola 5807
PepsiCo 5142
Profits of Coca-cola and PepsiCo in 2008
Coca-cola
53%
PepsiCo
47%
Coca-cola
PepsiCo
``
Figure 5.8: This chart compares Coca-Cola and PepsiCo profits published for
year 2008. We then compared these with the results of our model as shown in
Figure 5.10. We concluded that had PepsiCo implemented our model, it would
have substantively won the Kola War.
Results of the FDMSB simulations after five rounds which represent five years
(year 2008) are as shown in Table 5.3 on page 95. This has been compared to the
results of the FDMSB simulations in Table 5.4 on page 95.
It was observed that both players performed better in the game while the fuzzy
player who made use of the fuzzy reasoning performed much better despite his
weaker initial 2003 financial data that were used as input and starting strategies
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S/N Variables PepsiCo
1 Cost or expenditure (C) 23,999
2 Working capital (W ) 29,000
3 Sales(L) 42,001
4 Working capital turnover (Wt) 1.4483
5 Net income or profit (Aw) 18,002
6 Profit margin (Pm) 0.4286
Table 5.3: This table shows the results of FDMSB simulation after five rounds
and when compare the results to the data published by PepsiCo at the end
of year 2008 (shown in Table 5.4), it will be observed that the fuzzy player
(PepsiCo) performed better in terms of the profit gained (game payoffs), and
eventually won the cola war due to his ability to grasp the uncertainties in the
market through the implementation of the fuzzy rules and reasoning aided by
FDMSB framework.
Variables Coca-cola PepsiCo PepsiCo1
Cost or expenditure (C) 23,148 36,252 23,999
Working capital (W ) 37,738 28,136 29,000
Sales(L) 31,944 43,251 42,001
Working capital turnover (Wt) 0.8465 1.5372 1.4483
Net income/profit (Aw) 5,807 5,142 18,002
Profit margin (Pm) 0.1818 0.1189 0.4286
Table 5.4: Data published by the two companies in 2008 statements (in
columns 2 and 3) and when compared to the results of FDMSB simulation
in column 4, fuzzy player (PepsiCo) has better payoffs in terms of the profit
gained, and eventually won the cola war due to his ability to grasp the un-
certainties in the market through implementation of fuzzy rules and reasoning
aided by FDMSB framework.
for the first (2004) round of the game. Therefore, we concluded that if PepsiCo
or any company could make use of our model, they will be able to perform much
better while competing with their peers in the market and possibly win the market.
5.3 Conclusion
We have modelled decision making processes under uncertainty in business games,
using fuzzy logic concepts and game theory. We have shown that our model
works very effectively and efficiently in a real world by using a case study of the
competition between Coca-Cola and PepsiCo companies. These two companies
are the major players in the beverage industry.
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Coca-cola 5807
Fuzzy PepsiCo 18002
Cola-Cola 2008 Published Profit Vs PepsiCo 
Simulated Profit from FDMSB Model 
Coca-cola
24%
Fuzzy PepsiCo
76%
Coca-cola
Fuzzy PepsiCo
Figure 5.9: Results shown on this chart compares the profit from Coca-Cola
2008 published data and that of the simulated profit for PepsiCo from the
FDMSB game after five rounds (years) starting from year 2003. It was observed
that PepsiCo had higher profits in our model because it made use of fuzzy
rules aided by the fuzzy inference system (FIS) in making its business strategic
decisions.
Our model was termed fuzzy decision making system for business games (FDMSB).
A fuzzy decision making system for business games was designed and implemented
using Matlab software. Fuzzy rules were constructed in developing the FDMSB
model using the Matlab toolbox and the implementation of this model heavily
depends on expert knowledge and experience to facilitate the development of a
reasonable fuzzy rule base for the determination of the if-then rules that denote
the relationship between inputs and the output variables.
In running the FDMSB simulations, we used the companies’ data available in their
annual financial statements for the year 2003 as our initial values and input for
the first round (year 2004). We then ran the FDMSB simulations for five rounds
(representing five years) and we compared the results obtained in the simulations to
the two companies’ data published for the year 2008. According to the published
annual financial statements, PepsiCo had lower profits (payoffs) in both years.
Therefore, we took PepsiCo as our fuzzy player. After five rounds, we compared
the results obtained to those which were published in the 2008 financial year and
we discovered that had PepsiCo implemented our FDMSB approach, it would have
outperformed its rival (Coca-Cola) with higher profit (payoff) in the year 2008 and
eventually would have won the cola war.
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Fuzzy PepsiCo 0.4286
Unfuzzy PepsiCo 0.1189
PepsiCo Published 2008 Profit Margin
 and Simulated Fuzzy Profit Margin
Fuzzy PepsiCo
78%
Unfuzzy PepsiCo
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Fuzzy PepsiCo
Unfuzzy PepsiCo
Figure 5.10: This chart compares PepsiCo profit margin that came out our
simulation and compares it to that published by the company for year 2008. It
was observed that PepsiCo had higher profits magin in our model because it
made use of fuzzy rules aided by the fuzzy inference system (FIS) in making its
business strategic decisions.
From the results of the FDMSB simulations after five rounds, which represents
five years (from year 2003 to 2008), the fuzzy player (PepsiCo) who made use of
the fuzzy reasoning performed much better than its major competitor despite his
weaker initial 2003 financial data that were used as input and starting strategies
for the first (2004) round of the game. Therefore, we concluded that if PepsiCo
or any company could make use of our model, they will be able to perform much
better while competing with their peers in the market and possibly win the market.
We have further shown that the variables in our FDMSB model can be tailored
to the business situations in the real world and therefore are not limited to those
variables that we have used in designing the system as we explained in Section 1.3.1
on page 7 and Section 4.1 (page 63). Therefore, this model can now be applied to
any real business situation.
We showed that our model can also work for systems that have more (and varied)
strategic variables than those that we have used in our general business model in
chapter 4.
Furthermore, we have applied a learning algorithm to the decision processes which
enables the decision agent to optimize his performance in the decision processes
as the games were played so as to meet the set criteria. To do the learning,
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the Nelder-Mead simplex method for finding the minimum of an unconstrained
multivariable function was used.
Results of the learning showed that the learning algorithm works very effectively
and efficiently as the fuzzy player (PepsiCo) was able to perform much better after
learning with higher payoffs and this enables him to reach the set criteria.
In arriving at our results, the simulations are based on assumptions and condi-
tions that the players involved in the decision processes are rational players (Sec-
tion 2.1.1 on page 12) and that only the fuzzy player (PepsiCo), at the moment,
uses fuzzy moves [144]. This is in accordance with our overall aim of designing
models that illustrate how an entrepreneur could make effective and efficient busi-
ness decisions by using fuzzy inference systems (FIS) in capturing uncertainties
that may surround his business environments. This will therefore help the en-
trepreneur (PepsiCo) to have competitive advantages over his main competitor
(Coca-Cola) who is unaware of the usefulness of these tools and therefore is not
making use of the fuzzy inference models in his decision making processes.
Chapter 6
N-Player Game
6.1 Procedures for n-Player Game
In this chapter, we examined n-player games that represent perfect market compe-
titions with many players (please see page 30). Our fuzzy player is still represented
as yellow, the n-th player, who faces n − 1 opponent players (competitors). The
n-player games also follow the procedural steps of 2-player FDMSB general il-
lustrations in Section 4.2 (page 65) with exceptions to steps 2 and 7 which are
modified as follows:
• Step (2) Determining the strategy: as an example of a perfect market com-
petition, we have n players. For j = 1 to n−1, the opponents P (j) strategies
are denoted as [C(j),W (j),M(j)] and the fuzzy agent (yellow) strategy as
[C(n),W (n),M(n)].
• Step (7) Play the game: procedures for playing the game are as follows: The
game state is represented as vector S = [P1, P2, · · · , Pn−1, Pn, Aw, r]. Where
P1 to Pn−1 represent opponent players’ (competitors) amount of resources,
Pn represents fuzzy agent player (yellow) amount of resources, Aw represents
opponents’ accumulated wealth (profit) and r is the number of rounds the
game is played. Both the competitors and fuzzy player strategy are as stated
in step 2 above (page 99) and:
C(j) +W (j) +M(j) = P (j) = 5. (6.1)
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As explained in Section 1.3.1 on page 7 and Section 4.1 (page 63), our choices
of the number five in Equation 6.1 and for variable r are arbitrary. In a real
system, any number that suitably represents the process can be chosen.
General rules of the game are as follows:
– Initial state of the game is [5, 5, · · · , 5, 5, 0, 5] according to the vector
[P1, P2, · · ·, Pn−1, Pn, Aw, r].
– At every state [P1, P2, · · · , Pn−1, Pn, Aw, r], for j = 1 to n − 1, the op-
ponents P (j) choose their moves (strategies) [C(j),W (j),M(j)] where:
C(j) + W (j) + M(j) = P (j) = 5 and yellow who is the fuzzy player
chooses his strategy [C(n),W (n),M(n)].
– The game changes states as follows:
While r > 0
for j = 1 to n
Aw = Aw +
n−1∑
j=1
W (j)−W (n), (6.2)
Where W(n) is the fuzzy agent’s wealth
P (j) = P (j) + C(j) +M(j)r − (
n∑
i=1
P (i)−
P (j) +
n∑
i=1
C(i)− C(j) + (
n∑
i=1
M(i)−M(j))r), (6.3)
temp = Aw +
n−1∑
j=1
P (j)− P (n), (6.4)
Em = 5− (Ew + Ec),
D = M(n)/(
n−1∑
j=1
M(j)), (6.5)
CP = (M(n) + C(n) +K)/((
n−1∑
j=1
M(j))
+ (
n−1∑
j=1
C(j)) +K), (6.6)
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Esp = Ew + CP
.
– The game ends when r = 0 and if temp is greater than zero, (temp > 0),
then one of the opponent players wins, if less than zero (temp < 0), then
the fuzzy agent player (yellow) wins else, the game is a draw (i.e. if
temp = 0).
– To avoid repetition and to limit the size of this thesis, the rest of the
procedures follow those steps highlighted in Section 7.4.1 (page 110)
above for the 2-player FDMSB game case study.
6.2 Results Discussion for n-Player Game
From the n-player simulations, it was observed that because of the ability of the
fuzzy player to grasp effectively the uncertainty in the business environment by
changing his strategy based on the information provided by the fuzzy rule base,
the fuzzy player wins more often as the number of competitors (opponent players)
increases.
As shown in Table 6.1 with three players (n = 3), very interesting cases are seen
in those iterations where one expected the fuzzy player to lose because he started
the game with weaker strategies than those of his competitors (as it happens in 2-
player games), but because the player reasons in accordance with the fuzzy engine
(rule base) and changes his strategies accordingly, the fuzzy player wins in those
cases, and better than he wins in the 2-player game results shown on Table 4.3 of
page 75.
From the results in column five and six of Table 6.1, out of thirteen iterations
shown on the table, the fuzzy player (yellow) wins in ten iterations (iterations
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13) while the opponent (green) wins in only three
iterations which are iterations 6, 7, and 12.
This shows that the fuzzy player performs better in the 3-player game than in
the 2-player games where he won only eight iterations out of thirteen iterations
as shown in Table 4.3 of page 75. This shows that because of the fuzzy inference
reasoning being used by the fuzzy player, the more the number of competitors, the
better the payoffs of the fuzzy player. These trends continue with large number
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of competitors as we investigated up to one hundred competitors as illustrated in
the graph of Figure 6.2 on page 105.
Moreover, after learning, as stated in Section 7.4.1 step 11 and as shown in columns
seven and eight of Table 6.1, the fuzzy agent performs much more better as the
agent was able to win more than he won before training.
Results in columns nine and ten show the performance of the players after learning
(training). The columns show that after learning, the payoffs of opponent player
(green) were considerably reduced (minimized) by the learned fuzzy player
while the payoffs of the fuzzy player were increased.
For examples, in iterations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, before leaning of the fuzzy player, fuzzy
player payoffs were 59.1, 96.4, 328.1, 4.5 and 138.5 respectively. After learning, the
fuzzy player payoffs increased to 128.2, 163.4, 385.8, 72.7 and 205.4 respectively.
Also, the green player payoffs were considerable reduced by the learned fuzzy
player. As examples, in iterations 6, 7 and 12, before learning, green’s payoffs
were 82.9, 235.4 and 1397.4 respectively but these were reduced (minimized) to
22.3, 170.5 and 1330.7 respectively after the fuzzy player has learned.
As shown in columns seven and eight of Table 6.1, we verified these results by
designing a control experiment (simulation) in which the fuzzy player does not
change his moves in accordance with the fuzzy rule base. The results obtained
from the control experiments show that the game follows conventional trends,
that is, the fuzzy player wins only where he allocates more units of resources to
his marketing strategy at the start of the game than those of his competitors and
his payoff also depends on this. The payoff of the fuzzy player in the control
experiment (where he did not use fuzzy rule base) are far less than what he got
when he used fuzzy rule base to make his business decisions.
Therefore, after running several simulations with the number of players n ranging
from 1 to 100, the results of the n-player FDMSB game show that the larger the
number of opponent players (competitors), the better the fuzzy player performs,
as illustrated in graph of Figure 6.2 on page 105 (with up to fifty competitors),
due to the fact that he is able to adequately capture the uncertain information at
his disposal which was modelled using the concepts of fuzzy reasoning.
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.
Agent Moves Untrained AgentControl ExptTrained Agent
S/N Green Brown Yellow Winner Payoff Winner Payoff Winner Payoff
1 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 1, 0, 4 Yellow -59.1 Yellow -39.4 Yellow -128.2
2 2, 1, 2 2, 1, 2 1, 1, 3 Yellow -96.4 Yellow -64.3 Yellow -163.4
3 3, 0, 2 0, 4, 1 2, 0, 3 Yellow -328.1 Yellow -218.8 Yellow -385.8
4 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 Yellow -4.5 Yellow -3.0 Yellow -72.7
5 1, 0, 4 3, 2, 0 2, 0, 3 Yellow -138.5 Yellow -92.3 Yellow -205.4
6 3, 1, 1 3, 0, 2 4, 0, 1 Green 82.9 Green 124.4 Green 22.3
7 3, 0, 2 2, 0, 3 2, 1, 2 Green 235.4 Green 353.1 Green 170.5
8 3, 1, 1 3, 1, 1 3, 1, 1 Yellow -34.5 Yellow -23.0 Yellow -102.7
9 3, 1, 1 0, 1, 4 2, 0, 3 Yellow -26.5 Yellow -17.7 Yellow -95.8
10 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 1, 4, 0 Yellow -117.1 Yellow -78.1 Yellow -182.6
11 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 0, 1, 4 Yellow -243.6 Yellow -162.4 Yellow -309.9
12 0,0,5(Geq) 0, 0, 5(Geq) 0, 5, 0 (Leq) Green 1397.4 Green 2096.1 Green 1330.7
13 0,5,0 (Leq)0, 5, 0 (Leq) 0, 0, 5(Geq) Yellow -1145.1 Yellow -763.4 Yellow -1210.6
Table 6.1: Results of simulations of n-player game when n = 3: From
the table, the first column shows the serial numbers of the iterations, the second
column contains player green’s strategies, third column contains those of player
brown, while the forth column contains that of yellow. For example, in the
first iteration, green’s strategy shows [1, 1, 3], this indicates how resources are
allocated to strategy [C,W,M ]: C = 1, W = 1 and M = 3. The fifth column
gives the winners for the untrained simulations while the sixth column gives the
payoffs of those simulations. Column seven shows the winners for the control
experiment simulations while the payoffs of players for those simulations are
displayed in column eight. The control experiments show the results where
both players did not use fuzzy inference systems in playing the games. Column
nine shows the winners for the trained simulations while the payoffs of players
for those simulations are displayed in column ten. It can be observed that the
agent performs better than it does in 2-player game results shown on Table 4.3
of page 75. These two tables are better compared on the pie chart shown in
Figure 6.1 (page 104). For example, in iterations 5, 9 and 11 where one of
the opponents allocated higher strategy to marketing which is the strongest
strategy, one expects the fuzzy player to lose but it won. It also happened
in many other iterations which are not shown here for lack of enough space.
Also, the fuzzy player has higher payoffs than in 2-player game. The strongest
opponents (Geq) and weakest opponents (Leq) are shown in iterations 12 and
13 respectively. The minus sign on yellow payoffs merely shows the zero-sum
concept.
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3-Player Wins 10
2-Player Wins 8
3-Player Vs 2-Player Wins
3-Player Wins
56%
2-Player Wins
44%
3-Player Wins
2-Player Wins
Figure 6.1: This chart compares the performance of the fuzzy (yellow) player
in both 2-player (Table 4.3) and 3-player (Table 6.1)games. These trends extend
to n players as discussed in chapter 6. However, more simulations on these are
shown in Table 7.1 of page 116 for the business network games.
6.3 Conclusion
We have modelled decision making processes under uncertainty in business games,
using fuzzy logic concepts and game theory. Our model was termed fuzzy decision
making system for business games (FDMSB).
We have demonstrated that our model works well with large number of players. We
illustrated this by using n-player games that represent perfect market structure.
A fuzzy decision making system for business games was designed and implemented
using Matlab software. Fuzzy rules were constructed in developing the FDMSB
model using the Matlab toolbox and the implementation of this model heavily
depends on expert knowledge and experience to facilitate the development of a
reasonable fuzzy rule base for the determination of the if-then rules that denote
the relationship between inputs and the output variables.
The results of our n-player simulations showed that an entrepreneur needs not to
worry about the proliferation of competitors in the industry because by adopting
this FDMSB model, the results of the n-player games show that the larger the
number of opponent players (competitors), the better the fuzzy player performs
in the games as shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 (page 105).
We verified these results by designing control experiments (simulations) in which
the fuzzy player does not change his moves in accordance with the fuzzy rule base.
The results obtained from the control experiments show that the game follows
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Figure 6.2: A graph showing the strength of the fuzzy player with
respect to increasing number of competitors: It can be observed that the
fuzzy player performance in the games improve as the number of competitors
(opponent players) increases.
conventional trends, that is, the fuzzy player wins only where he allocates more
units of resources to his marketing strategy at the start of the game than those of
his competitors and his payoff also depends on this. The payoff of the fuzzy player
in the control experiments (where he did not use fuzzy rule base) are far less than
what he got when he used fuzzy rule base to make his business decisions.
Furthermore, we have applied a learning algorithm to the decision processes which
enables the decision agent to optimize his performance in the decision processes
as the games were played so as to meet the set criteria. To do the learning,
the Nelder-Mead simplex method for finding the minimum of an unconstrained
multivariable function was used.
Results of the learning showed that the learning algorithm works very well as the
fuzzy player was able to perform much better after learning with higher payoffs
and this enables him to reach the set criteria.
Our FDMSB procedure has practical uses in business contexts as it can serve as
very useful tools in the hands of an entrepreneur to:
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• Advise him on certain marketing strategic decision policies that can keep his
business in strategic advantage over his competitors in the market.
• Give him insight on how his firm can successfully compete with its peers
in the market by determining how much of its available resources or efforts
could be dissipated on our three adopted strategies of marketing in such a
way that his profit (accumulated wealth) will be maximized.
• Effectively utilize the uncertain (fuzzy) and prevailing or anticipated market
demand (D) information, cost of producing a commodity (CP ) and other
fuzzy information at his disposal to achieve the set goal of his business.
Also, we have been able to supplement the laws of demand and supply with a more
practical approach which takes into consideration the uncertain (fuzzy) nature of
most information available to business decision makers. While the traditional laws
of demand and supply address the nature of decision processes by consumers and
suppliers respectively, our own approach extends them further. This is to address
the nature of decision processes by an intending entrepreneur or manufacturer
to forecast the prospect of the proposed business through profit prediction from
estimated selling price given the fuzzy market or industry information available to
him. This allows him to determine price and marketing strategies in function of a
very low, medium, high, very high, etc. demand.
In arriving at our results, the simulations are based on assumptions and condi-
tions that the players involved in the decision processes are rational players (Sec-
tion 2.1.1 on page 12) and that only the fuzzy player (yellow), at the moment, uses
fuzzy moves [144]. This is in accordance with our overall aim of designing models
that illustrate how an entrepreneur could make effective and efficient business de-
cisions by using fuzzy inference systems (FIS) in capturing uncertainties that may
surround his business environments. This will therefore help the entrepreneur to
have competitive advantages over his competitors who are unaware of the useful-
ness of these tools and therefore are not making use of the fuzzy inference models
in their decision making processes.
Chapter 7
Fuzzy Decision Making System
on Business Networks
In this chapter, we are modelling uncertainty in business competitions in the form
of games on networks [62, 145, 146, 147, 148], using fuzzy logic concepts and
game theory. We investigate how the level of connectivity or number of links,
number of opponent players (competitors), as well as choice of strategies adopted
by opponent players affect the payoff of another player in the network. We shall
call this player the fuzzy player. Learning is also introduced to investigate how
the agent adapts over time during the game.
7.1 Introduction
Empirical work suggests that the pattern of social interaction has an important
influence on economic outcomes [149, 150]. Analysis of interaction and cooperation
among people in a group has been performed in the prisoners’ dilemma game
[15, 151, 152, 153, 154], snowdrift game [62, 71] and other games. For the first
time, we have combined the concepts of fuzzy logic [155, 156, 157], and game
theory to model interaction and decision making processes in business networks.
We would like to analyse interaction and competition among business organisations
as games on networks and we would like to examine various network characteristics
such as level of interaction or connectivity, number of nodes (players), location of
a player with respect to those of his opponents, strength of individual player’s
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strategy and those of his immediate opponents. We will investigate how these
characteristics affect the payoff [158, 159] of players in a business network [160,
161, 162].
7.2 Networks and Business
In a simple sense, a network is an interconnection of two or more nodes and a
business network can be regarded as a network where these interconnected nodes
are business units [163].
The search for models that account for the complex behaviour of biological, social,
and economic systems has been the motivation of much interdisciplinary works
in the last two decades [151, 164]. Strategists have been concerned with joint
ventures, strategic alliances and strategic networks and the words “network” and
“relationship” indicate that there is some kind of special organisational form at
an aggregate level above that of individual components [158, 165, 166].
7.3 Fuzzy Decision Making System in the Busi-
ness Network (FDMBN) Games Model
The design of an automatic FDMBN decision agent used a combination of game
theory, fuzzy logic concepts, and training or learning of the fuzzy player to optimize
his performance. This is achieved through the use of the Nelder-Mead Simplex
Search Method for finding the local minimum x of an unconstrained multivariable
function f(x) using a derivative-free method and starting at an initial estimate.
In this section, we will analyse some fundamental concepts needed for designing
the business network game.
We will consider two different sets of business networks as a case study [163]. One
network has three players and the other has six players with different connectivi-
ties, as shown in Figures 7.1 A and B respectively on page 110.
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7.3.1 Network Variables
The following variables will be used in the simulations: l is the number of connec-
tions or links to a particular node, d is the total number of nodes in the network,
t is the total number of links in the fully connected network, k is the number of
other nodes in the network that a particular node is directly connected to, while
w is the number of nodes in the network that a particular node is not connected
to. The payoff P of a player y will be represented as P (y). We have
w = t− k. (7.1)
For a fully connected network
t = (d− 1)/2. (7.2)
7.3.2 Agents Payoffs
The fuzzy player will be denoted by y, we will call him the yellow player. In this
simulation, with respect to figure 7.1 above, the payoff of the fuzzy player denoted
as yellow y is calculated as follows:
The payoff of y in the partially connected network, P (yl), is the payoff it would
get in the fully connected network P (yd) MINUS the payoff it would get if it was
connected to only those nodes that it is not connected to, P (yw). That is:
P (yl) = P (yd)− P (yw) (7.3)
Using the diagrams in Figure 7.1, the payoff of network ii is the payoff of network
i minus the payoff of network iii. This holds for networks A as well as B.
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Figure 7.1: The two figures A and B show two different sets of busi-
ness networks with three and six players respectively. Figures A(i)
and B(i) are networks with full connectivity while figures A(ii), A(iii), B(ii)
and B(iii) are networks with partial connectivity. Our results showed that the
higher the connectivity, the higher the payoff of the fuzzy player. That is, the
payoffs in A(i) and B(i) are greater than those in A(ii) and B(ii) respectively
which in turn greater than the payoffs in A(iii) and B(iii) respectively. Also, we
discovered that for the two sets of networks in A and B, the payoffs in (ii) are
equal to the payoffs in (i) minus the payoffs in (iii). The payoff of y, the fuzzy
player, also depends on the strategies of his neighbours as well as their positions
in the network. For example in B(ii), when y faces a stronger (strategy that
has highest resource allocation to marketing M) immediate opponent g, he has
low payoffs. However, when g in turn faces a stronger immediate opponent b,
this reduces the effects of g on fuzzy player y which results in y having higher
payoffs. This is further explained in Section 7.5 on page 117.
7.4 Research Methodology
7.4.1 A Case Study of a Fuzzy Decision Making System
for Business Network Games (FDMBN)
We shall illustrate our fuzzy decision making system in business network (FDMBN)[163]
games using a 3-player network model shown in Figure 7.1 A above. The model
involves three players (firms) in a typical market and we shall represent the players
as green g, brown b and yellow y. Yellow represents the fuzzy player. Each player
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is given five units of initial resources which may represent capital, time, personnel
or other business resources. In our case we assume capital (say £5M). The num-
ber of rounds the game must be played is five, which denotes a sequence of five
possible moves for each player. In each round, the players may choose to allocate
their units between three roles (strategies): consolidation efforts C, reserved or
generated wealth W and aggressive marketing efforts M . These resource alloca-
tions will be done with the knowledge of the opponents move history, but without
knowledge of the opponent’s current choice of strategy. They are denoted as a vec-
tor [C,W,M ] for each player. These strategies are fully explained in Section 4.1
on page 63.
7.4.1.1 Game Procedures
The procedures necessary for designing the proposed automatic decision system
(FDMBN) are as listed in the steps below:
1. List all uncertain (fuzzy) factors that will be considered in taking the business
decision: the uncertain or fuzzy information we are taking into consideration
are anticipated market demand information (D) and the production costs
(CP ).
2. Determine the strategies of the players: here, we are adopting three strategies
for each player and these strategies are consolidation efforts, wealth created
or reserved and aggressive marketing efforts, denoted as a vector with three
elements [C,W,M ]. As an example of a 3-player business network, we have
three players (firms) represented as green g, whose strategy is represented as
[Cg,Wg,Mg], brown b with strategy represented as [Cb,Wb,Mb] and yellow y
with strategy represented as [Cy,Wy,My].
3. Determine the input and output variables of FDMBN Fuzzy Inference Sys-
tem (FIS): The inputs are market demand information D and production
costs CP , and the outputs are expected consolidation efforts Ec, expected
wealth Ew and expected aggressive marketing efforts Em where: Em =
5 − (Ew + Ec) (Because the total (expected) resources of each player at
any point is five) The variables Ec, Ew, and Em relate to the fuzzy player y,
and we will not index them by y.
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4. Develop fuzzy sets, subsets and membership functions for all the input and
output variables. This can be accomplished by soliciting knowledge from
the experts or searching through literature data. Our adopted fuzzy sets,
subsets and membership functions are as shown in Figure 7.2 on page 112.
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(d) Expected wealth
Figure 7.2: Membership functions for fuzzy variables of FDMBN rule base-
inputs: Demand (D) and production cost (CP ) and outputs: expected consoli-
dation efforts (Ec) and expected wealth (Ew).
5. Formulate decision rules for the rule base. These also ought to be solicited
from experts [94]. The rules shown in Figure 7.2 depict our adopted decision
rules.
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6. Establish relationships between input values and their fuzzy sets and ap-
plying the decision rules. Using the relationships shown in Figure 7.2. The
fuzzy rule base was coded into a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) using the
Matlab toolbox.
7. Play the game: The procedure for playing the game is as follows. The game
state is represented as a vector [g, b, y, Aw, r]. Where g, b and y represent the
amount of resources of the green, brown and yellow players respectively, Aw
represents accumulated wealth (profit) and r is the number of rounds the
game is played. Green, brown and yellow strategies are respectively denoted
as [Cg,Wg,Mg], [Cb,Wb,Mb] and [Cy,Wy,My] where:
C +W +M = 5. (7.4)
As explained in Section 1.3.1 on page 7 and Section 4.1 (page 63), our choices
of the number five in Equation 7.4 and for variable r are arbitrary. In a real
system, any number that suitably represents the process can be chosen.
General rules of the game are as follows:
• Initial state of the game is [5, 5, 5, 0, 5] (i.e according to vector [g, b, y, Aw, r])
• At every state [g, b, y, Aw, r], green and yellow choose their respective
moves by allocating their strategies where: Cg + Wg + Mg = 5 and
Cb + Wb + Mb = 5 and yellow who is the fuzzy player chooses his
strategy [Cy,Wy,My] where Cy +Wy +My = 5.
• The game changes states as follows: for the full network A(i) shown in
Figure 7.1,
r = r − 1 (7.5)
Aw = Aw +Wg +Wb −Wy (7.6)
gd = g + Cg +Mgr − (b+ Cb +Mbr + y + Cy +Myr) (7.7)
bd = b+ Cb +Mbr − (g + Cg +Mgr + y + Cy +Myr) (7.8)
yd = y + Cy +Myr − (b+ Cb +Mbr + g + Cg +Mgr) (7.9)
P (yd) = Aw + gd + bd + yd (7.10)
Where gd, bd, and yd are the resources of the players g, b, and y in a
fully connected network. Pyd represents the payoff of the fuzzy player
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in the fully connected network. Next we have
Em = 5− (Ew + Ec), (7.11)
because the total resources or expected resources of each player at any
point is five. Also,
D = My/(Mg +Mb), (7.12)
CP = (My + Cy + k)/(Mg +Mb + Cg + Cb + k), (7.13)
Where k represents other costs which are taken to be zero to avoid
needless complication (i.e. k = 0).
We define Ew (expected profit/Wealth)= Esp − CP , where
Esp = Ew + CP (7.14)
Where Esp represents the expected selling price of the product of the
fuzzy player. The output of the fuzzy inference system are expected
consolidation efforts Ec, expected wealth Ew and expected aggressive
marketing efforts Em. In the subsequent rounds (r), the fuzzy player
changes his strategy to [Ec, Ew, Em] based on the output of the FIS.
For our partially connected networks shown in Figure 7.1, A(ii) and
that shown in Figure 7.1 A(iii) (page 110), the iteration follows similar
steps but the effects of a player unconnected to a particular player are
taken as zero. For example, in Figure 7.1 A(ii), the iteration is as
follows:
gl = (g + Cg +Mgr)− (y + Cy +Myr + b+ Cb +Mbr), (7.15)
bl = (b+ Cb +Mbr)− (g + Cg +Mgr) + 0, (7.16)
yl = (y + Cy +Myr)− (g + Cg +Mgr) + 0, (7.17)
P (yl) = Aw + gl + bl + yl, (7.18)
Where (P (yl)) represents the payoff of y in the partly connected net-
work. Similarly, for Figure 7.1 A(iii),
bw = b+ Cb +Mbr − (y + Cy +Myr), (7.19)
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yw = (y + Cy +Myr)− (b+ Cb +Mbr), (7.20)
(P (yw)) = Aw + bw + yw, (7.21)
and P (yw) represents the payoff of y in the partly connected network.
These iterations were combined into one simulation and we calculated
the payoff based on Equation 7.3 above: P (yl) = P (yd)− P (yw).
• The game ends when r = 0. If P (yl) is greater than zero, the fuzzy
player wins, if less than zero, then one of the opponents wins. Else, the
game is a draw.
• This game is a zero sum game and therefore, yellow loses whenever
opponents win and vice versa and since our aim is to develop an agent
that would win as much as possible, maximize his payoff and minimize
those of the opponents, Nash equilibrium [137, 138] is not considered
in this context.
8. Evaluate the FIS: Using Matlab fuzzy toolbox, all the fuzzy inputs are passed
into the Mamdani type FIS.
9. Get the defuzzified output from the FIS: the crisp output for the FDMBN
is computed using centre of gravity method (COG).
10. Determine whether the conditions for the end of the game have been met:
In this case study, the condition for the end of the game is when the number
of rounds r reaches 1 counting down from 5 (i.e. when r = 1).
11. Training and performance evaluation: Training and learning of the FDMBN
decision agent was accomplished through the optimization of the fuzzy logic
parameters while using the game payoff as the basis for the performance
measure after playing a series of the game as in [13]. Details of the training
method are as explained in Section 3.7 (page 53) and Section 11 (page 68).
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Players 2-Player;(g,y) 3-Player;(g,b,y)4-Player;(g,b,p,y)5-Player;(g,b,p,r,y)
S/NGreen(g)Blue(b)Purple(p)Red (r)Yellow(y)Winner Payoff Winner Payoff Winner Payoff Winner payoff
1 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 Green 249.00 Yellow 112.00 Yellow 3062.90 Yellow 29507.00
2 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 Yellow 117.00 Yellow 15.00 Yellow 517.93 Yellow 4564.00
3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 Green 96.00 Yellow 73.00 Yellow 2134.90 Yellow 20367.00
4 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 Green 122.00 Yellow 96.00 Yellow 2254.90 Yellow 21370.00
5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 Green 1006.00 Green 27.00 Yellow 2272.90 Yellow 23441.00
6 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow 912.00 Yellow 55.00 Yellow 1307.90 Yellow 10629.00
7 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 Yellow 63.00 Yellow 32.00 Yellow 1197.40 Yellow 11220.00
8 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Green 249.00 Green 92.00 Yellow 1872.10 Yellow 15230.00
9 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 Yellow 912.00 Yellow 312.00 Yellow 2462.90 Yellow 24691.00
10 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 Green 1006.00 Green 212.00 Yellow 1042.90 Yellow 8966.00
11 0, 3, 2 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 Green 69.00 Yellow 8.92 Yellow 1176.40 Yellow 10999.00
12 4, 1, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 Green 12.00 Yellow 8.47 Yellow 656.93 Yellow 5804.00
13 2, 3, 0 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 1, 3 Yellow 566.00 Yellow 240.08 Yellow 2048.90 Yellow 20562.00
14 0, 5, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow 912.00 Yellow 78.61 Yellow 1370.70 Yellow 10872.00
15 3, 1, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 2, 2 Yellow 136.00 Yellow 26.09 Yellow 1325.90 Yellow 11808.00
16 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 Yellow 11.00 Yellow 78.29 Yellow 1437.40 Yellow 13226.00
17 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 Yellow 73.00 Yellow 13.71 Yellow 957.45 Yellow 9213.00
18 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 Yellow 54.00 Yellow 62.87 Yellow 1052.90 Yellow 9249.00
19 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 Green 183.00 Yellow 104.03 Yellow 2658.90 Yellow 25438.00
20 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 Green 157.00 Yellow 81.03 Yellow 2538.90 Yellow 24435.00
21 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 Yellow 135.00 Yellow 29.17 Yellow 572.93 Yellow 5237.00
22 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 Yellow 89.05 Yellow 9.29 Yellow 1077.00 Yellow 10217.00
23 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Green 249.96 Yellow 112.03 Yellow 2433.00 Yellow 19846.00
24 1, 2, 2 1, 3, 1 1, 2, 2 1, 3, 1 1, 2, 2 Green 10.13 Yellow 10.48 Yellow 1491.00 Yellow 13364.00
25 3, 0, 2 3, 0, 2 3, 0, 2 3, 0, 2 3, 0, 2 Green 62.13 Yellow 87.71 Yellow 1851.00 Yellow 17302.00
26 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 3, 0, 2 3, 0, 2 0, 1, 4 Green 157.56 Yellow 81.03 Yellow 2389.00 Yellow 21723.00
27 0, 0, 5 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 0, 5 Green 249.96 Yellow 61.56 Yellow 2817.00 Yellow 26611.00
28 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 0, 5 Green 249.96 Yellow 112.00 Yellow 2937.00 Yellow 27575.00
29 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 1, 4 0, 0, 5 Green 249.96 Yellow 112.00 Yellow 3062.90 Yellow 28538.00
30 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 5, 0 Yellow 117.00 Yellow 202.03 Yellow 1547.00 Yellow 16695.00
31 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 1, 4 0, 5, 0 Yellow 117.00 Yellow 202.03 Yellow 1673.00 Yellow 17657.00
Table 7.1: Results of simulations of FDMBN showing how payoffs of
fuzzy player increase as competitors increase on a business network.
From the table, the first column shows the serial numbers of the iterations,
the second column to the sixth contain players’ strategies. For example, in the
first iteration, green’s strategy shows [0, 0, 5], this indicates how resources are
allocated to strategy [C,W,M ]: C = 0, W = 0 and M = 5. Columns 7, 9,
11 and 13 show the winners in 2-player, 3-player, 4-player and 5-player games
respectively while columns 8, 10, 12 and 14 give their respective payoffs. Each
iteration involves the fuzzy player yellow and one, two, three or four other play-
ers depending on the values of n on the result columns. It will be observed from
the results that the more the number of competitors on the business network,
the better (more) the payoffs of the fuzzy player. Figure 7.4 on page 118 gives a
graphical explanation on this table.
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Figure 7.3: A graph showing the strength of the fuzzy player with
respect to different levels of connectivity on the network. It can be
observed that the fuzzy agent performance in the games improve as the level
of connectivity increases. The higher the level of connectivity on the business
network, the higher the payoffs of the fuzzy player. This trend continues for
connections with up to 100 competitors and beyond. Table 7.2 on page 119
contains the data from which this graph was obtained.
7.5 Results Discussion for Business Games on
Networks
Based on the procedure highlighted in Section 7.4.1.1, several simulations of FDMBN
were run with different number of connections (levels of connectivity) and number
of players.
As shown in Figure 7.3 (page 117) and Table 7.2 (page 119), it was observed that
the higher connectivity among players, the higher the payoff of the fuzzy player.
From Table 7.2, l1 represents the number of missing links. Therefore, l1 = 1
represents the case when one link is missing from the business network. The
winners on these iterations are shown in column nine and the corresponding payoffs
in column ten.
Also, in the columns of the table, l1 = 2 represents the case when two links are
missing from the business network. The winners on these iterations are shown
in column eleven and the corresponding payoffs in column twelve. The last two
columns represent similar cases when l1 = 3.
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Figure 7.4: A graph showing the strength of the fuzzy player with
respect to an increasing number of competitors on the business net-
works. It can be observed that the fuzzy player performance in the game im-
proves as the number of competitors (opponent players) increases. This trend
continues for games with up to 100 competitors and beyond. Table 7.1 on
page 116 contains the data from which this graph was obtained.
From the result on these columns, it can be observed that the higher the number
of missing links l1 on the network, the lower the payoffs of the fuzzy player and
vice-versa. That is, the the higher the level of connectivity, the higher the payoffs
of fuzzy player on the business networks.
For examples, in the second iteration in which all the players have strategy [0, 5, 0],
the payoff of fuzzy player in the fully connected network was 4,586.00. This is as
shown in column eight for the second iteration. However, when one link was
missing from the network, the payoff of fuzzy player in this iteration reduced to
4,564.00. When two links were missing as shown in column twelve, the payoff
reduced to 4,445.00 and finally for that iteration, when the number of missing
links increased to three (l1 = 3), the payoff reduced to 4,133.00. These trends
continue for all the simulations and for a large networks.
We therefore concluded that the higher the level of connectivity among the players
on the business networks, the higher the payoffs of players.
Chart in Figure 7.5 (page 120) shows the pictorial trends of these results. Also,
results shown on the graph of Figure 7.4 (page 118) and Table 7.1 (page 116)
confirm that because of the ability of the fuzzy player to grasp effectively the
uncertainty in the business network environment by changing his strategy based
on the information provided by the fuzzy rule base, the fuzzy player wins more
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Players Full Network l1 = 1 l1 = 2 l1 = 3
S/NGreen(g)Blue(b)Purple(p)Red (r)Yellow(y)Winner Payoff Winner Payoff Winner Payoff Winner Payoff
1 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 Yellow 29504.00 Yellow 29507.00 Yellow 29021.00 Yellow 27313.00
2 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 Yellow 4586.00 Yellow 4564.00 Yellow 4445.00 Yellow 4133.00
3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 1, 1, 3 Yellow 20370.00 Yellow 20367.00 Yellow 20035.00 Yellow 18857.00
4 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 2, 0, 3 Yellow 21368.00 Yellow 21370.00 Yellow 21021.00 Yellow 19773.00
5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 Yellow 23434.00 Yellow 23441.00 Yellow 22531.00 Yellow 19848.00
6 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow 10657.00 Yellow 10629.00 Yellow 10936.00 Yellow 11598.00
7 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1 Yellow 11227.00 Yellow 11220.00 Yellow 11040.00 Yellow 10390.00
8 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow 15258.00 Yellow 15230.00 Yellow 15578.00 Yellow 16313.00
9 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 5 Yellow 24689.00 Yellow 24691.00 Yellow 24206.00 Yellow 22498.00
10 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 0, 5, 0 Yellow 8989.00 Yellow 8966.00 Yellow 8906.00 Yellow 8698.00
11 0, 3, 2 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 Yellow 11012.00 Yellow 10999.00 Yellow 10837.00 Yellow 10259.00
12 4, 1, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 Yellow 5825.00 Yellow 5804.00 Yellow 5718.00 Yellow 5423.00
13 2, 3, 0 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 1, 3 Yellow 20559.00 Yellow 20562.00 Yellow 20060.00 Yellow 18387.00
14 0, 5, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow 10897.00 Yellow 10872.00 Yellow 11195.00 Yellow 11836.00
15 3, 1, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 3, 1 1, 2, 2 Yellow 11821.00 Yellow 11808.00 Yellow 11730.00 Yellow 11345.00
16 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 Yellow 13223.00 Yellow 13226.00 Yellow 13012.00 Yellow 12222.00
17 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 0, 4, 1 Yellow 9231.00 Yellow 9213.00 Yellow 9067.00 Yellow 8558.00
18 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 5, 0, 0 Yellow 9250.00 Yellow 9249.00 Yellow 9095.00 Yellow 8521.00
19 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 1, 0, 4 Yellow 25436.00 Yellow 25438.00 Yellow 25021.00 Yellow 23543.00
20 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 0, 1, 4 Yellow 24438.00 Yellow 24435.00 Yellow 24035.00 Yellow 22627.00
21 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 1, 4, 0 Yellow 5258.00 Yellow 5237.00 Yellow 5152.00 Yellow 4856.00
Table 7.2: Results of simulations of FDMBN showing how payoffs
of fuzzy player decrease as the number of missing links (l1) increases
on a 5-player business network. In other words, the more the level of
connectivity (links) on the business network, the better (more) the payoffs of
the fuzzy player. From the table, the first column shows the serial numbers of
the iterations, the second column to the sixth contain players’ strategies (for full
explanations on strategies, please, see Section 4.1 on page 63). For example, in
the first iteration, green’s strategy shows [0, 0, 5], this indicates how resources
are allocated to strategy [C,W,M ]: C = 0, W = 0 and M = 5. Column 7 and 8
give the winner and the payoffs when the network is fully connected. Columns
9, 11 and 13 give the winners when 1, 2 or 3 links are missing from the network
while columns 10, 12 and 14 indicate their payoffs respectively. Figure 7.3 on
page 117 and Figure 7.5 on page 120 give graphical explanations on this table.
often or has a higher payoff as the number of players (competitors) in the game
increases.
This is as demonstrated in Table 7.1. The payoffs in 5-player networks (column
14) is greater than that of 4-player networks (column 12) and this is also greater
that the payoffs of players in 3-player networks (column 10) and the payoffs in
3-player network is greater that that of 2-player networks (column 8).
This confirms that the higher the number of competitors on the networks, the
higher the payoffs of the fuzzy player.
Concerning the position or location of a player in a network with respect to the
strategies of his neighbours, when y faces a stronger (strategy that has highest
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Figure 7.5: Pictorial view of the trends of the fuzzy player payoffs with respect
to different levels of connectivity. This shows that the payoffs of the fuzzy player
on the business network increase as the level of connectivity increases. Table 7.2
on page 119 contains the data from which this chart was obtained.
resource allocation to marketing M) immediate opponent g in the network as
shown in Figure 7.1B(ii) (page 110), then y has low payoffs. However, when g in
turn faces a stronger immediate opponent b, this reduces the effects of g on fuzzy
player y which results in y having higher payoffs.
Also, it was observed that due to Equations (7.15)-(7.17),(7.19) and (7.20), for
any of the players to win the game, he must allocate a substantial part of his
resources to aggressive marketing (M) and this allocation must outweigh those
of the opponents’ allocations. According to this model and with respect to the
equations, since the number of rounds r decreases as the game is played, this
reduces the strength of marketing aggressiveness. An entrepreneur who is a new
entrant into the networked industry, is best advised to try as much as possible to
devote more of his resources on aggressive marketing campaigns (M) than other
strategies (i.e. efforts on consolidation (C) and reserved wealth (W )). This will
enable him to have a strong footing in the industry and to be able to have a large
market share as early as possible as the game is played and thus, will result in
winning the game. At the end of the game, the estimated price for the commodity
can be forecast with Equation (7.14) (Esp = Ew + CP ).
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As in Tables 4.3 and 6.1 of chapters 4 and 6 respectively, we verified these results
by designing control experiments (simulations) in which the fuzzy player does not
change his moves in accordance with the fuzzy rule base. The results obtained
from the control experiments show that the game follows conventional trends,
that is, the fuzzy player wins only where he allocates more units of resources to
his marketing strategy at the start of the game than those of his competitors and
his payoff also depends on this. The payoff of the fuzzy player in the control
experiments (where he did not use fuzzy rule base) are far less than what he got
when he used fuzzy rule base to make his business decision.
After training, as stated in Section 7.4.1.1 step 11 (page 68), the fuzzy player per-
forms better as the player was able to win more often than he won before training.
From the results explained above, it can be observed that training (learning) of
the fuzzy player was really important and the training algorithm was very effective
because it enables the fuzzy player to learn and reach the performance criteria.
7.6 Conclusion
We have modelled decision making processes under uncertainty on business net-
works, using fuzzy logic and game theory. Our model was termed fuzzy decision
making system for business networks (FDMBN). We illustrated this firstly with
3-player, 6-player and n-player network games to capture perfect market struc-
tures (please, see chapter 6). Also, we examined this model via a case study. The
system was designed and implemented using Matlab software. Fuzzy rules were
constructed in developing the FDMBN model using Matlab toolbox and the im-
plementation of this model heavily depends on expert knowledge and experience
to facilitate the development of a reasonable fuzzy rule base for the determination
of the if-then rules that denote the relationship between inputs and the output
variables. Furthermore, we have applied a learning algorithm to the decision pro-
cess which enables the decision agent to optimize his performance in the decision
process as the game is played so as to meet the set criteria. To do the learn-
ing, Nelder-Mead simplex method for finding the minimum of an unconstrained
multivariable function was used.
Our FDMBN model has practical use in a business context as it can serve as a very
useful decision tool in the hands of an entrepreneur. Given the fuzzy demand and
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cost of production information, the estimated selling price (Esp) can be predicted
according to Equation 7.14.
In arriving at our results, the simulations are based on assumptions and condi-
tions that the players involved in the decision processes are rational players (Sec-
tion 2.1.1 on page 12) and that only the fuzzy player (yellow), at the moment, uses
fuzzy moves [144]. This is in accordance with our overall aim of designing models
that illustrate how an entrepreneur could make effective and efficient business de-
cisions by using fuzzy inference systems (FIS) in capturing uncertainties that may
surround his business environments. This will therefore help the entrepreneur to
have competitive advantages over his competitors who are unaware of the useful-
ness of these tools and therefore are not making use of the fuzzy inference models
in their decision making processes.
Chapter 8
Fuzzy Decision Making Systems
using Board Games with
Constraints as Models of Business
Games
8.1 Introduction
We will now study uncertainties surrounding competition in businesses using board
games[76, 79, 167] as illustrations. We investigated these uncertainties using con-
cepts of fuzzy logic, percolation theory and game theory. These investigations
focus on how the level of connectivity or number of links, number of opponent
players (competitors), possible constraints or restrictions on the boards as well as
choice of strategy[168] adopted by opponent players affect the payoff of another
player on the boards. This other player is referred to, in this thesis, as the fuzzy
player. We introduced learning to train and analyze how the fuzzy player adapts
over time during the game.
This chapter contains experiments on the economic effects of the pattern of social
interactions modelled as fuzzy board games and we will refer to the model as fuzzy
strategy decision making system on business board (FSBB) games [169].
123
Chapter 8. Fuzzy Decision Making Systems using Board Games 124
8.2 Chapter Objectives
Our main objectives are:
• To analyse competitions among business organisations as games on boards
and we would like to examine various board characteristics such as level of
connectivity, number of nodes (players), location of a player with respect to
those of his opponents, patterns of board connections and moves, strength
of individual player’s strategy and those of his immediate opponents. We
would investigate how these characteristics affect the payoffs of players in
games played on boards.
• To investigate situations where there are constraints imposed by regulatory
authorities such as when two or more players are forbidden (possibly by law)
from interacting to prevent collusion. This leads to constrained optimisation.
Constraints can be between variables, or can be constraints imposed on
communication between players.
• To analyse how level of availability of vital infrastructures such as trans-
portation (also communication) in a geographical location can affect the
profitability (known here as payoffs) of business enterprises.
• To investigate why industries tend to concentrate in highly developed loca-
tions rather than less developed ones.
• To investigate why developing nations are less attractive to industrialists
when compared to the developed ones.
• To study how fuzzy reasoning or fuzzy inference system (FIS) can help to
improve the performance of businesses in an environment that is clouded
with uncertainties and adverse conditions such as low level of infrastructural
development.
• To investigate how performance of these business enterprises can be improved
or enhanced through adaptation or learning (training of the fuzzy players)
of the fuzzy inference system. We are providing trained and optimized fuzzy
rules that simulate the relationship between demand (D), production cost
(CP ) as well as those marketing strategies that an entrepreneur can follow
in forecasting the selling price (Esp) of a commodity and thereby, the profit
or wealth to be generated or accumulated (Aw).
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8.3 Board Games and Business
Board games have a universal appeal and there can be few people who have not at
some time, been excited or stimulated by a board game [79]. There are different
types of board games and in [79], they are grouped according to the following
categories: Games of position, Mancala games, War games, Race games, Dice,
Calculation and other games. Figure 8.1 (page 125) and Figure 8.2 (page 126)
show the author, Festus, and his wife, Adesola, playing different types of board
games in the computer laboratory in their attempts to investigate the outcome of
the experiments of this research. The games played in the two Figures 8.1 and 8.2
are Ayo-Olopon (also called Mancala) and Ludo games respectively.
Figure 8.1: The author, Festus, playing Ayo-Olopon (also known as Mancala)
game with his wife, Adesola, in the laboratory to investigate the outcomes of
research experiments.
In this research, we have formulated a board game named; fuzzy strategy decision
making system on business board (FSBB) games to simulate strategic competitions
in business environments and we used this to investigate the impacts of basic
infrastructures such as transportation networks [170, 171] on the profitability of
businesses in particular geographical locations.
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Figure 8.2: The author is playing Ludo game with his wife, Adesola, in the
computer laboratory in order to investigates the outcomes of his research ex-
periments.
8.4 Fuzzy Strategy Decision Making System on
Boards (FSBB) Games Models
The general model for our proposed FSBB is as shown in Figure 8.3 on page 127.
The design of the automatic FSBB decision agents used a combination of game
theory, percolation theory[155, 156, 172], fuzzy logic concepts and training or
learning of the fuzzy player to optimize his performance. This is achieved through
the use of the Nelder-Mead Simplex Search Method [131, 173, 174] for finding
the local minimum x of an unconstrained multivariable function f(x) using a
derivative-free method and starting at an initial estimate [163].
In the sections that follow, we will firstly analyse some fundamental concepts
needed for designing the fuzzy strategy decision making system on business board
(FSBB) games.
8.5 Difference between the Network Games (FDMBN)
and the Board Games (FSBB)
In networks, the nodes represent the players and edges are links between players.
Existence of links or non-existence determines whether the players can compete
or not respectively. However, in board games, nodes are locations while edges are
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Figure 8.3: A model of FSBB game showing inputs, processes and outputs.
links between these locations. Existence of links or their non-existence between
locations determines whether players can move between these locations or not
respectively.
8.6 Fuzzy Strategic Decision Making System us-
ing Board Games with Constraints as Model
of Businesses(FSBB)
Fuzzy strategic decision making system on business board (FSBB) game is an ab-
stract experimental and strategic board game that is played on 5X5 board among
two players whom we shall represent as yellow and green players. Each of the
two players has ten pieces which represent trucks which are loaded with firms’
products. The trucks are positioned initially, as shown in Figure 8.4 (page 129),
at the start nodes which are at row 1 and row 5 for yellow and green players re-
spectively. As shown in the figure, each node at the start row contains two pieces
(trucks) each at the initial (start) stage of the game. These ten trucks owned by
each player contain products which are to be distributed at their respective goal
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nodes (destinations). The goal node for each player resides at the opponent’s side
of the board which necessitates for each player to travel across the board in order
to take as many of his resources as possible to his destination (the goal node).
The board is used here to represent the road networks in a particular geographic
location (such as between Edinburgh and London in the United Kingdom) and
where players represent companies (involve in logistics with trucks) at each of
these mentioned locations.
We varied level of connectivity (number of links) on the board by removing links
arbitrarily and we investigated how these restrictions (missing links l1) affect pay-
offs (profitability of businesses). This level of connectivity is used to investigate
how the level of availability of vital infrastructures such as transportation networks
in a geographical location can affect the profitability (known in the research as
game payoffs) of business enterprises.
8.7 Board Variables
The following variables would be used in the simulation: n represents the number
of players (n = 2), l1 is the number of missing links on the board, d is the total
number of nodes on the board, t is the total number of links in the fully connected
network, Cost of production is represented as Cp, estimated demand of the product
at destination node is represented as D . The payoff P of a player y will be
represented as P (y).
8.8 A Case Study of a Fuzzy Strategic Decision
Making System on Business Board (FSBB)
Games
We shall illustrate our fuzzy strategic decision making system on business board
(FSBB) games with different board connections in Figure 8.4 (page 129). The
model involves two players which represent firms that deal in logistics by road
and are based at different geographical locations in a particular country or region.
We shall represent the players as green (g) and yellow (y). Yellow represents the
Chapter 8. Fuzzy Decision Making Systems using Board Games 129
 
                                     A      B     C     D      E  
G
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
Green goal node 
5
4
3
2
1
Yellow goal node 
Green start row 
Yellow start row 
(a) Full Connection
 
                                     A      B     C     D      E  
G
                                              
 
1 2 
 
        
 
3   4  4 
 
 
 
Y
Green goal node 
5
4
3
2
1
Yellow goal node 
Green start row 
Yellow start row 
(b) Four Links Missing
 
                                     A      B     C     D      E  
G
                                              
 
1 2 
 
       3       4 
 
5   4  6 
 
 
 
Y
Green goal node 
5
4
3
2
1
Yellow goal node 
Green start row 
Yellow start row 
(c) Six Links Missing
 
                                     A      B     C     D      E  
G
                                              
 
1 2      3 
 
4      5 
 
       6       7       8 
 
 
 
Y
Green goal node 
5
4
3
2
1
Yellow goal node 
Green start row 
Yellow start row 
(d) Eight Links Missing
Figure 8.4: Different board connectivity figures: (a) shows a board with com-
plete links/connectivity (i.e. fully connected), (b)board with four missing links,
(c)board with six missing links and (d) board with eight missing links. Our
results thus show that the less the connectivity on the board, the less the pay-
offs of the players. That is, the payoff of fuzzy player in (a) is greater than his
payoff in (b) which in turn is greater than that of (c) and finally, the payoffs in
(d) turn to be the lowest.
fuzzy player. Given the boards with different patterns of connections as shown
in Figure 8.4, the game state is represented as vector [g, y, Aw, r]. Where g rep-
resents green player’s amount of resources, y represents yellow player’s amount of
resources, Aw represents green’s accumulated wealth (profit) and r is the number
of rounds the game is played. Green player strategy is denoted as [Cg,Wg,Mg]
and yellow player strategy is denoted as [Cy,Wy,My] where:
C +W +M = 10. (8.1)
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Because the total resources of each player at any point is ten. These resources
are trucks of products to be taken to the players’ respective goal nodes. For more
information on players’ strategies, please see Section 4.1 on page 63.
8.8.1 FSBB Game Rules
From Figure 8.4 (page 129), row 1 is the yellow player start row while row 5 is
the green player start row. As shown on the diagram, the goal node of player y is
represented as Y while the goal node of player g is represented as G.
Other rules are as follows:
• A node can only contain a maximum of three trucks at a time.
• A node can only contain a maximum of two trucks from same firm.
• A player that has two trucks in the same node (other than the start node)
would get his profit reduced to half because his goods are in excess for
that particular location. This means the less the connectivity among the
nodes, the more the need for branching of a truck into neighbours’ paths
and therefore the more the risk of that player having two trucks in same
node and thereby reducing his profits.
• A player must follow legal moves through connected nodes and cannot jump
nodes.
• At any particular location, a player seeks the shortest path to move to the
next location.
• For game to exist, there must be a minimum valid connection on the board.
A minimum valid connection is the connection such that there exists at least
a single path for a player to take his resources (trucks) from the start node
to reach the destination node.
8.8.2 Game procedures
Following the FSBB general model in Figure 8.3 (page 127) and with respect
to board diagrams in Figure 8.4 (page 129), the procedures that are necessary
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for designing the proposed automatic business decision system (FSBB) are as
explained below:
From the knowledge of percolation theory[155, 156, 172], the probability that there
exist a connected link through which a truck will move from its start node to the
destination node is denoted as p. Therefore, the probability that a piece will not
arrive at the destination node due to lack of links between the nodes is given as
1− p.
On a fully connected board of twenty five nodes as shown in Figure 8.4a (page 129),
the total connections the board would have if fully connected is 40; (t = 40). Since
l1 represents the number of missing links, therefore;
p = 1− (l1/t) (8.2)
In the FSBB game our fuzzy player is still represented as yellow. The methodology
of FSBB game simulation also follows the procedural steps of FDMBN general
illustration in Section 7.4.1.1 (page 111) with exception to step 2, step 3 and
step 7 which are modified as follows:
• Step(2) Determining the strategy: We still adopt our previous strategic vec-
tor [CWM ]. This represents products being taken to the destination node to
consolidate existing customers (Consolidation C), those that are not moved
or reserved at the base as unused wealth (Wealth W ) and those being taken
to the goal nodes to market new customers (Marketing M).
We have two players (firms) represented as green (g) whose strategy is
represented as [Cg,Wg,Mg], and yellow (y) with strategy represented as
[Cy,Wy,My].
• Step(3) Determine the input and output variables of FSBB FIS: As before,
the inputs are market demand information (D), production costs (CP ) and
the outputs are expected consolidation efforts (Ec), expected wealth (Ew)
and expected aggressive marketing efforts (Em) where: Em = 10− (Ew+Ec)
(Because the total (expected) resources of each player at any point is ten).
These variables Ec, Ew and Em relate to the fuzzy player y, and we will not
index them by y.
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Figure 8.5 on page 134 shows the FIS interface for the membership functions
of the input variable demand (D), while Figure 8.6 on page 134 shows the
FIS interface for input variable Production Cost (CP ).
• Step(7) Play the game: Procedures for playing the game are as follows: The
game state is represented as vector S = [g, y, Aw, r]. Where g represents
green player’s amount of resources, y represents fuzzy player (yellow) amount
of resources, Aw represents opponents’ accumulated wealth (profit) and r is
the number of rounds the game is played. Both the green and fuzzy player
strategies are as stated in step 2 (page 130).
Figure 8.7 on page 135 shows the Mamdani-type FIS interface for the board
games. The interface shows the inputs variables demand (D) and Production
Cost (CP ) as well as the expected wealth outputs (Ew).
General rules of the game are as follows:
– Initial state of the game is [10, 10, 0, 10] (i.e. according to vector [g, y, Aw, r]).
– At every state [g, y, Aw, r], green chooses his move by allocating to his
strategies [Cg,Wg,Mg] where: Cg +Wg +Mg = g = 10 and yellow who
is the fuzzy player chooses his strategy [Cy,Wy,My] where:
Cy +Wy +My = y = 10 (8.3)
As explained in Section 1.3.1 on page 7 and Section 4.1 (page 63),
our choices of the number ten in Equation 8.3 and for variable r are
arbitrary. In a real system, any number that suitably represents the
process can be chosen.
– The game changes states as follows: for different board connections
shown in Figure 8.4a-d on page 129,
r = r − 1 (8.4)
Aw = Aw +Wg −Wy (8.5)
g = ((g + Cg +Mgr)− (y + Cy +Myr)) ∗ d ∗ p (8.6)
(where d is the total number of nodes and p as in equation 8.2)
y = ((y + Cy +Myr)− (g + Cg +Mgr)) ∗ d ∗ p (8.7)
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temp = Aw + g − y; (8.8)
Where temp represents game payoff. Then,
Em = 10− (Ew + Ec) (8.9)
Because the total resources or expected resources of each player at any
point is ten. Now,
D = My/Mg, (8.10)
CP = (My + Cy + v)/(Mg + Cg + v), (8.11)
Where v represents other costs which are taken to be zero to avoid need-
less complication (i.e. v = 0). We define Ew (expected profit/Wealth)=
Esp − CP , where:
Esp = Ew + CP (8.12)
and Esp represents the expected selling price of the product.
– The game ends when r = 0 and if temp is greater than zero (temp > 0),
the green player wins, if less than zero (temp < 0), then the fuzzy player
(yellow) wins else, the game is draw (i.e. if temp = 0). Also, the game
can end when one of the players has successfully taken all his resources
to the goal node and in that case, such player wins.
Figure 8.8 on page 135 shows the FIS interface for the membership
functions of output variable expected consolidation efforts (Ec).
– This 2-player game is a zero sum game and therefore, yellow loses when-
ever green wins and vice versa and since our aim is to develop an agent
that would win as much as possible, maximize his payoff and minimize
that of the opponents, Nash equilibrium [137, 138] is not considered in
this context.
The remaining steps follow those stated in Section 7.4.1.1 on page 111.
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Figure 8.5: FIS interface for the membership functions of the input variable
demand (D) for the board games.
 
Figure 8.6: FIS interface for the membership functions of the input variable
Production Cost (CP ) for the board games.
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Figure 8.7: Mamdani-type FIS interface for the board games showing inputs
demand (D) and Production Cost (CP ) as well as expected wealth outputs (Ew).
 
 
Figure 8.8: FIS interface for the membership functions of the output variable
expected consolidation efforts (Ec) for the board games.
8.9 Results Discussion for Business Games on
Boards
Based on the procedures highlighted in Section 8.8.2 above and from the board
diagrams in Figure 8.4, we varied level of connectivity (number of links) on the
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Figure 8.9: A graph showing how payoff of fuzzy player decreases as links on
the board decrease. This figure illustrates data on Table 8.1 of page 139.
boards by removing links arbitrarily and we investigated how these restrictions
(missing links) affect payoffs (profitability of businesses) [169]. This level of con-
nectivity was used to simulate (investigate) how the level of availability of vital
infrastructures such as transportation networks in a geographical location can af-
fect the profitability of business enterprises and to achieve other objectives stated
in Section 8.2 on page 124.
In the simulation, the number of links is the most important factor as this grossly
affects the movements of the players’ resources (the trucks). This is analogous
to how poor road networks affect transportation of goods across a geographical
location. In the simulation, other network characteristics such as the positions of
the missing links are taken into consideration by the fuzzy variables in the fuzzy
rule base. For example, if the position of the missing links affect the network such
that a player needs to take longer route to reach destination, this increases the
cost of production. The cost of production (CP) has been taken care of in the
fuzzy rule base.
The results obtained as shown on Table 8.1 (page 139) show that the higher the
level of connectivity on the boards, the higher the payoff of the players and vice-
versa. That is, as the number of missing links on the board increases, the payoffs
of players decrease.
From Table 8.1, l1 on the columns represents the number of missing links on the
board. Therefore, l1 = 4 represents the case when four links are missing from
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the board. The payoffs on these iterations are shown in column four. l1 = 6
represents the case when six links are missing from the board. The payoffs on
these iterations are shown in column five. l1 = 8, l1 = 10 and l1 = 12 represent
the cases when eight, ten and twelve links respectively are missing from the board
and their corresponding payoffs are as shown in columns six, seven and eight
respectively.
As shown in the table (Table 8.1), the payoffs in column four are greater than
the payoffs in column five and these are also greater than the payoffs in columns
six. The payoffs in column six are greater than the payoffs in column seven. The
payoffs in column eight are the least because the boards have highest number of
missing links in column eight. That is the lowest level of connectivity on the board.
From the result on these columns, it can be observed that the higher the number
of missing links l1 on the board, the lower the payoffs of the fuzzy player and
vise-versa. That is, the the higher the level of connectivity, the higher the payoffs
of fuzzy player on the business boards.
For example, in the sixth iteration (and same in all iterations) in which both
players have strategy [0, 10, 0], the payoff of fuzzy player in the board games with
four missing links was 11,570.00. This is as shown in column four for the sixth
iteration.
However, when six links were missing from the board, the payoff of fuzzy player
in this iteration reduced to 3,708.80. This is as shown in column five.
When eight links were missing as shown in column six, the payoff reduced further
to 1,110.50. Moreover, when ten and twelve links were missing from the boards,
the payoffs further reduced to 307.90 and 78.20 respectively.
We therefore concluded that the higher the level of connectivity on the boards,
the higher the payoffs of players.
This means that the higher the availability of transportation networks in a par-
ticular geographical location, the higher the profitability of business enterprises in
such location.
This shows why developing nations that have low level of infrastructures such as
transportation networks are less attractive to investors.
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The graph in Figure 8.9 (page 136) illustrates these trends. This means that the
lower the availability of road networks in a geographical location, the lower the
prospects of businesses in such location.
Also, yellow wins more often than green because he takes his decisions based on
the output of fuzzy reasoning from the fuzzy inference system (FIS). This shows
the extent to which fuzzy reasoning can benefit a business operating in an adverse
business environment that is clouded with diverse uncertainties as in developing
nations.
We also observed that the stronger the strategy, the higher the payoff. That is,
an agent that allocates more resources to marketing has stronger strategy and is
more likely to have higher payoff.
Yellow, the fuzzy player begins to lose when the links on the board are extremely
low. This shows the extent to which extremely poor road networks (and other
infrastructures) can run a once prosperous business down.
As in Tables 4.3 and 6.1 of chapters 4 and 6 respectively, we verified these results
by designing control experiments (simulations) in which the fuzzy player does not
change his moves in accordance with the fuzzy rule base. The results obtained
from the control experiments show that the game follows conventional trends,
that is, the fuzzy player wins only where he allocates more units of resources to
his marketing strategy at the start of the game than those of his competitors and
his payoff also depends on this. The payoff of the fuzzy player in the control
experiments (where he did not use fuzzy rule base) are far less than what he got
when he used fuzzy rule base to make his business decisions.
After training, the fuzzy player performs better with higher payoffs as shown in
Table 8.2 (page 140). This shows that the learning is important as the fuzzy player
is able to adapt with fuzzy reasoning over time as also previously shown in FIS
interface in Figure 4.8 on page 82.
The difference between the average payoffs before learning and the average payoffs
after learning have been further summarised in Table 8.3 on page 141. The table
shows that the fuzzy player payoffs increased in all the iterations after the fuzzy
player has learned.
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Player Moves Players Payoff Vs Missing Links l1 (in ”000)
S/N Green Yellow l1 = 4 l1 = 6 l1 = 8 l1 = 10 l1 = 12
1 0, 0, 10 10, 0, 0 -12954.00 -3954.10 -1117.00 -288.60 -67.20
2 10, 0, 0 0, 0,10 -130410.00 -41844.00 -12541.00 -3480.30 -885.10
3 0, 10, 0 0, 0, 10 -131450.00 -42196.00 -12653.00 -3513.40 -894.10
4 0, 0, 10 0, 10, 0 -965.40 -105.40 37.30 32.00 14.40
5 0, 0, 10 0, 0, 10 -120830.00 -38588.00 -11503.00 -3173.00 -801.30
6 0, 10, 0 0, 10, 0 -11570.00 -3708.80 -1110.50 -307.90 -78.20
7 10,0,0 10, 0, 0 -22520.00 -7205.30 -2152.60 -590.00 -150.80
8 8, 0, 2 0, 8, 2 -32590.00 -10402.00 -3099.10 -854.30 -215.60
9 5, 0, 5 3, 0, 7 -93253.00 -29824.00 -8905.30 -2461.10 -622.90
10 0, 5, 5 4, 5, 1 -23071.00 -7302.40 -2154.90 –587.50 -146.40
11 7, 0, 3 10, 0, 0 -19659.00 -6233.20 -1843.00 -503.63 -125.81
12 9, 0, 1 3, 3, 4 -61123.00 -19581.00 -5857.90 -1622.40 -411.66
13 6, 0, 4 6, 0, 4 -61843.00 -19758.00 -5892.70 -1626.30 -410.99
14 4, 0, 6 4, 0, 6 -81506.00 -26034.00 -7762.80 -2141.90 -541.10
15 1,9 0 0, 1, 9 -119360.00 -38312.00 -11602.00 -3189.50 -811.59
16 1, 9, 0 1, 0, 9 -120560.00 -38696.00 -11602.00 -3221.50 -819.75
Table 8.1: Results of simulation of the fuzzy business board games:
l1 represents number of missing links on the board. From the table, the first
column shows the serial numbers of the iterations, the second column contains
player green’s strategies while the third column contains that of yellow. For
example, in the first iteration, green’s strategy shows [0, 0, 10], this indicates
how resources are allocated to strategy [C,W,M ]: C = 0, W = 0 and M = 10.
Columns 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 give the fuzzy player’s payoffs when 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12
links (connections) are removed from the board respectively. It can be observed
from the results that as l1 increases, the payoff of fuzzy player decreases. This
means that the less the level of connectivity on the business board, the less the
payoff of fuzzy player and vice-versa. This implies that the less the availability
of vital infrastructures such as road networks in a geographical location, the
less the profitability of businesses in such location. The minus signs on payoffs
merely show zero-sum. When it is minus, fuzzy player y wins but otherwise,
green wins. Figure 8.9 on page 136 gives a graphical explanation on this table.
8.10 Conclusion
We have modelled decision making processes under uncertainty on boards using
concepts of fuzzy logic, percolation theory and game theory. Our general model
was termed fuzzy strategy decision making system for business boards (FSBB).
The FSBB was used to investigate how various board characteristics such as level of
connectivity or restrictions on the board affect the payoffs of players on the boards.
Also, we examined these models with examples. The system was designed and
implemented using MATLAB software. Fuzzy rules were constructed in developing
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Player Moves Players Payoff After Training (in ”000)
S/N Green Yellow l1 = 4 l1 = 6 l1 = 8 l1 = 10 l1 = 12
1 0, 0,10 10, 0, 0 -12965.00 -3958.20 -1118.40 -289.00 -67.31
2 10, 0, 0 0, 0, 10 -130420.00 -41848.00 -12542.00 -3480.70 -885.23
3 0, 10, 0 0, 0, 10 -131460.00 -42201.00 -12654.00 -3513.90 -894.26
4 0, 0, 10 0, 10, 0 -976.72 -109.44 35.89 31.53 14.28
5 0, 0, 10 0, 0, 10 -120850.00 -38593.00 -11505.00 -3173.50 -801.48
6 0, 10, 0 0, 10, 0 -11583.00 -3713.60 -1112.10 -308.38 -78.37
7 10, 0, 0 10, 0, 0 -22531.00 -7209.40 -2154.00 -595.74 -150.92
8 8, 0, 2 0, 8, 2 -32604.00 -10407.00 -3100.80 -854.86 -215.76
9 5, 0, 5 3, 0, 7 -93267.00 -29829.00 -8907.10 -2461.60 -623.06
10 0, 5, 5 4, 5, 1 -23082.00 -7306.50 -2156.30 -587.92 -146.48
11 7, 0, 3 10, 0, 0 -19670.00 -6237.20 -1844.40 -504.06 -125.98
12 9, 0, 1 3, 3, 4 -61134.00 -19585.00 -5859.30 -1622.90 -411.79
13 6, 0, 4 6, 0, 4 -61853.00 -19761.00 -5893.90 -1626.70 -411.10
14 4, 0, 6 4, 0, 6 -81517.00 -26038.00 -7764.20 -2142.30 -541.22
15 1, 9, 0 0, 1, 9 -119370.00 -38316.00 -11489.00 -3190.00 -811.74
16 1, 9, 0 1, 0, 9 -120570.00 -38701.00 -11604.00 -3222.00 -819.90
Table 8.2: Results of simulation of the trained FSBB fuzzy player
payoffs: From the table, the first column shows the serial numbers of the
iterations, the second column contains player green’s strategies while the third
column contains that of yellow. For example, in the first iteration, green’s
strategy shows [0, 0, 10], this indicates how resources are allocated to strategy
[C,W,M ]: C = 0, W = 0 and M = 10. Columns 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 give the fuzzy
player’s payoffs after training when 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 links (connections) are
removed from the board respectively. It can be observed from the results that
the trained agent is able to perform better after training as he wins more often
than when he was not trained as compared to the results obtained on table 8.1.
Where he does not win (such as in iteration 4), opponent’s payoff is minimized
considerably and thereby maximized his own. The strongest opponent (Geq)
and weakest opponent (Leq) (explained in Section 7.4.1.1 step 11 page 68) are
shown in iterations 4 and 3 respectively. The minus sign on payoffs merely
shows zero-sum. When it is minus, fuzzy player y wins but otherwise, green
wins. Table 8.3 on page 141 summarizes and compares the average results for
the trained and untrained simulations.
the FSBB model using MATLAB toolbox and the implementation of this model
heavily depends on expert knowledge and experience to facilitate the development
of a reasonable fuzzy rule base for the determination of the if-then rules that
represent the relationship between inputs and the output variables. Furthermore,
we have applied a learning algorithm to the decision process which enables the
decision agent to optimize his performance in the decision process as the game is
played so as to meet the set criteria. To do the learning, Nelder-Mead simplex
method for finding the minimum of an unconstrained multivariable function was
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Average Payoffs After Training Vs Before Training (in ”000)
Missing Links (l1) l1 = 4 l1 = 6 l1 = 8 l1 = 10 l1 = 12 Total
1 Before Training -65229 -20859 -6234 -1720 -435 -94479
2 After Training -65240 -20863 -6229 -1721 -435 -94490
Table 8.3: This table summarizes and compares average results of fuzzy
player’s payoffs before training (Table 8.1 on page 139) and the payoffs af-
ter training (Table 8.2 on page 140). It can be observed that the fuzzy player
performs better after training. The table therefore shows that training is very
important.
used.
Our FSBB models have practical uses in business contexts as they can serve as
very useful decision tools in the hands of entrepreneurs trading in environments
similar to the scenarios. The experiments show that businesses are less profitable
in situations where there are restrictions such as lack of availability of vital in-
frastructures or by constraints which may be imposed by regulatory authorities
such as when two or more players are forbidden (possibly by law) from interacting
to prevent collusion. Constraints can be between variables, or can be constraints
imposed on communication between players. Also, given the fuzzy demand and
cost of production information, the estimated selling price (Esp) can be predicted
according to Equation 8.12.
In arriving at our results, the simulations are based on assumptions and condi-
tions that the players involved in the decision processes are rational players (Sec-
tion 2.1.1 on page 12) and that only the fuzzy player (yellow), at the moment, uses
fuzzy moves [144]. This is in accordance with our overall aim of designing models
that illustrate how an entrepreneur could make effective and efficient business de-
cisions by using fuzzy inference systems (FIS) in capturing uncertainties that may
surround his business environments. This will therefore help the entrepreneur to
have competitive advantages over his competitors who are unaware of the useful-
ness of these tools and therefore are not making use of the fuzzy inference models
in their decision making processes.
Chapter 9
Fuzzy Game Approach to Wage
Negotiation Decision Problems
(FGAW)
In most cases, annual escalation clauses in employment contracts do specify future
percentage increases in wages which are not tied to any index or rules. However,
very often employers do find it difficult to meet these rigid [175, 176, 177] per-
centages and therefore, on various occasions, these have resulted into industrial
disputes between employers and employees (or their unions) [177, 178, 179]. The
percentages are mostly based on predictions of future inflation which are mostly
misleading and based on historical data. In [180], Flood and Marion demonstrated
that in an open economy under optimal wage indexation, in a world of one good,
floating rates are preferred to fixed rates, regardless of the stochastic structure of
the economy[175].
Many authors have agreed that wages ought to be positively linked to financial
performance of the business and some also have detected some links between wages
and profits[176].
In this thesis however, rather than pre-setting a rigid future and yearly percentage
increase in wages, we propose a flexible scheme for employers and employees which
they can use as decision support system for their future salary increase and this
scheme uses a fuzzy inference system in arriving at more agreeable decisions on
wage increase. For example, rather than specifying 5% yearly increase of wages,
we propose that the wage increase formula needs to take into consideration other
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factors which are mostly difficult to predict with certainty. These include inflation
rate, business revenues or (profit), cost of production, number of competitors and
other uncertain factors that may affect business operations. The accuracy of the
fuzzy rule base would help to mitigate the adverse effects that a business may suffer
from these uncertain factors. Based on our scheme, we propose that employers and
employees should calculate their future wage increase by using a fuzzy rule base
that takes into consideration these future variables which are mostly uncertain
and that could affect their decisions.
9.1 Problem Definition
Wage negotiation has always been a persistent problem in business organisations
[181, 182]. On many occasions, there have been cases in which the entire workforce
of countries embarked on industrial strikes that resulted from wage negotiation
problems. Gielen and VanOurs in [181] investigated what determines quits and
layoffs that usually result as problems of poor wage negotiations by using a unique
matched worker-firm dataset from the Netherlands. They concluded that in wage
negotiation, the wage growth of a worker that stays in the firm is larger if that
worker had a high quit probability and smaller when that worker had a high layoff
probability.
In most cases, the root causes of wage negotiation [181, 183] disputes are not
unconnected with inability of either of the two parties involved (employers and
employees’ unions) to sustain or maintain the status quo contained in their earlier
agreement on wage increase[177]. This may be as a result of many reasons and
some of these reasons are explained below on both sides.
9.1.1 Employers’ Perspective
On the employers’ parts, the once prosperous business might have run into an
economic turbulence as a result of diverse and adverse uncertainties that surround
the business environment. Several of these cases were witnessed during the recent
global economic recession which affected several businesses globally and during
which many businesses went underground (closed).
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Therefore, when the revenue of a business goes down, then it may be economically
impossible for managements to sustain the earlier agreements signed when the
revenues of the companies were booming.
The same situation may occur if the rate of inflation adversely and grossly affect
the cost of production (CP ) in a firm without a corresponding increase in revenue.
9.1.1.1 Wage Negotiation in Developing Nations
In developing nations[184] such as Nigeria, wage negotiation has always been a
chronic problem [185, 186] and this menace has been directly and indirectly run-
ning down the nation’s economy for many decades. This is because many trade
unions have always insisted on international wage scales for their respective pro-
fessions but irrespective of whether the revenues of their countries attain those
standards on which those scales were designed.
For example, the Medical Doctors, under the umbrella of the Nigeria Medical Asso-
ciation (NMA)[187, 188] will always insist on World Health Organisation (WHO)
salary scales standard for their profession not minding whether the revenues and
resources of the nation match those expected by these standards.
Also the academic staff in the universities under their union, Academic Staff Union
of Universities (ASUU) [186, 187, 188] have always insisted on a very high salary
scale called the University Academic (Staff) Salary Scale (UASS)[189, 190] as
well as the international pension scheme called universities superannuation scheme
(USS) which may certainly be obtainable in developed nations like the United State
of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK). However, these unions would
never consider the fact that their country’s revenues are very very far below those
of the developed nations mentioned.
9.1.2 Employees’ Perspectives
Generally in any country and on the side of the employees however, the rates of
inflation in the country mighty have shot up astronomically such that earlier wage
increase agreement becomes no more realistic. This is because inflation affects
the purchasing powers of the consumers. Example of this high inflation otherwise
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known as hyperinflation is what is being currently experienced in Zimbabwe, a
Southern African country.
9.2 Our Proposed Fuzzy Model for Wage Nego-
tiation (FGAW)
Implementing and agreeing on our fuzzy reasoning (FGAW) model approach to
wage negotiation would eliminate all the concerns mentioned in Section 9.1 above.
The model takes effective cognisance of the factors that affect wage negotiation and
effectively grasps and captures the uncertainty therein using fuzzy rules solicited
from experts in the field. That is, the model considers varying ranges of inflation
trends as they affect both parties and also considers the varying ranges of possible
revenue increase of the organisation and arrives at an agreeable rate for wage
increase which can be more sustainable for both present and in the future. This
will also be more agreeable and acceptable to both parties.
For instance, rather than specifying 5% yearly increase, our work proposes a
scheme such as:
IF Inflation is very high AND Revenue is very low THEN Wage increase is
medium.
We verified this scheme and proved its validity with our algorithm and we discov-
ered that it could be an invaluable tool in the hands of entrepreneurs. Details of
the scheme are as explained in the sections that follow.
9.3 Justifications for the Scheme
• The scheme will reduce level of industrial disputes and revenue or profit
losses. This is because both the employers and the employees already know
the factors on which their wage increase are based and both parties can
calculate the expected wage increase for a particular year right from their
own desk based on the factors specified in the fuzzy rule base.
• Rather than management pushing or driving workers to work hard, for the
betterment or success of the firm, this scheme would indirectly rest these
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duties in the hands of the workers or their unions who will encourage em-
ployees to work hard so as to increase the revenues of the firm and hence,
directly increase their wages.
• The scheme will reduce man hours lost on yearly wage negotiation.
• It puts the fate of the workers regarding salary increase in their own hands.
The harder they work, the better the firm’s revenue and the better the
increase in their wages.
• It will reduce unemployment rate. This is because firms will no longer em-
bark on sudden staff cut [181] as a result of unregulated agitation for wage
increase which firms are occasionally forced to pay.
• There will be no need for staff to take abrupt pay cuts [177, 181, 182] in
bids to keep the company afloat as was the case in Highland Airways [191],
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) [182] and many other companies
during the 2009 economic recession.
9.4 Factors in Wage Negotiation
In competitive labour markets, wage rates are determined by the forces of supply
and demand for labour[42]. Even though, there may be many factors to be consid-
ered during wage negotiation, two major factors: inflation and revenue, and their
concepts are as explained below.
In this simulation, while we are considering only inflationary trends and business
revenue as the most important factors in determining wage increase, we are as-
suming that other factors remain constant and that decision makers are rational
in their views (section 2.1.1). These other factors that are kept constant include
the labour force and the market trends.
We are also assuming that the labour force of the organisations are represented
jointly by their unions and that all necessary information about the company (such
as the company account details) are available to both the union and the employer’s
representatives in the decision processes.
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9.4.1 Inflation
Inflation in simple terms, can be defined as a decline in the purchasing power of
money for goods and services. It is a rise in the aggregate level of prices of goods
and services in a particular economy over a certain period of time[42].
Inflation is one of the major factors that are usually considered in wage bargaining
[192, 193]. Den Butter and van de Wijngaert in [193] defined wage space as the
sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth. In economics, inflation
is calculated using consumer price index (CPI) [194]. Raffaela Giordano in [192]
stated that the relationship between labour cost and inflation is statistically sig-
nificant and quantitatively non-trivial. He further explained that high inflation
countries are those where the cost of labour is lower.
9.4.1.1 Inflation Calculation
Inflation can be calculated by recording the prices of goods and services over
certain years, we then take a particular year as a base year and then calculate the
percentage rate changes of those prices over certain number of years. There exist
many different price indices that can be used in calculating inflation, the most
popular are:
• Consumer price index (CPI)
• Producer price index (PPI)
• GDP deflator
• Cost of living index (COLI)
• Commodity price index
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the most commonly used in calculating inflation
in an economy. CPI measures the prices of particular goods and services for a
typical consumer.
To use CPI in calculating inflation, there must be a base year (say year 2005) and
the commodity we want to use say a bottle of Coca-Cola of 25cl. For example, if
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Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2010 112.4 112.9 113.5 114.2 114.4 114.6 114.3 114.9
2009 108.7 109.6 109.8 110.1 110.7 111 110.9 111.4 111.5 111.7 112 112.6 110.833
2008 105.5 106.3 106.7 107.6 108.3 109 109 109.7 110.3 110 109.9 109.5 108.483
2007 103.2 103.7 104.2 104.5 104.8 105 104.4 104.7 104.8 105.3 105.6 106.2 104.7
2006 100.5 100.9 101.1 101.7 102.2 102.5 102.5 102.9 103 103.2 103.4 104 102.325
Table 9.1: United Kingdom Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by UK
Office for National Statistics (ONS).
in year 2005, the price of a bottle of Coca-Cola was £1.00, year 2005 becomes our
base year and the CPI then has index value of 100.
If by year 2006, the price of a bottle of Coca-Cola had become £1.25, then in year
2006, the value of our CPI is 125. If in 2007, the price had become £1.31, then
the value of our CPI for that year is 131. This will be done for every year and a
table of consumer price index (CPI) will be established.
In order to calculate the inflation for a particular year, we simply calculate the
percentage change rate as follows:
Inflation(I) =
CPI1 − CPI0
CPI0
∗ 100
1
(9.1)
Where CPI0 is the initial value and CPI1 is the final value.
Table 9.1 (page 148) gives United Kingdom Consumer Price Index (CPI) published
by UK Office for National Statistics (ONS).
9.4.2 Company’s Profit
On wage bargaining and company’s profit, many authors have worked on the idea
of profit (Net income) sharing schemes to replace simple wage rates. One of such is
[195] in which Norman Ireland explained the argument that profit sharing concerns
microeconomic efficiency and relates to incentives in the place of work. He further
explained that if workers see how their labour turns into profit from which they
benefit, and particularly if they have some say in determining their work practices,
then work will be better motivated, better performed and more highly valued.
Reinhilde Veugelers in [196] reports a model that applies a generalized Nash-
Zeuthen-Harsanyi asymmetric bargaining theory [197]. He explained that the
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bargaining outcome from this scenario is that workers receive the competitive
wage plus a fraction of the firm’s price-cost margins.
9.5 Methodology and Game Description
In accordance with the principal aim of our research which is based on ensuring
the success of business organisations through effective decision processes. Our
objective of fuzzy approach to wage negotiation is to develop an effective decision
system that takes efficient cognizance of the uncertainty in the market and helps in
achieving success in wage bargaining to ensure continued survival of the business.
9.5.1 Players’ Strategies in Wage Negotiation
As defined and comprehensively explained in Section 4.1 (page 63), a strategy
is a decision rule that specifies how the player will act in every possible circum-
stance [136]. It is a specific course of action taken by the firm. This will involve
the firm allocating values to its policy variables. These policy variables are gener-
ally those aspects of its activities that the firm can directly affect and may include
price, spending on promotion, marketing, research and development and so on. For
each strategy of this firm, its rival (or rivals) may adopt counter-strategies [42].
In this experiment, the business has five units of initial resources (profit say £5M).
Both the employer (represented as fuzzy player y) and the employees (represented
as opponent player g) are deliberating on how this profit should be spent and also,
how subsequent (future) profits generated by the company should hence be spent.
Both players agreed on three variable-vector [C,W,M ]. This forms the strategies
for both players. That is, employer (y) strategy is [Cy,Wy,My] while that of the
employees’ union is [Cg,Wg,Mg]. The bone of contention is “what proportion of
this £5M should be allocated to each of these strategic variables C, W and M?”.
In each round, the players may choose to allocate their resources to one of these
three roles: consolidation efforts (C), reserved wealth (W ) and market expansion
(M). The allocations are denoted as a vector [C,W,M ] for each player and con-
stitute the strategy of that player.
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Consolidation efforts (C) refer to the proportion of the profit that adds to the
wage increase of the employees. This is the most important variable to the em-
ployees as they would want to maximise this as much as they could. The reverse
is the case with the employer. Employer would want to minimise allocation to this
variable as much as they could. Market expansion (M) denotes the part of this
profit designated for market expansion of the business including various advertis-
ing, marketing and promotional campaigns. These are principally targeted toward
getting new customers and the most important variable to employers which they
would like to maximise as much as they could. To the employees, it is less impor-
tant. Reserved wealth W refers to part of the resources that are kept unused or
those distributed to the firm’s shareholders.
As examples of players’ strategies, consider a case where the employer Y decides
to allocate £4M out of the £5M on market expansion M = 4, and remaining
£1M to be distributed to shareholders as shares W = 1. This means that for that
financial year, there would be no wage increase for (or to consolidate the) workers
C = 0. Then, employer strategy implies:
[Cy,Wy,My] = [0, 1, 4]
On the other hand, workers, represented by their union, may embark on nego-
tiation with employer with a proposal that £3M be allocated to wage increase
(C = 3), £1M to shareholders (W = 1) and remaining on market or business
expansion M = 1. Therefore, workers strategy becomes:
[Cg,Wg,Mg] = [3, 1, 1]
The variables in our models can be tailored to the business situations in the real
world and therefore are not limited to those variables that we have used in design-
ing the system as we further explained in Section 1.3.1 on page 7 and Section 4.1
(page 63). Therefore, this model can be applied to any real business situation and
the variables can be adapted to suit the situation in question.
The model can also work for systems that have more strategic variables than those
that we have used in this model.
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9.5.2 Sources of Fuzzy Rules
As stated in Section 1.3.2 (page 8), as in many applications of fuzzy rule-based
systems, the fuzzy if-then rules used in our models have been solicited from human
experts [50, 51]. We sought knowledge from human experts in the fields that are
related to each scenario described in this thesis. For example, in these wage
negotiation games, we sought knowledge from both the employers’ sides and also
from those of the unions.
In all the simulations, the accuracy of these solicited rules are judged and amended
by searching related data from published economic and fuzzy inference literatures
such as [42, 43, 52, 53, 54].
However, various other methods have been proposed in different publications for
automatically generating fuzzy if-then rules from numerical data. According to
Nozaki et al in [50], most of these methods have involved iterative learning proce-
dures or complicated rule generation mechanisms such as gradient descent learning
methods, genetic-algorithm-based methods and least-squares methods.
Therefore in this thesis, the fuzzy rule base we have adopted in formulating the
fuzzy if-then rules used in our models have been solicited from human experts
[50, 51] in the related fields.
9.5.3 The Model
From Equation 9.1, Inflation in an economy is calculated as follows:
Inflation(I) =
CPI1 − CPI0
CPI0
∗ 100
1
An entrepreneur may want to base his own inflation on the changes in the cost of
production (CP ) of his goods or services such that inflation is calculated as:
Inflation(I) =
CP1 − CP0
CP0
∗ 100
1
(9.2)
Where CP0 is the initial value and CP1 is the final value.
Therefore, change in inflation (∆I) is calculated as:
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(∆I) =
I1 − I0
I0
∗ 100
1
(9.3)
and change in profit (∆R) of the business is calculated as:
∆R =
R1 −R0
R0
∗ 100
1
(9.4)
Where R0 is the initial profit value and R1 is the final value.
We assume that the company has initial resources (say £5M) profit. These re-
sources are what are being deliberated upon by the two parties namely:
1. Employer (represented as fuzzy player y)
2. Employees (or their union as representative and therefore represented as
player g)
These resources are to be allocated between three variables [C,W,M ] that form
the strategy of each player. After the initial allocation which represents wage
negotiation. The subsequent allocation will follow the outcome of the fuzzy rules
from the fuzzy inference system and the expected outcome will determine the
winner.
9.5.4 Play the Game
Following the general procedures highlighted in Section 7.4.1.1 on page 111, from
Equations 9.1 to 9.4, and the FGAW general model in Figure 9.2 on page 154,
the procedures necessary for designing the proposed automatic business decision
system for wage negotiation (FGAW) are as explained below:
In the FGAW game our fuzzy player is still represented as yellow. The method-
ology of FGAW game simulation also follows the procedural steps of FDMBN
general illustration in Section 7.4.1.1 (page 111) with exception to step 2, step 3
and step 7 which are modified as follows:
• Step(2) Determining the strategy: The game strategies are as explained in
Section 9.5.1 (page 149). The business has five units of initial resources
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Figure 9.1: Fuzzy decision making system (FDMS) for fuzzy inference. This
is used as part of the components of the FGAW model shown in Figure 9.2
(page 154).
(profit say £5M). Both the employer (represented as fuzzy player y) and
the employees (represented as opponent player g) are deliberating on how
this profit should be spent and also, how subsequent profits generated by the
company should hence be spent. Both players agreed on three variable-vector
[C,W,M ]. This forms the strategies for both players. That is, employer (y)
strategy is [Cy,Wy,My] while that of the employees is [Cg,Wg,Mg]. The
bone of contention is “what proportion of this £5M should be allocated to
each of these strategic variables C, W and M?”. Further details on player
strategies are as explained in Section 9.5.1.
• Step(3) Determine the input and output variables of FGAW FIS: The inputs
are the values of change in inflation (∆I), and change in business profit
(∆R) and the outputs are expected wage increase (consolidation efforts)
(Ec), expected wealth (Ew) and expected market expansion efforts (Em)
where: Em = 5− (Ew +Ec) (Because the total (expected) resources of each
player at any point is five).
Chapter 9. Fuzzy Game Approach to Wage Negotiation Decision Problems 154
 
           
               No             Yes       Yes 
                              No    
                                                                               Yes 
             
                                   
                                                                                           No 
          Cy=Ec 
                                     Wy=Ew 
                                           My=Em 
Change in 
Inflation (I) 
(input 1) 
   
Change in 
Profit (R) 
(input 2) 
 
r >1
[Cy, Wy, My] 
 
 
 
(FDMS) 
Payoffs
Set 
criteria 
met ?
Training/learning 
Winner 
 
[Cg, Wg, Mg] 
Figure 9.2: A model of fuzzy game approach to wage negotiation (FGAW)
game showing inputs, processes and outputs. The FDMS components are as
shown in Figure 9.1 (page 153).
• Step(7) Play the game: Procedures for playing the game are as follows: The
game state is represented as vector S = [g, y, Aw, r]. Where g represents
green player’s amount of resources, y represents fuzzy player (yellow) amount
of resources, Aw represents opponents’ accumulated wealth (profit) and r is
the number of rounds the game is played. Both the green and fuzzy player
strategy are as stated in step 2 above.
– Initial state of the game is [5, 5, 0, 5] (i.e. according to vector [g, y, Aw, r]).
– At every state [g, y, Aw, r], green chooses his move by allocating to his
strategies [Cg,Wg,Mg] where: Cg + Wg + Mg = g = 5 and yellow who
is the fuzzy player chooses his strategy [Cy,Wy,My] where:
Cy +Wy +My = y = 5 (9.5)
As explained in Section 1.3.1 on page 7 and Section 4.1 (page 63),
our choices of the number five in Equation 9.5 and for variable r are
arbitrary. In a real system, any number that suitably represents the
process can be chosen.
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– The game changes states as follows:
r = r − 1, (9.6)
Aw = Aw +Wg −Wy, (9.7)
g = g + Cg +Mgr − (y + Cy +Myr), (9.8)
y = y + Cy +Myr − (g + Cg +Mgr), (9.9)
temp = Aw + g − y; (9.10)
Where temp represents game payoff. Then,
Em = 5− (Ew + Ec) (9.11)
This is because the total or expected resource of each player at any
point is five. Now, the outputs of each round of the game are expected
wage increase (consolidation efforts) (Ec), expected wealth (Ew) and
expected market expansion efforts (Em). This then forms the input
strategies for the fuzzy player in the subsequent rounds of the game.
The game ends when r = 0 and if temp is greater than zero (temp > 0),
the green player (employees) wins, if less than zero (temp < 0), then
the fuzzy player (yellow or employer) wins else, the game is draw (i.e.
if temp = 0).
– Evaluate the fuzzy inference system (FIS): Using Matlab fuzzy toolbox,
all the fuzzy inputs are passed into the Mamdani-type FIS and a de-
fuzzified (crisp) output interface is as shown in Figure 9.5 on page 158.
– The remaining steps follow those stated in Section 7.4.1.1 on page 111.
Sample rules of the fuzzy inference system are as copied below:
Rule Base 1:
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1. If (Net Profit is High) and (Inflation is Low) then (Expected Wage Increase
is Large)
2. If (Net Profit is High) and (Inflation is Medium) then (Expected Wage In-
crease is Medium)
3. If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is Low) then (Expected Wage In-
crease is Small)
4. If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is Medium) then (Expected Wage
Increase is Medium)
5. If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is High) then (Expected Wage In-
crease is Large)
6. If (Net Profit is Low) and (Inflation is Low) then (Expected Wage Increase
is Medium)
7. If (Net Profit is Low) and (Inflation is High) then (Expected Wage Increase
is Small)
8. If (Net Profit is Very Low) and (Inflation is Medium) then (Expected Wage
Increase is Small)
Rule Base 2
1. If (Net Profit is High) and (Inflation is Low) then (Expected Market Expan-
sion is Medium)
2. If (Net Profit is High) and (Inflation is Medium) then (Expected Market
Expansion is High)
3. If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is Medium) then (Expected Market
Expansion is Medium)
4. If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is High) then (Expected Market
Expansion is Low)
5. If (Net Profit is Low) and (Inflation is Medium) then (Expected Market
Expansion is Very High)
6. If (Net Profit is Very Low) and (Inflation is High) then (Expected Market
Expansion is Very Low)
Chapter 9. Fuzzy Game Approach to Wage Negotiation Decision Problems 157
During implementation, the fuzzy rules would be solicited from experts in the
field.
The fuzzy rules for the change in inflation and business profits are coded using
Matlab software as shown in Figure 9.3 (page 157). The Mamdani type fuzzy in-
ference system (FIS) showed in Figure 9.4 (page 158) shows the basic input/output
system of the FGAW model for the rule base.
 
Figure 9.3: The rule base for the inflation rate and business profit coded using
Matlab software.
Figure 9.6 on page 159 shows the FIS interface for the membership functions
of the input variable Change in inflation (∆I), Figure 9.7 on page 159 shows
the FIS interface for input variable Change in Profit (∆R) and Figure 9.8 on
page 160 shows the FIS interface for the output variable Expected Wage Increase
or consolidation (Ec).
This 2-player game is a zero sum game and therefore, yellow loses whenever green
wins and vice versa.
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Figure 9.4: Mamdani type fuzzy inference system for the fuzzy decision system
for wage negotiation.
 
Figure 9.5: Defuzzified (crisp) values for Expected Wage Increase or Consoli-
dation (Ec) at inputs I = R = 2.5.
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Figure 9.6: FIS interface for the membership functions of the input variable
Change in inflation (∆I) for the FGAW games.
 
Figure 9.7: FIS interface for the membership functions of the input variable
Change in Profit (∆R) for the FGAW games.
9.6 Results Discussion for Fuzzy Game Approach
to Wage Negotiation Decision Problems
Based on the procedures highlighted in Section 9.5.4 above and from the results
on Table 9.2 on page 161, the results of the game shows that yellow (employer)
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Figure 9.8: FIS interface for the membership functions of the output variable
Expected Wage Increase or consolidation (Ec).
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77%
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23%
Yellow (Employer) Wins
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Figure 9.9: This chart summarises the performance of the fuzzy player (em-
ployer) and the union in the FGAW simulations shown on Table 9.2 of page 161.
wins more often than green (employees’ union) because the business decision was
based on the output of fuzzy reasoning from the fuzzy inference system (FIS). This
shows the extent to which fuzzy reasoning can help a business if they make use of
fuzzy rules as their decision support tools. Fuzzy rules make the wage negotiation
more flexible and were able to capture both the present and the future uncertainty
inherent in the business environment.
These results on Table 9.2 (page 161) show that the fuzzy player (Yellow which
represents the employer) in FGAW iterations was able to win more often than the
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Player Moves FGAW Players Control Expmt
S/N Green Yellow Winner Payoff Winner Payoff
1 1, 1, 3 1, 0, 4 Yellow -22.0 Yellow -63.9
2 2, 1, 2 1, 1, 3 Yellow -94.8 Yellow -52.7
3 3, 1, 1 4, 0, 1 Yellow -65.2 Green 03.1
4 3, 0, 2 2, 1, 2 Green 94.9 Green 136.8
5 3, 0, 2 2, 0, 3 Yellow -68.8 Yellow -26.7
6 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 Yellow -8.2 Green 40.8
7 0, 5, 0 0, 1, 4 Yellow -747.2 Yellow -704.8
8 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow -906.2 Yellow -863.8
9 1, 0, 4 2, 0, 3 Green 302.2 Green 351.6
10 3, 1, 1 3, 1, 1 Yellow -34.2 Green 14.8
11 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 Green 1012.0 Green 1054.5
12 3, 1, 1 2, 0, 3 Yellow -305.0 Yellow -289.3
13 0, 5, 0 1, 4, 0 Yellow -142.2 Yellow -99.8
Table 9.2: Results of simulations for the fuzzy game approach to wage
negotiation (FGAW ) decision system: From the table, the first column
shows the serial numbers of the iterations, the second column contains player
green’s strategies while the third column contains that of yellow. For example,
in the first iteration, green’s strategy shows [1, 1, 3], this indicates how resources
are allocated to strategy [C,W,M ]: C = 1, W = 1 and M = 3. The fourth and
fifth columns show FGAW players and the results, that is, the simulations in
which the business uses fuzzy rules in taking its decisions. The sixth and seventh
columns contain the control experiments in which the business management did
not use fuzzy rules in the wage negotiation.
These results show that that the fuzzy player (Yellow which represents the
employer) in FGAW iteration was able to win more often than the employees’
union (Green) because the management of the business made use of the fuzzy
inference system in making the business decisions. Out of the thirteen FGAW
iterations on the table, yellow won a total of ten iterations. The control experi-
ment in columns sixth and seven in which business did not use fuzzy rules show
that the green wins as often as yellow does. These results are as summarized in
the pie chart of Figure 9.9.
employees’ union (Green) because the management of the business made use of
the fuzzy inference system in making the business decisions. Out of the thirteen
FGAW iterations on the table, yellow won a total of ten iterations.
The results of the control experiments in columns six and seven of the table (in
which business did not use fuzzy rules to make decisions) show that green wins as
often as yellow does. These two results (the FGAW games and the control exper-
iment simulations) are as summarized in the pie chart of Figure 9.9 on page 160.
The results of the control experiment (where fuzzy rules were not used) may be
considered dangerous for the business. This is because if employees continue to
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win and wages continue to grow without corresponding market expansion, the
trend may lead to gradual demise of the business.
We also observed, as shown on the table, that the stronger the strategy, the higher
the payoff. This means that the more the yellow player allocates to the market
expansion variable, the better the payoffs. That is, for the business to continue to
survive, decision makers must allocate more resources to marketing.
After training, the fuzzy player performs better with higher payoffs. This shows
that the learning is important as the fuzzy player is able to adapt with fuzzy
reasoning over time as also previously shown in FIS interface in Figure 4.8 on
page 82.
9.7 Conclusion
We have used a fuzzy inference system in designing an effective and efficient de-
cision system that models wage bargaining processes in organisations. The model
took effective cognisance of the two parties involved and effectively grasped and
captured the uncertainties in wage negotiation using fuzzy rules solicited from
experts in the field. The model considers varying ranges of inflation trends as it
affects both parties and also considers the varying ranges of possible revenue in-
crease of the organisation and arrives at an agreeable rate for wage increase which
will be sustainable for both present and future and also agreeable and acceptable
to both parties.
The results of the model showed that the employer wins most often because the
management implemented a fuzzy rule base in taking their wage decisions. This
helped to formulate sustainable wage agreements between employers and employ-
ees.
The fact that the employer wins most often does not mean that the employees are
cheated but rather guarantees the continued survival of their firm (or organisation)
and therefore guarantees the continuity of their jobs.
If our scheme could be employed by entrepreneurs, it would help to greatly reduce
deadlocks that usually plague wage negotiations between employers and employees
(or their union) and will therefore increase productivities.
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In arriving at our results, the simulations are based on assumptions and condi-
tions that the players involved in the decision processes are rational players (Sec-
tion 2.1.1 on page 12) and that only the fuzzy player (yellow), at the moment, uses
fuzzy moves [144]. This is in accordance with our overall aim of designing models
that illustrate how an entrepreneur could make effective and efficient business de-
cisions by using fuzzy inference systems (FIS) in capturing uncertainties that may
surround his business environments. This will therefore help the entrepreneur to
have competitive advantages over his opponent players who are unaware of the
usefulness of these tools and therefore are not making use of the fuzzy inference
models in their decision making processes.
Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes the thesis. A summary of the research is presented and we
highlight the main contributions of the thesis.
10.1 Summary
The main objectives of this thesis were to design and develop efficient and effective
decision support schemes simulated in the form of non-cooperative zero-sum games
with imperfect information. We used fuzzy logic theory, business concepts and
concepts of game theory to develop decision processes (schemes) that can assist
business organizations in making effective decisions in their competitive market
environments.
Furthermore, we have applied a learning algorithm to the decision process which
enables the decision agent to optimize his performance in the decision processes
as the games were played so as to meet the set criteria. To do the learning,
the Nelder-Mead simplex method for finding the minimum of an unconstrained
multivariable function was used.
Results of the learning showed that the learning algorithm works very effectively
and efficiently as the fuzzy player (yellow) was able to perform much better after
learning with higher payoffs and this enables him to reach the set criteria
In chapter 4, we used a general illustration to describe the model and we gave the
general methodology that we used throughout the research. Chapter 5 contained
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experiments in which we used a case study to verified the validity of our model,
that we explained in chapter 4, by using companies’ real data and we used a case
study of competition between Coca-Cola and PepsiCo companies who are major
players in beverage industry.
In chapter 6, we carried out several experiments to investigate how the payoffs of
the fuzzy player are affected as the number of competitors increased. There, we
used an n-player game to model perfect market competition situations with many
players and as an extension of the two-player game of a duopoly market which we
considered in chapter 4.
We showed that our models can also work for systems that have more (and varied)
strategic variables than those that we have used in our business models.
Chapter 7 explains how we modelled competitions on business networks with un-
certain information and varying levels of connectivity. In that chapter, we varied
level of interconnections (connectivity) among business units on the networks and
we investigated how their payoffs were affected.
In chapter 8, we modelled business competitions as games on boards and we in-
vestigated how various constraints on the boards affected players’ payoffs.
Our last experiments were in chapter 9 which contains work on wage negotiation.
We proposed how fuzzy logic and game theory concepts could help to successfully
reduce the problems that usually accompany wage negotiation in employers and
employees relationships.
We also concluded that our FGAW model could also be applied for pension ne-
gotiations in determining what percentages the employers and employees should
contribute toward their pension pots.
This research generally extended knowledge in the area of decision support func-
tionalities through extension of methods for modeling underlying functionalities
of fuzzy logic and game theory concepts. It also supports decision making pro-
cesses in economics, measures impacts on individual users, multi-participant users
and organisations in evaluating the fuzzy decision support systems. In accordance
with the aim of classical economists, our interests were concerned with answer-
ing questions of how agents in a market could interact so as to gather maximum
monetary wealth (profits) for themselves. We used the decision support scheme
developed in [13] as our background research. The payoffs of the game relied on
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the concepts of theory of fuzzy moves [144] (TFM) in which, according to Kandel
and Zhang in [24], players were not only striving to take strategies that were ad-
vantageous to themselves but that were also at the same time, disadvantageous to
their opponents.
In each simulation, we verified these results by designing a control experiment
(simulation) in which the fuzzy player does not change his moves in accordance
with the fuzzy rule base. The results obtained from the control experiments show
that the game follows conventional trends, that is, the fuzzy player wins only
where he allocates more units of resources to his marketing strategy at the start of
the game than those of his competitors and his payoff also depends on this. The
payoff of the fuzzy player in the control experiment (where he did not use fuzzy
rule base) are far less than what he got when he used fuzzy rule base to make his
business decisions.
10.2 Conclusions and Contributions
The following sections summarise the conclusions on different experiments in this
thesis and also highlight the main contributions of the research.
10.2.1 The 2-Player Game
In chapter 4, sampled results of our FDMSB experiments in 2-player games which
represent the duopoly market showed that the fuzzy player (Yellow) was able to
win more often than the competitor (Green) because he made use of the fuzzy
inference system in making his business decisions. This shows the effectiveness
and efficiency of our model in capturing the uncertainty that surrounds business
environments.
We observed from Equations 4.4 and 4.5 on page 67 and from the results on
Table 4.3 on page 75 that for any of the players to win the game, he must allocate
a substantial part of his resources to aggressive marketing and this allocation must
outweigh that of the opponent’s allocation.
According to this model and with respect to the two equations, since the number
of rounds r decreases as the game is played, this reduces the strength of marketing
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aggressiveness. An entrepreneur who is a new entrant into an industry, is best
advised to try as much as possible to devote much of his resources on aggressive
marketing campaigns. This will enable him to have a strong footing in the industry
and to be able to have a large market share as early as possible as the game is
played and thus, will result in winning the game.
At the end of the game, an entrepreneur can successfully forecast the estimated
price for the commodity with the help of Equation 4.10: (Esp = Ew + CP ).
Also, after training, the fuzzy player performs better as the agent was able to win
more than he won before training.
From the results, it can be observed that training (learning) of the fuzzy player
was really very important and the training algorithm was very effective because it
enables the agent to learn and reach the performance criteria.
10.2.2 FDMSB Case Study of the Cola War
In this chapter (chapter 5), we showed that our model works very effectively and
efficiently in a real business system. We illustrated the FDMSB model via a case
study by taking competition in the beverage industry as our case study and this
was between Coca-Cola and PepsiCo who are the major players in the industry. We
chose the two companies after we have considered companies in other industries
but most of them do not have uniform means of reporting their financial data
which made their data comparison very difficult.
In running the FDMSB simulations, we used the companies’ data available in their
annual financial statements for the year 2003 as our initial values and input for
the first round (year 2004). We then ran the FDMSB simulations for five rounds
(representing five years) and we compared the results obtained in the simulations to
the two companies’ data published for the year 2008. According to the published
annual financial statements, PepsiCo had lower profits (payoffs) in both years.
Therefore, we took PepsiCo as our fuzzy player. After five rounds, we compared
the results obtained to those which were published in the 2008 financial year and
we discovered that had PepsiCo implemented our FDMSB approach, it would have
outperformed its rival (Coca-Cola) with higher profit (payoff) in the year 2008 and
eventually would have won the cola war.
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From the results of the FDMSB simulations after five rounds, which represents
five years (from year 2003 to 2008), the fuzzy player (PepsiCo) who made use of
the fuzzy reasoning performed much better than its major competitor despite his
weaker initial 2003 financial data that were used as input and starting strategies
for the first (2004) round of the game. Therefore, we concluded that if PepsiCo
or any company could make use of our model, they will be able to perform much
better while competing with their peers in the market and possibly win the market.
We have further shown that the variables in our FDMSB model can be tailored
to the business situations in the real world and therefore are not limited to those
variables that we have used in designing the system as we explained in Section 1.3.1
on page 7 and Section 4.1 (page 63). Therefore, this model can now be applied to
any real business situation.
We showed that our models can also work for systems that have more (and varied)
strategic variables than those that we have used in our business models.
Furthermore, we have applied a learning algorithm to the decision processes which
enables the decision agent to optimize his performance in the decision processes
as the games were played so as to meet the set criteria. To do the learning,
the Nelder-Mead simplex method for finding the minimum of an unconstrained
multivariable function was used.
Results of the learning showed that the learning algorithm works very effectively
and efficiently as the fuzzy player (PepsiCo) was able to perform much better after
learning with higher payoffs and this enables him to reach the set criteria.
10.2.3 Conclusion on n-Player Game
Chapter 6 examined our model with many players using n-player game concepts
which represents perfect market competition scenarios.
From the n-player simulation results, it was observed that because of the ability of
the fuzzy player to grasp effectively the uncertainty in the business environment by
changing his strategy based on the information provided by the fuzzy rule base, the
fuzzy player wins more often than normally expected. Very interesting cases were
seen in those iterations where one expected the agent to lose because it started
the game with weaker strategies than those of his competitors (as it happened in
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the 2-player games), but because the player reasoned in accordance with the fuzzy
engine (rule base) and changes his strategies accordingly, the agent won in those
cases, and more decisively than he won in the 2-player game.
We verified these results by designing a control experiment (simulations) in which
the agent did not change his moves in accordance with the fuzzy rule base. The
results obtained from the control experiments showed that the game follows con-
ventional trends, that is, the agent wins only where he allocates more units of
resources to his marketing strategy at the start of the game than those of his
competitors and his payoff also depends on this.
Therefore, after running several simulations with the number of players n ranging
from 1 to 100, the results of the n-player FDMSB game showed that the larger the
number of opponent players (competitors), the better the fuzzy agent performs,
as illustrated in graph of Figure 6.2 on page 105, due to the fact that he is able to
adequately capture the uncertain information at his disposal which was modelled
using the concepts of fuzzy reasoning and game theory.
10.2.4 Fuzzy Decision Making System on Business Net-
works
In chapter 7, we modelled uncertainties in business competitions in the form of
games on networks. We investigate how the level of connectivity or number of links,
number of opponent players (competitors), as well as choice of strategies adopted
by opponent players affect the payoff of another player on the network. We called
that player the fuzzy player. Learning was equally introduced to investigate how
the agent adapts over time during the game. Several simulations of FDMBN were
run with different number of connections (levels of connectivity) and number of
players.
From the results, it was observed that the higher level of connectivity among the
players, the higher the payoff of the fuzzy player. Also, results shown on the
graph of Figure 7.4 on page 118 and Table 7.1 on page 116 confirm that because
of the ability of the fuzzy player to grasp effectively the uncertainty in the business
network environments by changing his strategy based on the information provided
by the fuzzy rule base, the fuzzy agent wins more often or has a higher payoff as
the number of players (competitors) in the game increases.
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Concerning the position or location of a player in a network with respect to the
strategies of his neighbours, when y faces a stronger (strategy that has highest
resource allocation to marketing M) immediate opponent g in the network as
shown in Figure 7.1B(ii) on page 110, then y has low payoffs. However, when g in
turn faces a stronger immediate opponent b, this reduces the effects of g on fuzzy
player y which results in y having higher payoffs.
10.2.5 Business Games on Boards
In this chapter (chapter 8), we studied uncertainties surrounding competitions
in businesses using boards games as illustrations. Our investigations focused on
how the level of connectivity or number of links, number of opponent players
(competitors), possible constraints or restrictions on the boards as well as choice
of strategies adopted by opponent players affect the payoff of another player on
the boards. We also introduced learning to train and analyze how the fuzzy player
adapts over time during the game.
The chapter contains experiments on the economic effects of patterns of social
interactions modelled as fuzzy board games and we referred to the model as fuzzy
strategy decision making system on business board (FSBB) games.
To re-emphasize how these experiments were different from those of the business
networks studied in chapter 7, main objectives and our results from this chapter
are as follows:
• We analysed competitions among business organisations as games on boards
and we examined various board characteristics such as level of connectivity,
number of nodes (players), location of a player with respect to those of his
opponents, patterns of board connections and moves, strength of individual
player’s strategy and those of his immediate opponents. We investigated
how these characteristics affected the payoffs of players in games played on
boards.
• We investigated situations where there were constraints imposed by regula-
tory authorities such as when two or more players are forbidden (possibly
by law) from interacting to prevent collusion. This led to constrained op-
timisation. Constraints could be between variables, or could be constraints
imposed on communication between players.
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• We principally used the experiments to investigate how the level of availabil-
ity of vital infrastructures such as transportation (also communication) in a
geographical location can affect the profitability (known here as payoffs) of
business enterprises.
• We investigated why industries tend to concentrate in highly developed lo-
cations than less developed ones.
• We analysed why developing nations are less attractive to industrialists when
compared to the developed ones.
• We studied how fuzzy reasoning or fuzzy inference system (FIS) can help
to improve the performance of businesses in an environment that is clouded
with uncertainties and adverse condition such as low level of infrastructural
development.
• We also investigated how performance of these business enterprises could be
improved or enhanced through adaptation or learning (training of the fuzzy
players) of the fuzzy inference system.
10.2.5.1 Board Games Results
We developed an abstract, experimental and strategic board game that is played
on 5X5 board among two players whom we represented as yellow and green players.
Each of the two players had ten pieces which represented trucks which were loaded
with firms’ products. The trucks were positioned initially as shown in Figure 8.4
on page 129. As shown in the figure, each node at the start row contained two
pieces (trucks) each at the initial (start) stage of the game. These ten trucks
owned by each player contained products which were to be distributed at their
respective goal nodes (destinations). The goal node for each player resided at the
opponent’s side of the board which necessitated for each player to travel across
the board in order to take as many of his resources as possible to his destination
(the goal node).
The board was used here to represent the road networks in a particular geographic
location (such as between Edinburgh and London in the United Kingdom) and
where each player represents companies (involve in logistics with trucks) at each
of these mentioned locations.
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We then varied level of connectivity (number of links) on the boards by removing
links arbitrarily and we investigated how these restrictions (missing links) affected
payoffs (profitability of businesses) on the boards. This level of connectivity was
used to simulate (investigate) how level of availability of vital infrastructures such
as transportation network in a geographical location can affect the profitability of
business enterprises and to achieve other objectives stated above.
10.2.5.2 Conclusion on Board Games
• The results obtained showed that the higher the level of connectivity on the
boards, the higher the payoffs of the players and vice-versa. This means that
the lower the availability of vital infrastructures, such as road networks, in a
geographical location, the lower the prospects of businesses in such location.
• Also, yellow wins more often than green because he takes his decisions based
on the output of fuzzy reasoning from the fuzzy inference system (FIS). This
shows the extent to which fuzzy reasoning can benefit a business operating
in an adverse business environment that is clouded with diverse uncertainties
as in developing nations.
• We also observed that the stronger the strategy, the higher the payoff. That
is, agent that allocates more resources to marketing campaigns has stronger
strategy and is more likely to have higher payoff.
• Yellow, the fuzzy player began to lose when the links on the boards were ex-
tremely low. This showed the extent to which extremely poor road networks
(and other poor infrastructures) could run a once prosperous business down.
• After training, the fuzzy player performed better with higher payoffs. This
showed that the learning was important as the fuzzy player was able to adapt
with fuzzy reasoning over time.
10.2.6 Fuzzy Game Approach to Wage Negotiation Deci-
sion Problems
Our final experiments were carried out in chapter 9 in which we applied our model
to wage negotiation and in managing employer and employees relationships.
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The model described the interests of the two players (employers and employees)
and effectively grasped and captured the uncertainties associated with wage deci-
sions by using fuzzy rules solicited from experts in the field. The model considers
varying ranges of inflation trends as it affects both parties and also considers the
varying ranges of revenue increase of the organisation and arrives at a mutually
agreeable rate for wage increase which will be sustainable for both present and
future and also agreeable and acceptable to both parties.
If our scheme could be employed by the entrepreneurs, it would help to greatly
reduce deadlocks that usually plague wage negotiations between employers and
employees (or their unions) and will therefore increase productivity.
It must be noted that the fact that the employer wins most often does not mean
that the employees are cheated but rather, it guarantees the continue survival of
their firm (or organisation) and therefore guarantees the continuity of their jobs.
Our FGAW model can also be applied for pension negotiations in determining
what percentages the employers and employees should contribute toward their
pension pots.
In each simulation, we verified these results by designing control experiments (sim-
ulations) in which the fuzzy player does not change his moves in accordance with
the fuzzy rule base. The results obtained from the control experiments show that
the game follows conventional trends, that is, the fuzzy player wins only where he
allocates more units of resources to his marketing strategy at the start of the game
than those of his competitors and his payoff also depends on this. The payoffs of
the fuzzy player in the control experiments (where he did not use fuzzy rule base)
are far less than what he got when he used fuzzy rule base to make his business
decision.
10.2.7 Assumptions and General Remarks
In arriving at our results, the simulations are based on assumptions and condi-
tions that the players involved in the decision processes are rational players (Sec-
tion 2.1.1 on page 12) and that only the fuzzy player (yellow), at the moment, uses
fuzzy moves [144]. This is in accordance with our overall aim of designing models
that illustrate how an entrepreneur could make effective and efficient business de-
cisions by using fuzzy inference systems (FIS) in capturing uncertainties that may
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surround his business environments. This will therefore help the entrepreneur to
have competitive advantages over his competitors who are unaware of the useful-
ness of these tools and therefore are not making use of the fuzzy inference models
in their decision making processes.
These models can be used as effective and efficient decision tools by business organ-
isations that are operating in different scenarios similar to those we have described
in this thesis. However, in using the models as decision tools, the entrepreneur
will need to adapt, adjust and modify the variables and the decision rules to suit
the situations in question as well as his business environments.
For example, rather than competing with capital resources (say £5M), the organ-
isation’s competing resources may be in terms of roles assigned to personnels in
the organisation. For instance, due to persistent reduction in sales over the last
few weeks, an organisation may decide to assign more personnels to the marketing
department (M ) and less to the operation department (C ) of the organisation.
The organisation will then change these roles until desirable results are attained
in the business.
Therefore, the models could be used as decision tools but the variables may need
to be modified to adequately represent the situations in question as we have done
in chapter 5 of Cola War simulations between Coca-Cola and PepsiCo companies.
10.3 Future Work
The thesis has made its investigation and concluded, however there is much scope
for future work for all the models presented in this work.
Future research may be developed along the following lines. Applying this model
in a wider range of micro and macroeconomic models that are targeted to specific
industries and international trade among countries. More specifically, the business
network games could be used in modelling the adverse effects of international
sanctions (disconnections) on the economies of nations. The model can also be
applied to other different strategic games.
Experiments may be carried out to determine the actual duration and number of
steps in the business games. In our model, we arbitrarily chose the steps based on
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expert advice and from the game experiments in [13]. However, further work may
be carried out to determine the actual duration for the business games.
To replace the adaptation of the membership functions by operations on type-2
fuzzy sets [198]. Type-2 fuzzy sets address the issues concerning uncertainty about
the value of the membership functions and it allows incorporating uncertainty
about the membership function into fuzzy set theory [199].
Also, the model can be applied for optimizing bidding in auctions and other areas
of economics such as trading.
This FGAW model may also be applied for pension negotiations in determining
what percentages the employers and employees should contribute toward their
pension pots.
This automatic decision system can also be extended to capture human activi-
ties where available data are mostly uncertain or fuzzy such as in meteorology or
weather forecasting and in designing embedded systems [200] for business enter-
prises.
Future work of this nature can also be channelled toward applications in robotics
which is an area in artificial intelligence that is concerned with the practical uses
of robots. A robot is a machine that is guided automatically and that is capable of
doing tasks on its own. One of the other major characteristics of a robot is that by
its movements or appearance, it often conveys a sense that it has intent or agency
of its own. Therefore, fuzzy logic concepts and game theory may be introduced to
integrate further intelligence into robots to enable them capture and grasp various
uncertain events in their movements.
Learning (training) of the fuzzy system will also help robot to learn in making bet-
ter decisions using fuzzy inference systems and also to deal with systems requiring
advanced decision making in unpredictable environments [201].
Also, future work may be carried out to test the system behaviour toward other
fuzzy inference techniques. In our model, we have used Mamdani-type fuzzy in-
ference system. However, there are other inference techniques that can be tested
on the system and evaluate its performance.
As explained in Section 3.6 (page 50), other popular common methods of deductive
inference for fuzzy systems [53] that can be tested on this model are:
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• Sugeno systems
• Tsukamoto models
Other areas of future work may also be channelled toward trying other optimiza-
tion algorithms on the system and evaluate the performance of the models. Other
optimization techniques that may be tried on the models are as suggested in Sec-
tion 3.7 (page 53) and Step 11 (page 68).
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